La catastrophe US (et cool, comme BHO) au Moyen-Orient

La catastrophe US (et cool, comme BHO) au Moyen-Orient

Un excellent rapport de McClatchy.News a paru le 20 juillet 2013 sur le rôle général des USA au Moyen-Orient, particulièrement pour ce qui concerne leurs relations avec leurs alliés arabes et la situation de ces derniers.. Ce rapport général confortera certainement ceux qui jugent que la “stratégie profonde” des USA est d’instaurer le désordre partout (par conséquent, au Moyen-Orient et ailleurs également, y compris et même surtout aux USA, de Washington à Detroit).

Cette conception d’une “stratégie profonde” (le qualificatif “profonde” est magique dans ce cas, pour donner du crédit à la thèse), consistant à dire qu’on organise le contraire de ce que sa politique voudrait qu’on organise comme ruse suprême et gagnante, est un modèle déjà utilisé, usé et, dirait-on, authentifié par les événements. Il fut utilisé dans les années 1980 (et est encore ressorti à telle ou telle occasion) pour qualifier la politique de l’URSS (Gorbatchev) à partir de 1985 comme une ruse suprême du KGB, consistant à organiser la liquidation de la puissance de l’URSS, d’abord par ses satellites abandonnant le communisme sous la poussée de Gorbatchev, puis abandonnant le communisme au terme de la bataille Gorbatchev-Eltsine, puis livrant le pays à l’encan du capitalisme sauvage US, pour faire croire que l’URSS (Russie entretemps) n’était plus l’ennemi principal, – pour, enfin, mieux frapper l’Occident ainsi “endormie”. Effectivement, le complet effondrement d’une puissance est le meilleur moyen de faire croire à l’ennemi que cette puissance n’existe plus, – ruse suprême de l’inversion, dire et faire le vrai pour faire passer la ruse... D’un plus grand intérêt que de juger la justesse rationnelle de cette analyse, par exemple au vu des événements actuels, est de juger la psychologie de ceux qui développent cette sorte de théories.

Faudrait-il ranger le témoignage du général Dempsey devant le Sénat dans la catégorie de cette “stratégie profonde” ? Après avoir déclaré que les militaires travaillaient à la demande de l’administration sur l’option d’une intervention en Syrie comme ils le font d’une façon continue sans que l’administration ne le leur demande, lors d’une précédente audition (voir le Guardian du 19 juillet), provoquant ainsi un renouveau de spéculations d’une attaque US tandis que le monde (et la Russie, ce qui donnerait une piètre appréciation de sa diplomatie) avait paraît-il son attention sollicitée par la crise Snowden/USA, Dempsey est revenu hier sur le sujet (Guardian, du 23 juin 2013). Jamais le président du comité des chefs d’état-major des forces armées n’a pris une position aussi défavorable à cette option, s’adressant à des sénateurs de la commission des forces armées qui ont récemment appelé à une invasion de la Syrie. Encore de la “stratégie profonde”...

«The top US military officer warned senators on Monday that taking military action to stop the bloodshed in Syria was likely to escalate quickly and result in "unintended consequences", representing the most explicit uniformed opposition to deeper involvement in another war in the Middle East.

»Alluding to the costly, bloody occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, said that once the US got involved militarily in the Syrian civil war, which the UN estimates to have killed about 93,000 people, “deeper involvement is hard to avoid”. “We have learned from the past 10 years, however, that it is not enough to simply alter the balance of military power without careful consideration of what is necessary in order to preserve a functioning state,” Dempsey wrote to senators John McCain and Carl Levin on Monday. “We must anticipate and be prepared for the unintended consequences of our action.’»

On peut ainsi revenir à l’analyse de McClatchy.News. Malgré les très épisodiques poussées de fièvre belliqueuse de l’administration Obama à l’encontre de la Syrie, qui sont pure posture de circonstance pour la plus minable tactique intérieure à laquelle se résume toute sa politique, le rapport de McClatchy.News montre que la politique de cette administration en Syrie, en Égypte et ailleurs, malgré les manipulations et plans machiavéliques sans nombre, est fondamentalement organisatrice d’un désordre qui touche spécifiquement et presque exclusivement les amis des USA. (Entretemps, Assad se renforce, comme le britannique Cameron le reconnaît lui-même, ce 21 juillet 2013, encore dans le Guardian.) L’analyse de McClatchy.News montre que la politique d’Obama au Moyen-Orient concerne “les marges” des citations réelles, c’est-à-dire en aucun cas leur réalité profonde (encore ce qualificatif). Disons qu'il s'agit de la version cool, type-BHO, de la “stratégie profonde”, – profonde sur les marges... L'analyse de McCltachy vaut ample citation, étant elle-même basée sur des citations d’experts venant d’instituts du Moyen-Orient très proches des USA et du bloc BAO, puisqu'il s'agit d'extension d'instituts US et britannique dans des pays amis du bloc bAO..

«Some of America’s closest Middle East allies, viewing U.S. policy as adrift, are competing for influence in the region’s trouble spots, producing discord that might get in the way of stable outcomes and take decades to put right, experts in the region say. Analysts blame the Obama administration, which they say still doesn’t have a strategy to deal with the aftershocks of the 2011 Arab Spring – in particular the war in Syria and Egypt’s latest political upheaval. Instead, the U.S. aim appears to be to “contain” the crises and manage them at the margins, they say.

»“We are in a situation where the United States doesn’t want to lead. It has quite an effect on the region,” said Salman Shaikh of the Brookings Institution in Doha, Qatar. In its place, regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar are devising their own policies, but without coordination and often with different aims, he said. “The Gulf states and the Turks thought they would own the Syrian problem in the early period of the uprising,” said Emile Hokayem, a Bahrain-based analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies who’s just written a book about the Syrian war. “Then they realized the limits of their power and begged for U.S. leadership, figuring the U.S. could harmonize the various approaches toward Syria and de-conflict them.” But the United States wants only to manage the Middle East crises “at the margins,” he said. Both men spoke in telephone interviews.

»The discord is on display in both Syria and Egypt. Saudi Arabia recently upstaged Qatar and helped force a shakeup in the leadership of the internationally recognized Syrian Opposition Coalition, displacing the power of delegates from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood by adding liberal secular Syrians. The coalition was created last year at the behest of the United States to become a government in exile, prepared to step in should President Bashar Assad fall. But the U.S. has provided no funds to the group – State Department officials have told McClatchy they think the coalition is too unstable to be counted on to spend the money wisely – and senior members of the coalition say the United States gives widely inconsistent advice and doesn’t follow through on its pledges of support. [...]

»The Saudis and the Qataris have pursued distinctly different approaches to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and Egypt; the Saudis fear the Brotherhood as a pan-Arab movement determined to undermine the region’s monarchies, whereas Qatar sees the Brotherhood more opportunistically as a force that will bring results, Hokayem said.

»The clearest example may be in Egypt. The Saudis refused to send financial support to the government of former President Mohammed Morsi, who rose to prominence through the Brotherhood. But Qatar committed $8 billion in aid and material support, and Turkey, governed by the Justice and Development Party, the Turkish equivalent of the Brotherhood, pledged $2 billion. Days after the Egyptian military overthrew Morsi early this month, the Saudis stepped in with $5 billion in various forms of aid for the military-backed interim government, and the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait added another $7 billion.

»The Persian Gulf countries can provide “some legitimacy, some regional cover” to the military for overthrowing Morsi, “but they don’t have the strategic vision, the expertise . . . the democratic vision that would lead to an inclusive political scene in Egypt,“ Hokayem said, “preferring one side over the other.” “In their competition and their machinations, the regional players are making a mess of it,” Shaikh said. “They should have come together with a series of actions to stabilize the country. But we’re not in that situation. The simple fact is that the Emiratis, the Kuwaitis . . . jumped on the chance to do one over on the guys that the Turks and the Qataris were supporting.”

»Since Morsi was toppled July 3, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his senior aides have called almost daily for Morsi’s reinstatement, leading Egypt’s new rulers to issue a diplomatic protest. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Turkey and the United Arab Emirates and Turkey “are huge,” Hokayem said. Shaikh predicted that the competition “in the end of the day will come back to haunt them,” for an unstable Egypt “is not good for any of them.” [...]

»But the country that’s suffering the most from what Shaikh calls a policy “that is adrift” is Syria, where the country’s civil war has claimed more than 100,000 lives on both sides. A leading figure in the opposition coalition’s new Saudi-backed civilian leadership says the U.S. has “a policy of vagueness.”

»In principle, the United States backs the coalition, said Fayez Sara, a writer and journalist who’s now a member of the coalition’s political committee. However, he said, “until now, no money has been received from the U.S.” When the U.S. offers advice, “it is inconsistent,” he said in an interview. “In the morning, they say, ‘Unite.’ In the afternoon, it’s ‘Fight terror groups.’ In the evening, they say, ‘Work for a political settlement with the regime.’ ”

»He said there was a contradiction in the U.S. message, which declared on one hand that “Assad must go” and on the other demands of Assad’s opponents that “You have to arrive at some sort of agreement with him.” Sara says that when he points this out to U.S. officials, he receives different responses. Some say, “You’re right,” and others “just walk away,” he said. The Americans have, “for now, abandoned the Syrian situation to its fate,” he said. “They will not take on the political or moral responsibility. They may come back to it. But it will be much more difficult when they do.”

Hokayemsaid the Obama administration had defined its policies in the region in terms of avoiding another Iraq. But Syria “has already overtaken Iraq” in terms of its humanitarian, regional and strategic significance, he said. “Syria is going to be the defining issue of the decade” in the region, he said, and the Obama administration may soon get the “worst of both worlds.” “We’re going to see an Assad surviving in a weakened fashion, more dependent on Iran and Hezbollah, with no strategic gain,” Hokayem said. There will be “a range of radical groups, whose identity we don’t know, which will be very difficult to contain.” Shaikh agreed. “I don’t think we’ve got a grip on this,” he said. “The legacy of that is quite, quite devastating in the future.”»

Mis en ligne le 23 juillet 2013 à 07H19