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16 novembre 2004 — Parmi les nombreuses analyses qui ont été faites sur l’avenir des Etats-Unis dans un second mandat Bush, celle du Dr. Michael A. Weinstein du 12 novembre, pour PINR (The Power and Interest News Report), nous paraît particulièrement bien argumentée et judicieuse.
Weinstein n’est pas très optimiste. Il embrasse bien les possibilités des quatre prochaines années à la lumière d’un fait complètement fondamental, qui échappe encore à nombre d’analystes : l’impasse où se trouve une politique extérieure hégémoniste et belliciste après que les récents événements, notamment l’Irak, aient mis en évidence les limites dramatiques de la puissance américaine (tant militaire que diplomatique). Il est évident que la mise en échec de la puissance américaine constitue un blocage complet de cette politique, qui n’existe qu’en fonction de cette puissance. (Il est évident également que nos analystes et fonctionnaires européens mettront un certain temps avant de comprendre, puis d’admettre que la puissance américaine n’est pas ce phénomène invincible et d’un autre monde qu’ils ont vénéré jusqu’ici.)
Sa conclusion mérite d’être méditée, d’autant qu’elle introduit une autre image absolument sacrilège, toujours pour les mêmes analystes et fonctionnaires européens, d’une Amérique passant de l’ambition impériale de l’ “hyper-puissance” au statut de « dominant regional power with some global reach ». Voici cette conclusion, avant de lire le texte de Weinstein ci-dessous.
« As Washington drifts, the rest of the world will test it, probing for weaknesses. Under steady pressure from many sides, the Bush administration will be drawn toward retrenchment, retreat and eventually retraction in international affairs. The scenario of American empire has faded into memory and the prospect that the U.S. will eventually become a dominant regional power with some global reach becomes more probable. »
By Michael A. Weinstein, PINR, 12 November 2004
Geostrategic decisions made by states and international organizations can be traced primarily to the efforts of their ruling groups to pursue their perceived interests. As a rule, the policies that have been adopted and adapted over time to satisfy persisting interests take precedence over shifts in public opinion. Yet — especially in democracies — popular sentiment influences decision makers, reinforcing or weakening pre-established tendencies. Elections are the most important vehicles for popular sentiment because they establish the constituencies on which leaders depend for their support.
The recent U.S. presidential election, which gave George W. Bush a second term, reinforces the loss of clear direction in the country's foreign policy that had already become manifest after the limits of U.S. military and diplomatic power were revealed by the occupation of Iraq. The failures of the Iraq intervention have left Washington without a strategic doctrine to replace the neo-conservative vision of employing preemptive warfare to eliminate rogue states and create demonstration projects in democracy that would eventually provide the impetus for realizing a world of market democracies.
A victory by John Kerry would have opened the possibility for the renewal of a multilateralist policy in which the United States would lead broad alliances through consultation and compromise. A second Bush administration makes a return to multilateralism much less likely, although it remains an alternative that will probably be pursued in fits and starts. The dominant trend will be retreat to ad hoc responses to the pressure of events as the administration tries to find its way to a new strategic paradigm in a world presenting increasing threats to U.S. interests.
A Divided Society
The presidential vote starkly confirmed the divisions in the U.S. electorate that had crystallized in the 2000 election. The electoral map, broken down by counties, showed Kerry's support to be concentrated in urban areas on the two coasts and the upper midwest, and Bush's to repose in the rest of the country. Bush defeated Kerry by 57 to 42 percent in small towns and rural areas, and by 52 to 47 percent in the suburbs. In contrast, Kerry won cities with more than 50,000 people by 54 to 45 percent.
The exit-poll data were even more telling. Of the 19 percent of voters who named terrorism the major issue in the election, 86 percent chose Bush, whereas of the 15 percent who named Iraq as the major issue, 73 percent voted for Kerry. The divide on security and foreign policy was overlaid by splits on economic and social issues, with 80 percent of those naming jobs and the economy as the key issue supporting Kerry, and 80 percent of those naming moral values as the key issue favoring Bush. The sides were relatively equally balanced: Bush won 51 percent of the vote and Kerry 48 percent.
Analysts have explained the narrow Bush majority, which he had failed to gain in 2000, by partially overlapping constituent interests in security (there had been no repeat of the September 11 attacks) and social issues (the Republicans had been able to mobilize the faith-based social conservative vote). Those concerns shifted the balance in Bush's favor, but they did not alter significantly the underlying division in the country, which is rooted fundamentally in social identification.
Beneath the superficial divides between urban and rural, and secular and religious sectors is the familiar modern tension between cosmopolitanism and provincialism. Translated into political terms, the Kerry vote, especially its middle-class component, was internationalist and the Bush vote was nationalist. That difference was epitomized in the campaign by Bush's effort to convince voters that Kerry would impose a ''global test'' on decisions to pursue U.S. interests, and Kerry's argument that renewed cooperation with allies would be necessary in order to achieve desired security.
The nationalist tendency of the Bush constituency places an obstacle in the way of any future moves toward multilateralism, which would not have been there had Kerry won. A shift toward multilateralism in a second Bush administration would have to overcome nationalist sentiment rather than be bolstered by internationalist sentiment, as a Kerry administration would have been. A Republican congress that is dependent upon the same constituencies that elected Bush will limit his administration's flexibility. Depending on the course of events, opportunities might open up for multilateral initiatives, but they will face the difficulty of being perceived as reversals of policy. The election is apt to blunt the consistency and cloud the clarity of U.S. foreign and security policy. With the probable eclipse of neo-conservative influence, nationalist sentiment has no policy expression, leaving the administration in a policy void.
Adverse Conditions
A popular support base that is conditioned to accept and affirm the moribund neo-conservative paradigm is only one added factor in an array of persisting conditions that impedes the administration's ability to change direction in order to pursue U.S. interests more effectively. The list of constraints on an active international posture and a corresponding pull toward retraction and reactivity to challenges initiated elsewhere includes the need for Washington to continue dealing with the aftermath of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the likelihood that other great and regional powers will exploit the policy void to test U.S. vulnerabilities throughout the world, the overhang of a renewal of Islamic revolutionary military action on U.S. territory, and a complex of economic problems, notably the federal budget deficit, but also the possibility of resource scarcity leading to higher prices for raw materials, particularly energy, and political and military conflict over supplies. Each of those conditions limits Washington's discretion; together, they dispose Washington to caution, indecision and sporadic bursts of reaction.
The persistence of insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, which has hampered rebuilding efforts in both countries and blocked their emergence as credible democracies, diverts U.S. resources and attention from other interests and — as long as progress is slow or nonexistent — sends the message that Washington remains vulnerable. The recent election of Hamid Karzai to Afghanistan's presidency has not changed that country's political situation; power outside Kabul remains in the hands of warlords, the drug trade remains the major support of the country's economy, and the Taliban insurgency continues. In Iraq, Washington counts on elections in January 2005 for a constitutional assembly to provide legitimacy for the state-building process, but at present that goal seems unlikely to be achieved. Washington for the foreseeable future will be tied down managing the consequences of its earlier interventions. If Washington decides to retreat — more likely from Iraq than from Afghanistan — its loss of power will be confirmed, encouraging other powers to test its resolve elsewhere.
Only in the unlikely case that Washington manages to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq in the short term will other powers think twice about probing U.S. vulnerabilities. In South America, Brazil will attempt to secure a foothold for the Mercosur customs union and beat back Washington's efforts to extend the N.A.F.T.A. formula south. In East Asia, China will push for regional hegemony and is likely to put pressure on Taiwan and to try to draw Southeast Asian states into its sphere of influence. Beijing can also be expected to drag its feet on North Korean denuclearization and to continue to oppose sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program. Russia will attempt to increase its influence over the states on its periphery that were formerly Soviet republics. Moscow will try to strengthen ties in Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and Eastern Europe (Belarus and Ukraine), and to fend off Washington's inroads into those areas. The European Union, with the Franco-German combine at its heart, will continue its moves to assimilate its Eastern European members and extend its sphere of influence to the entire Mediterranean basin through trade agreements. In each of these regions, Washington will face tests leading to the possibility of an overload of challenges and a decreased likelihood that any one of them will be handled with sufficient attention and resources.
Within the general scenario, Islamic revolution remains a disturbing factor. If there is another major attack within the United States, Washington's security policy will fall into disarray and the population will suffer a traumatic loss of confidence that will adversely affect the economy and will open the possibility of a legitimation crisis or a burst of ultra-nationalism. Even if there is not another event like the September 11 attacks, homeland security and the international adjustments that are necessary to serve it will divert attention and resources from other challenges.
The geostrategic constraints on Washington are exacerbated by the financial limits posed by the budget deficit and the possibilities of a precipitous decline in the dollar and rising raw materials prices. How much the United States will be able to spend to protect the interests perceived by its leaders remains an open question. It is widely acknowledged that post-war nation building has been underfunded in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that major increases in expenditures are unlikely. Most generally, Washington is faced with the choice of rebuilding U.S. power or slowly retreating to an undisputed regional power base in North America. It is not clear that the Bush administration will have the resolve or the resources to rebuild its military and intelligence apparatus, and restore its alliance structure.
During the first term of George W. Bush, Washington was the initiator in world affairs, attempting to carry through a unilateralist program that, if successful, would have made the United States a permanent superpower protecting globalized capitalism to its advantage. In Bush's second term, Washington will primarily be a responder, because it is mired in the failures of the unilateralist thrust. The image of decisive military superiority has been replaced by a sense of U.S. limitations, and massive budget surpluses have given way to the prospect of continued large deficits.
Reinforcing Factors from the Election
As the Bush administration attempts to deal with persisting problems resulting in great part from actions taken during the President's first term, it will face difficulties that follow from the need to satisfy the constituencies that made for the Republican victory. The election confirmed that the American public does not share a consensus on foreign policy and, indeed, is polarized. It is also polarized on economic and social issues, along similar axes, creating a situation in which any new policies proposed by the administration are likely to be met with domestic opposition and at the very least partial support.
Besides being a drag on foreign policy initiatives, polarization also affects Washington's international posture by the attention and commitment that the administration will have to give to the domestic battles that it will fight in congress in order to push a legislative agenda that will satisfy its constituencies. During his campaign and in his post-election press conference, Bush committed his administration to ambitious policy initiatives to take steps in the direction of privatizing Social Security and to reform the tax code radically. Both of those plans, along with tort reform and extension of tax cuts, will generate fierce conflicts in congress and quickly exhaust the President's ''political capital'' available to win support on other issues. The vision of an ''ownership society,'' in which government regulations and entitlements are dismantled or scaled back is the domestic equivalent of neo-conservative foreign policy; it is a utopian view with little chance of success. If the administration seriously pursues its plans, it will be preoccupied domestically and, consequently, will devote less attention to world affairs.
Focus on domestic politics will be increased by the need to satisfy social conservative constituencies by appointing judges favorable to their positions on ''moral values.'' Here again, there will be strong opposition if appointments are perceived by Democrats and moderate Republicans as too ideologically favorable to the religious right. Protracted battles over judgeships — whether successful or not — would further diminish Bush's political capital for foreign policy initiatives by heating up partisanship.
It is possible that the administration will not pursue its agenda aggressively and will seek compromises, but that is not likely because of pressures within the Republican Party. The same constituencies that voted in Bush elected a Republican congress, and its members face reelection contests and the consequent need to satisfy their bases. Since Bush cannot serve a third term, Republican officeholders can no longer depend on his popularity to help carry them to victory. They also do not have a unifying leader with a political strategy to coordinate diverse constituencies.
The combination of the lame-duck effect and the strategy void will drive Republicans to depend on their particular constituencies and press their claims assertively. The administration will be under pressure to push its domestic agenda vigorously at the same time that the various Republican factions fight for control of the party and Democrats move to exploit any weaknesses that appear. It is likely that Republican loyalty to Bush will be strained, further decreasing the administration's latitude and forcing it to bargain for support. The Republican majority is less solid than it might seem on the surface and includes factions that are at odds with administration foreign policy.
Conclusion
Persistent and emerging political conditions all point in the direction of drift and reactivity in U.S. foreign and security policy — the election has intensified tendencies that were already present. There is little chance that a new security doctrine will be created in the short term and that a coherent political strategy will inform Republican politics. Lack of public consensus will inhibit foreign policy initiatives, whether unilateralist or multilateralist. Washington's operative foreign policy is likely to be damage control.
As Washington drifts, the rest of the world will test it, probing for weaknesses. Under steady pressure from many sides, the Bush administration will be drawn toward retrenchment, retreat and eventually retraction in international affairs. The scenario of American empire has faded into memory and the prospect that the U.S. will eventually become a dominant regional power with some global reach becomes more probable.
[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit être lu avec la mention classique à l'esprit, — “Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.”.]
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