Liberastia : anatomie de notre suprémacisme

Liberastia : anatomie de notre suprémacisme

Nous insistons autant que faire se peut, à chaque occasion que nous donnent les événements ou la fortune de nos commentaires, sur l’idée que le fonctionnement pseudo-politique du “bloc BAO”, – UE et USA essentiellement, – s’appuie sur un jugement implicite et catégorique, sinon un trait psychologique inconscient qui irait jusqu’au mécanisme pavlovien, que nous désignons comme du suprématisme. (Voir notamment le 15 octobre 2013, le 4 juin 2014, le 28 juin 2014.) Il s’agit d’une variante perverse, prédatrice et dissolvante du racisme, basée non pas sur le constat de la différence d’avec “l’autre”, mais sur l’affirmation de sa propre et indiscutable supériorité sur n’importe quel “autre”. Une référence évidente dans l’esprit est le nazisme, mais le suprémacisme d’origine anglo-saxonne (avec sa variante américaniste), tel qu’il s’est développé à notre époque puisque c’est de lui dont il s’agit ici, écarte évidemment l’explication biologique au profit d’une explication à la fois communicationnelle et psychologique. Ce qu’on pourrait nommer s’il n’y avait la censure et l’autocensure la “race” anglo-saxonne élargie à l’occidentalisme, tout cela bien identifié historiquement et géographiquement, est opérationnalisée par les canaux de la communication (émetteur) et de la psychologie (récepteur). Ses arguments sont les “valeurs” qu’on connaît bien (démocratie, droitdel’hommisme, etc.), dont l’universalité selon notre interprétation à nous, – et à nous seuls, hein, – est un caractère absolu et non négociable. Au bout du compte, nous dit la logique, cela implique la liquidation des “autres” d’une façon ou d’une autre, par assimilation ou par... liquidation.

Nous nous retournons sur un article du 7 juin 2014, de Alexander Loukine, dans Russia in Global Affairs, sous le titre de «Chauvinism or Chaos?». (Loukine est directeur du Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies à l’Institut des Relations Internationales du ministère des affaires étrangères de la Fédération de Russie [MGIMO]). Le thème central de l’article de Loukine est de déterminer quelle devrait être la politique extérieure de la Russie, mais pour cela il doit d’abord définir le comportement de l’Ouest (notre bloc BAO). Fort justement, Loukine définit le bloc BAO comme totalement idéologisé et il propose les termes de “démocratisme”, ou liberastia pour définir le contenu “de communication” de cette idéologie, – dont le fondement est effectivement pour nous le suprématisme. Seul le dernier paragraphe de cette citation peut être contesté , parce qu’il n’est pas assez radicalisé et accorde trop d’importance à la géopolitique selon notre appréciation. (Nous reviendrons prochainement sur cette question.)

«The post-Soviet consensus was based on the mutual understanding with the West that both sides would move towards closer cooperation, respect each other’s interests and make mutual compromises. However, these conditions were met only by Russia. While not having fully given up its national interests, Russia was showing readiness to give up some of them for the sake of cooperation with the “civilized world” in order to become its part. However, despite numerous encouragements, the “civilized world” was thinking in Cold War terms and sincerely considering itself the winner. Having forgotten all of its promises (for example, not to enlarge NATO eastward), the West was trying to do what it had failed to do during the Cold War because of the Soviet resistance – it was incorporating more and more countries and territories and moving its military infrastructure closer to the Russian border, often doing so on the territory of Moscow’s historical allies.

»There are different explanations for this behavior. The Russian authorities believe that the real Western foreign policy is determined solely by geopolitical goals such as subordinating more countries and territories and becoming the only dominating force in the world (in a single-polar world) and uses different values such as democracy and human rights simply as a cover-up. This perception stems from the fact that most of the incumbent Russian leaders came from law enforcement services of the late Soviet period when only a few believed in the official communist ideology, which was in fact used as a front for real policy.

»In reality, however, the Western community is much more ideologized than Russian society. The West is virtually the only existing ideological empire in the world (in fact, communist China or Vietnam can hardly be seriously considered ideologized as ideology there is no more than just a ritual and even their leaders cannot state its communist essence). In the West, practically everyone believes in its ideology, it is imbibed from childhood in kindergarten, school, university, and then at work. This ideology of “democratism” (described quite well by Ilya Smirnov, who coined the term ‘liberastia’, in his book of the same name) is quite simple: Western society, albeit not ideal, is nevertheless more perfect than all the others, it is at the forefront of public progress, and the rest of the world should try to use the Western model as we know it. In principle, this is primitive cultural chauvinism which is characteristic of many nations and countries from small tribes to large civilizations which considered themselves the center of the Universe, and all the others were barbarians. What makes the modern West different from them is its size.

»The West’s foreign policy is based on this belief. The main vector of its foreign policy is determined, paradoxical as it may seem, by pragmatic-minded ideologists who think that the best way to incorporate all “barbaric” nations and countries into the world of “freedom and democracy” is to subordinate them to political influence through economic and political alliances. To achieve that, the reins of power in these countries should be in the hands of those who understand that they themselves can benefit from doing that (i.e. West-oriented forces) and they should be helped in every possible way. Even if these forces do not quite conform to “democratic” standards, it’s not a big problem. Let them get subordinated economically and politically first, and then they will be pulled to the required standards under the West’s influence. This explains why Europe has been so mild in rebuking Estonia and Latvia for the fact that a considerable part of the Russian-speaking people there has no civil rights. And although the real reasons for this shortsightedness are not made public, they do come to the surface from time to time. Germany’s independent 2008 Bertelsmann Foundation’s report on Estonia is quite noteworthy in this respect: “Estonia has never had any direct or indirect challenges to its democratization or transition to a market economy. There are no embedded social classes who might resist reform, since the communist era leveled society’s social structure. The military has also been firmly under civilian control and well integrated into NATO structures. Although Estonia’s ethnic cleavages remain serious, the restrictive citizenship policy has meant that Russians have much less political power, which otherwise might have enabled them to slow the pace of reform.” It states very clearly that Russians in Estonia are the only obstacle to westernization and it is for this reason that their rights had to be limited.

»This explains also why radical nationalists in Ukraine remain unnoticed: they are the ones who are acting toward progress and from the historical point of view they can be justified and some of their crimes can even be overlooked (as was the case with Kosovar nationalists and the Croatian army in Serbian Krajina, etc.). It’s worth mentioning how Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, reacted by condemning the attempt to storm the Ukrainian parliament building by Right Sector militants after the anti-Russian opposition had come to power, even though she had basically supported their similar actions when “the bad guys” who were not fully committed to the EU had a majority in the Verkhovna Rada. At the same time, the crimes committed by the forces of regress must be exposed and condemned in full.

»There are also idealists among ideologists in the West who say that it’s bad to befriend even “progressive” dictators and who try to criticize “their own guys” and the authorities for sidetracking from the ideals of “democratism”. But they make no political decisions, they are considered impractical office dreamers who get in the way of real business. As a result, the drive for global geopolitical control gets mixed with ideological goals, and it’s hard to say whichever comes first...

Mis en ligne le 2 juillet 2014 à à 08H15