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1257Le Calendrier des Mayas avait-il prévu le “Fiscal Cliff” ? Question à $64.000, qui concerne la psychologie de l’hyperpuissance réduite aux acquêts des jeux stériles du paralytique en phase terminale qu’est devenu l’appareil du pouvoir washingtonien. Les articles sur le déclin accéléré de la puissance US abondent en ces jours de panique tranquille, à ce point où l’on peut vous dire que, quoi qu’il arrive à Washington d’ici mardi, et même aujourd’hui peut-être, – qu’importe, le mal est fait déjà, et l’on entend déjà le tsunami de sarcasmes qui accueillerait un accord de dernière minute, dont nul ne douterait qu’il ne servirait qu’à donner un peu de temps à chacun des deux “partenaires” pour trahir l’autre et revenir sur ses engagements.
L’humeur de Pentagone est crépusculaire, Hagel ou pas Hagel, et séquestration ou pas séquestration. Un article de Mackenzie Eaglen, ce 28 décembre 2012, sur le site AOL Defense, dresse un tableau catastrophique de la situation de la puissance militaire des USA. Eaglen, membre du conseil d’administration de l’éditeur de ce site très influent, vient de l’American Economic Institute
«…Still, some brass are clinging to the hope that they may not have to revise the January document in light of sequestration – if it occurs. But even casual observers know that the guidance issued before the 2013 budget simply did not add up. The long-standing strategy-resource mismatch was never before so rawly exposed as with the latest guidance and subsequent budget.
»The pivot was so powerless that senior Navy officials were repeatedly called over to the White House throughout the Presidential election season to explain, re-explain, and then explain again how and why the Administration was pivoting to Asia yet shrinking and aging both the Navy and Air Force.
»Regardless of whatever window dressing is used to pitch any new strategy if needed, the bottom line is that it will force the U.S. military to abandon for good its long-standing two-war construct to one that looks more like the defense posture of the rest of the world.
»The two-war construct, as imprecise a measurement as it was, provided a basis of comparison against which to assess American hard power. The ability to fight and win in two major engagements at once proved to be a reasonable approximation of the forces necessary to maintain a military with global reach and responsibilities. The official death of this standard means that America will not be able to do as much around the world because of increased strain on shrinking forces.
»It would seem the newest report by the intelligence community predicting the U.S. will lose its superpower status will turn out to be quite accurate, unfortunately.»
Mis en ligne le 28 décembre 2012 à 17H18