La “bombe Petraeus” vue par Bacevich

La “bombe Petraeus” vue par Bacevich

Parmi les réactions à l’audition devant le Congrès, le 16 mars, du général Petraeus (voir notre F&C du 16 mars 2010), on notera celle de Andrew C. Bacevich. L’homme est connu et honorable. Aujourd’hui historien et commentateur, il fit une carrière dans l’U.S. Army, qu’il quitta au début des années 1990 avec le grade de colonel. Opposant déterminé de la guerre en Irak et de la politique qui va avec, le commentaire et le travail de Bacevich sont soulignés par une tragédie personnelle, la mort, en 2006, au combat en Irak justement, de son fils, capitaine de l’U.S. Army.

Dans un article publié le 17 mars 2010 sur Salon.com, Bacevich analyse les déclarations de Petraeus (essentiellement, le fameux passage sur le “conflit” israélo-palestinien) et leurs significations. Il juge qu’elles représentent, encore plus qu’une analyse stratégique, la marque d’une évolution de l’état d’esprit aux USA vis-à-vis de l’influence d’Israël au travers, notamment, de son lobby AIPAC.

«This much is certain, however: Gen. Petraeus, easily the most influential U. S. officer on active duty, has discovered the Holy Land. And his discovery is likely to discomfit those Americans committed to the proposition that the United States and Israel face the same threats and are bound together by identical interests.

»With regard to the plight of the Palestinians, Petraeus says that this is emphatically not the case. Here, he believes, U. S. and Israeli interests diverge – sharply and perhaps irreconcilably.

»In a lengthy statement offered to the Armed Services Committee earlier this week, Petraeus ticked off a long list of problems in his AOR – AfPak, Iran, Iraq, Yemen – and then turned to what he called the “root causes of instability.” Ranking as item No. 1 on his list was this: “insufficient progress toward a comprehensive Middle East peace."”…

»“The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests in the AOR. Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations. The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and other militant groups exploit that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas.”

»These judgments are not exactly novel. Indeed, they are commonplace, even if they remain in some quarters hotly contested. What is striking is that Petraeus, hardly a political naif, should have endorsed them – and that he chose to do so at a moment when U. S.-Israeli relations are especially fraught.

»What are we to make of this?

»It seems increasingly clear that a thoroughgoing reappraisal of the U. S.-Israeli strategic partnership is in the offing. Much of the credit (or, if you prefer, blame) for that prospect belongs to John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, authors of the famous (or infamous) tract “The Israel Lobby.”

»Whatever that book's shortcomings, its appearance in 2007 injected into discussions of U.S.-Israeli relations a candor that that had been previously absent. Convictions that had been out of bounds now became legitimate subjects for discussion. Prejudices were transformed into mere opinions.

»Out of this candor has come a rolling reassessment, with the ultimate outcome by no means clear. That David Petraeus, hitherto not known to be an anti-Semite, has implicitly endorsed one of Mearsheimer and Walt's core findings – questioning whether the United States should view Israel as a strategic asset – constitutes further evidence that something important is afoot…»

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