Don Rumsfeld et William S. Lind, même pensée ?

On peut difficilement faire du secrétaire à la défense Rumsfeld et de l’expert “dissident”, promoteur du concept de la “guerre de quatrième génération” (G4G) William S. Lind, des personnalités proches par les conceptions. D’où la surprise de les voir se rencontrer, selon certaines interprétations, sur un point fondamental d’analyse stratégique.

Lind développe depuis quelque temps l’idée que les forces US en Irak sont dans une position difficile, qui peut devenir tragique dans certaines circonstances (une attaque de l’Iran par les USA, une riposte de l’Iran). Dans son plus récent (11 août) article, Lind compare la position du corps expéditionnaire US à une sorte de Stalingrad des sables potentiel, d’autant plus si la faiblesse d’Israël se confirme , affaiblissant à mesure la protection du flanc de l’armée US. Son idée est bien la menace d’un possible anéantissement de ce corps, comme l’armée de Von Paulus à Stalingrad :

«To the region, America's apparently unconditional and unbounded support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq are part of the same picture. For a military historian, the question arises: will history see Iraq as America's Stalingrad? If we kick the analogy up a couple of levels, to the strategic and grand strategic, there are parallels. Both the German and the American armies were able largely to take, but not hold, the objective. Both had too few troops. Both Berlin and Washington underestimated their enemy's ability to counterattack. Both committed resources they needed elsewhere and could not replace to a strategically unimportant objective. Finally, both entrusted their flanks to weak allies – and to luck.

»Let us hope that, unlike von Paulus, our commanders know when to get out, regardless of orders from a leader who will not recognize reality.»

On imaginerait qu’un officiel de l’administration GW comme le “super-dur” qu’est Rumsfeld rejette évidemment une telle hypothèse stratégique impliquant la possibilité d’une telle faiblesse stratégique des USA. La surprise est bien que, d’après des remarques rapportées par Seymour Hersh le 14 août, ce pourrait être exactement le contraire.

Hersh note : « Some current and former intelligence officials who were interviewed for this article believe that Rumsfeld disagrees with Bush and Cheney about the American role in the war between Israel and Hezbollah. The U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel said that “there was a feeling that Rumsfeld was jaded in his approach to the Israeli war.” He added, “Air power and the use of a few Special Forces had worked in Afghanistan, and he tried to do it again in Iraq. It was the same idea, but it didn’t work. He thought that Hezbollah was too dug in and the Israeli attack plan would not work, and the last thing he wanted was another war on his shift that would put the American forces in Iraq in greater jeopardy.”

» A Western diplomat said that he understood that Rumsfeld did not know all the intricacies of the war plan. “He is angry and worried about his troops” in Iraq, the diplomat said. Rumsfeld served in the White House during the last year of the war in Vietnam, from which American troops withdrew in 1975, “and he did not want to see something like this having an impact in Iraq.” Rumsfeld’s concern, the diplomat added, was that an expansion of the war into Iran could put the American troops in Iraq at greater risk of attacks by pro-Iranian Shiite militias. »

Mis en ligne le 14 août 2006 à 10H01