Quand la CIA écrivait un discours pour Kadhafi

Quand la CIA écrivait un discours pour Kadhafi

Effectivement, c’étaient en quelque sorte “les temps bénis des colonies”, du temps de la coopération intense, voire parfois amicale, entre deux des principaux services du bloc BAO, la CIA américaniste et le MI6 britannique, et le régime libyen du colonel Kadhafi… Un long article du New York Times du 2 septembre 2011 détaille le contenu d’un certain nombre de documents découverts dans les bureaux de la direction des services de renseignement libyens. Il semble que leur authenticité soit assurée ; si le MI6 a refusé le moindre commentaire, la CIA, sous la forme d’une déclaration d’une des porte-paroles de l’agence, Jennifer Youngblood, n’a pas fait de commentaire direct à propos explicitement des documents mais un commentaire général particulièrement rassurant : «It can’t come as a surprise that the Central Intelligence Agency works with foreign governments to help protect our country from terrorism and other deadly threats.»

Divers sujets sont couverts par ces documents, qui remontent à 2002 alors qu’on pensait que cette coopération n’avait débuté qu’en 2004, lorsque Kadhafi a annoncé son intention d’abandonner le développement d’armes de destruction massive. La “preuve”, dira-t-on, c’est que la CIA avait elle-même rédigé un discours, selon les formes les plus précises de l’apparat du colonel Kadhafi, pour justement annoncer cette décision, et qu’elle lui avait fait parvenir à la Noël 2003.

«The documents cover 2002 to 2007, with many of them concentrated in late 2003 and 2004, when Moussa Koussa was head of the External Security Organization. (Mr. Koussa was most recently Libya’s foreign minister.)

»The speech that appears to have been drafted for Colonel Qaddafi was found in the C.I.A. folder and appears to have been sent just before Christmas in 2003. The one-page speech seems intended to depict the Libyan dictator in a positive light. It concluded, using the revolutionary name for the Libyan government: “At a time when the world is celebrating the birth of Jesus, and as a token of our contributions towards a world full of peace, security, stability and compassion, the Great Jamhariya presents its honest call for a W.M.D.-free zone in the Middle East,” referring to weapons of mass destruction.»

Bien entendu, les documents exposent en détails la principale activité de “coopération”, qui était de transférer vers les “interrogateurs” libyens des prisonniers plus ou moins suspectés d’être des membres de telle ou telle organisation pas très bien vue. On retrouve également les traces de nombres de membres du LIFG (Libyan Islamic Fighter Group), qui forme un bon tiers des forces rebelles et qui a largement participé à la bataille contre Kadhafi, et que la CIA soupçonnait alors, et sans la moindre hésitation, d’avoir des liens avec al Qaïda ; de même trouve-t-on la trace de l’“odyssée” de Abdulhakim Belhadj, alias Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq, désormais chef militaire de Tripoli dont il a conduit l’assaut.

«One document in the C.I.A. binder said operatives were “in a position to deliver Shaykh Musa to your physical custody, similar to what we have done with other senior L.I.F.G. members in the recent past.” The reference was to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, which was dedicated to the overthrow of Colonel Qaddafi, and which American officials believed had ties to Al Qaeda.

»When Libyans asked to be sent Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq, another member of the group, a case officer wrote back on March 4, 2004, that “we are committed to developing this relationship for the benefit of both our services,” and promised to do their best to locate him, according to a document in the C.I.A. binder. Two days later, an officer faxed the Libyans to say that Mr. Sadiq and his pregnant wife were planning to fly into Malaysia, and the authorities there agreed to put them on a British Airways flight to London that would stop in Bangkok. “We are planning to take control of the pair in Bangkok and place them on our aircraft for a flight to your country,” the case officer wrote.

»Mr. Bouckaert of Human Rights Watch said he had learned from the documents that Sadiq was a nom de guerre for Abdel Hakim Belhaj, who is now a military leader for the rebels. In an interview on Wednesday, Mr. Belhaj gave a detailed description of his incarceration that matched many of those in the documents. He also said that when he was held in Bangkok he was tortured by two people from the C.I.A…»

Pour poursuivre la nomenclature, on observera que l’un ou l’autre service ne dédaignait nullement d’accomplir des missions pour les Libyens sur son propre territoire, comme le MI6 informant les services libyens de l’identité et des activités de telle personne, habitant à Londres et y travaillant. On a également des échos de la concurrence et de la méfiance régnant également entre MI6 et CIA, lorsqu’il s’agissait de s’assurer de la coopération libyenne.

«While questioning alleged terror group members plainly had value to Western intelligence, the cooperation went beyond that. In one case, for example, the Libyans asked operatives to trace a phone number for them, and a document that was in the MI-6 binder replied that it belonged to the Arab News Network in London. It is unclear why the Libyans sought who the phone number belonged to.

»The document also suggested signs of agency rivalries over Libya. In the MI-6 binder, a document boasted of having turned over someone named Abu Abd Alla to the Libyans. “This was the least we could do for you to demonstrate the remarkable relationship we have built over recent years,” an unsigned fax in 2004 said. “Amusingly, we got a request from the Americans to channel requests for information from Abu Abd through the Americans. I have no intention of doing any such thing.”»

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