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1919On sait bien que pour nous, le concept d’antiSystème est d’une rationalisation extrêmement ferme et simple (“tout ce qui est contre le Système, visant à détruire le Système ou à l'aider à s'autodétruire”) et d’une opérationnalisation extrêmement fluide, changeante, parfois énigmatique, très souvent surprenante ; il est, l’antiSystème, sauf pour les rares psychologies qui s’y sont accrochées fermes parce qu’elles savent que là seulement se trouve aujourd’hui le combat qui compte, complètement insaisissable dans sa course, complètement insoucieux des alliances, des lois de la géopolitique, des intérêts financiers et des complots (sans aucun doute réels) sans fin et sans nombre, et il ne cherche à se fixer que sur ce qui, à l’instant présent, fera le plus de tort au Système. Il ne pouvait faire aucun doute que la venue fracassante d’une sorte d’“électron libre” de cette taille si gigantesque qu’est Donald Trump ne pouvait qu’engendrer des conséquences extrêmes, des dé-rangements formidables complètement imprévus suivis de nouveaux rangements colossaux complètement inattendus. C’est le cas avec l’ouverture de la messe annuelle rituelle de Davos, cette fois avancée dans la calendrier d’une bonne décade par rapport à la tradition pour que son terme correspondît avec l’entrée en fonction du président Trump.
La Chine y tiendra la vedette, dans tous les cas comme laudateurs sans mesure de la globalisation, tandis que d’autres, plus tacherons qu’impériaux, exploreront le thème du “comment s’arranger de la montée du populisme et de l’anti-globalisme”. Les USA officiels étant représentés par les derniers débris, – Jo Biden et John Kerry, – de l’administration Obama occupée actuellement à tenter de lancer une Troisième Guerre mondiale in extremis, juste pour saluer le nouveau président ; mais personne, semble-t-il, de l’administration Trump, ce qu’impliquerait bien la chronologie de Davos qui se passe au moment de l’inauguration comme on l’a dit, comme si l’on se doutait bien, à Davos, qu’il n’y a rien à attendre de Trump et de sa bande...
Certes, l’on sait depuis longtemps que dans la formule “un pied-dedans-un pied-dehors” (par rapport au Système), la Chine était beaucoup plus inclinée à être dedans que, par exemple et exemple fondamental, la Russie. L’arrivée de Trump fait tomber le masque de l’hypothèse pour dévoiler les vérités-de-situation. Ce qui était possible-probable devient avéré et renverse brutalement l’orientation de nombre de supputations, de perspectives et d’évaluations. Par exemple et aussitôt avancée vient l’hypothèse que la tournure plutôt anti-chinoise et pro-russe de l’équipe Trump vient clairement de son orientation fondamentale anti-globaliste, – qui devient alors une orientation antiSystème, beaucoup plus qu’idéologique, voire que stratégique et commerciale, même elle est tout cela en même temps.
Dans Katehon.com ce 16 janvier (texte ci-dessous), Kerry Bolton fait une analyse serrée de ce qui deviendrait la Chine-Système, passant du statut de membre de la coalition antiSystème du temps du BRICS lorsque le BRICS avait une signification ontologique antiSystème forte, à celui de principal rempart de la globalisation et par conséquent, au niveau ontologique par rapport au Système, du globalisme comme principal instrument déstructurant du Système. Bolton en fait surtout une histoire de la finance américaniste (« Modern China a Creation of Wall Street »), ce qui reste pour nous une occurrence accessoire, mais montre assez bien comment la fraction anti-Trump et pro-Système se manifeste aujourd’hui dans ce sens, en même temps que ne cesse de s’affirmer son antirussisme.
On remarquera bien entendu que certains aspects de cette analyse viennent de loin. Parmi les instigateurs de cette Chine-Système défenderesse de la globalisation, et donc alliée naturelle de la fraction Système/parti démocrate à Washington D.C., on y trouve mention de Zbigniew Brzezinski qui se trouve ainsi parfaitement en accord profond avec sa haine de la Russie. C’est Brzezinski qui, au printemps 2009 avait proposé une sorte d’“alliance” type-G2, ou “globalisation à deux”, entre les USA et la Chine ; Brzezinski en attendait que cette “alliance” brisât la Russie comme une noisette prise dans un casse-noisette gigantesque. Cette idée nous paraissait à cette époque complètement irréaliste et sans fondement parce que nous jugions la pensée politique chinoise très fortement influencée par les conceptions principielles telles que la souveraineté, que nous la jugions comme faisant partie d’une tradition immémoriale et s’opposant absolument aux anti-principes déstructurants de la globalisation. En un sens, nous jugions que la Chine jouait le jeu de la globalisation parce qu’il était impossible de faire autrement, mais qu’elle n’était pas globaliste pour autant.
Il est bien possible, sinon tout à fait probable, que nous devions réviser cette conception pour ce qui est de la Chine tant les impératifs de la puissance économique ont pris le pas sur le reste dans le chef de cette puissance, et tant elle est ainsi devenue totalement dépendante du maintien de la globalisation jusqu’à devenir globaliste. Bien entendu, cette révision se fait, aujourd’hui, dans des conditions dramatiques de basculement cosmique, au moment où les USA basculent dans l’anti-globalisation et dans l’hostilité au globalisme, l’un et l’autre qui semblent constituer le pilier central assuré et immuable des conceptions trumpistes. Quoi qu’il en soit, une telle révision n’a rien pour nous effrayer selon les observations faites plus haut sur l’“opérationnalisation extrêmement fluide, changeante, parfois énigmatique, très souvent surprenante” du concept d’antiSystème.
Il faut alors songer à réviser complètement, après diverses alertes, les positions des uns et des autres par rapport aux postures Système & antiSystème, et notamment constater qu’il existe désormais entre la Chine et la Russie, – jugées indéfectibles “alliés stratégiques” en 2014-2015, – un fossé en cours de creusement qui pourrait s’avérer décisif. Bien entendu, l’ouragan-Trump et le chaos-Trump sont l’accélérateur et le détonateur explosifs de cette évolution en cours...
L’une des “alertes diverses” dont nous parlons plus haut avait eu lieu en août 2015, avec la dévaluation du yuan et un remous économique mondial causé par la Chine-globalisée : « La Chine a fait le contraire de la Russie, laquelle commença par pulvériser son système politique, entraînant l’économie dans le chaos du capitalisme-western qui faillit réussir ce que le communisme n’avait pu réaliser : la dissolution et la disparition de la nation russe dans une sorte de trou noir de la barbarie postmoderne. Les circonstances et leur orientation changèrent en 2000, avec l’arrivée de Poutine, et il est apparu qu’une reconstruction de l’État était nécessaire pour espérer installer une économie viable, – laquelle serait, nul doute à cet égard, conforme aux prescriptions du marché et de l’hyperlibéralisme, donc satisfaisante pour la doxa élégante et impérative qui oriente notre pensée. Mais la reconstruction de l’État se fit selon des prescriptions historiques évidentes, abandonnant tout ce qui subsistait du passé communiste dans les structures mêmes de la chose. Certes, il y avait de la corruption, du centralisme bureaucratique, le poids important des services de sécurité nationale, mais tout cela alors que commençaient à réapparaître un sens de l’intérêt national appuyé sur des principes puissants, avec les notions de tradition, y compris dans un sens spirituel, avec l’Église orthodoxe, avec le rappel des fondements historiques. Ce renforcement constant de l’État dans un sens principiel fit apparaître que, dans un conflit éventuel entre le politique et l’économique, – conflit inévitable à notre sens et actuellement en cours, – l’État et sa politique appuyée sur les principes métahistoriques l’emporteraient. C’est ce qui manque aujourd’hui désespérément à la Chine, même si la politique chinoise voudrait se nourrir à la référence puissante de la tradition principielle.
» Ainsi l’adoubement de la Chine comme puissance centrale se fait-il dans des conditions extrêmement ambigües, où la puissance du politique se découvre minée par l’absence de fondations solides. Comme la Russie, la Chine a passé un marché avec le Système, ce qui la met, également comme la Russie, “un pied en-dedans, un pied en-dehors”. (Ce pied “en-dehors” se nomme BRICS, Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai, quasi-alliance avec la Russie, etc.) Mais contrairement à la Russie, elle est pieds et poings liés par ce marché, bien plus qu’elle ne se trouve en partie libérée comme l’est la Russie pour suivre la politique qui lui importe à cause des conditions qu’on a décrites. »
Voici donc le texte de Kerry Bolton, dans Katehon.com, du 16 janvier ; il n’est bien entendu pas indifférent que ce site, qui est celui de Douguine, ait choisi de publier ce texte qui aborde d’une façon si frontale la question des principes contre la globalisation ; il est d’ailleurs tout aussi évident que les perspectives impliquées par une telle analyse doivent peser fortement sur le concept d’“eurasisme” de Douguine, notamment dans les rapports que ce concept implique entre la Russie et la Chine.
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Finally China is to make an unequivocal declaration of support for globalisation. President Xi Jinping will be aptly making the globalist declaration at the World Economic Forum in Davos during January 17-20. This meeting of Davos is reported to be focusing on the rise of anti-globalist reaction as epitomised by the election of Trump. It will also likely address the concern at the rise of ‘populism’, the conservative political manifestation of anti-globalism that is not as easy to co-opt as the ‘left-wing’ variety, as indicated – again – by the left’s histrionic opposition to Trump.
This Davos meeting will provide for a parting swing by U.S. plutocrats and their frontmen, with the USA being represented by Vice President Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry in their presumably final notable acts in those positions.
Reportedly what President Xi will be touting is ‘inclusive globalisation’, while condemning ‘populism’ as promoting ‘war and poverty’. His globalisation agenda for Davos was outlined by Jiang Jianguo, head of the State Council Information Office, who told a symposium hosted by the World Trade Organisation at Geneva that ‘President Xi would go to Davos to push for development, cooperation and economic globalization in order to build “a human community with shared destiny”’. (‘China; Xi to promote globalization at Davos, not war and poverty’, Reuters, 11 January 2017). Jiang explained:
‘With the rise of populism, protectionism, and nativism, the world has come to a historic crossroad where one road leads to war, poverty, confrontation and domination while the other road leads to peace, development, cooperation and win-win solutions’. (Ibid).
Vice Foreign Minister Li Baodong, in a briefing on Davos, said that ‘China would respond to the international community’s concern over globalization by putting forward Beijing’s opinions on how to “steer economic globalization toward greater inclusiveness”. Li said criticism of trade protectionism leveled at China, by Trump and others, was unjust. “Trade protectionism will lead to isolation and is in the interest of no one,” he said’. (Ibid).
Here we have the primary rhetoric that the globalists have long been using. The supposed demands and expectations of an ‘international community’ is an euphemism for the ‘international community’ of oligarchs, and the ‘public opinion’ generated by their mass media. Doing so in the name of ‘peace, development, and co-operation’ is indicative that China adopts the word-spin that has been used by Western politicians since Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points promoted ‘free trade’ as a war aim in the name of a ‘new world order’, as it is now called. Imperial adventures since Alexander the Great have been justified in the name of peace and co-operation, and in today’s era often by reference to ‘human rights’. World War II was fought by the USA in the interests – again- of world free trade (globalisation) as overtly stated in Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter. The devastation of Serbia in order to obtain the mineral wealth of Kosovo via globalisation was undertaken in the name of ‘peace and co-operation’. There is now a Kosovan department of privatisation. And so we might continue through history to the present day, with the imperial adventures, wars and revolutions that have been undertaken in the name of ‘peace’. China jumps aboard the globalist bandwagon and its true face is exposed now that there is a U.S. president-elect who has made some comments indicating that America’s globalist trade and foreign policies might be reversed. Now that lines of interest are being defined more forthrightly,
China is forced to show its hand as a primary partisan of globalisation. Indeed, if Trump does reverse the globalism, despite the prominence of luminaries from Goldman Sachs as his economic advisers, China will emerge as the primary state sponsor of globalisation, with Soros, Goldman Sachs, and Rockefeller clutching the coat-tails.
China is as always dominated by self-interest in the name of theoretical slogans. While practising a command economy it demands that other states remain open to their dumping. In New Zealand’ situation, recently poor quality Chinese steel has been imported. There is presently an investigation into the steel dumping, but there are always concerns when questions are raised in regard to trade with China that she will retaliate. This is ‘partnership’ and ‘co-operation’ as defined by China; the other ‘partner’ must always remain subservient. This demanded subservience is part of China’s mentality over millennia, when the emperor was upheld as the world ruler as mandated by heaven. This imperial mentality has substituted the state for the emperor. The steel dumping is a practical example of what China means by ‘globalisation’. (‘MBIE launches investigation into Chinese steel dumping’, Stuff Business Day, 23 December 20156; http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/87920079/MBIE-launches-investigation-into-Chinese-steel-dumping).
Vice Foreign Minister Li added that ‘Channels of communication are open’ between China and Trump’s transition team at the forum, ‘but warned that scheduling a meeting might be difficult’. Again, the attitude is one of dominance and contempt for the foreigner behind the smiles and handshakes and Western-style business suits. However, regardless of Trump’s policy, the U.S. oligarchy is always assured influential contact with China via the perennial Henry Kissinger. The former Secretary of State, who has been close to oligarchic and especially Rockefeller interests for most of his long life, has not lost any time in assuring that regardless of Trump, China’s relations with the globalists will be maintained. Why would China need to maintain formal diplomatic relations with a Trump government when there will be business as usual via Kissinger’s jaunts between the highest levels of American and Chinese business?
Kissinger, whose so-called ‘ping pong diplomacy’ brought China into the world trade system during the 1970s, was fulfilling a major aim of the globalists, and in particular Rockefeller interests centred around the Trilateral Commission and the Council on Foreign Relations. Bloomberg News reports that Kissinger was in Beijing soon after Trump’s election, after having had secret talks with Trump on 18 November. Kissinger told CNN that ‘people should not be nailing’ Trump ‘to positions that he had taken in the campaign on which he doesn’t insist’. (‘China, Grappling With Trump, Turns to “Old Friend” Kissinger’, Bloomberg News, 2 December 2016).
If saving jobs from globalisation, which Trump clearly identified with China, is not a bottom line for the president-elect then nothing is. It is troubling if Trump indicated to Kissinger that the comments on China and globalisation were just election rhetoric. Certainly the appointments to the Cabinet from Goldman Sachs do not promote confidence.
Kissinger met with President Xi, thanking him for explaining ‘the nature of your thinking and the purposes of your long-range policy’; while Xi responded that he was ‘all ears to what you have to say about the current world situation and the future growth of China-U.S. relations’.
Gao Zhikai, interpreter for the late Chinese leader Deng, who had frequently met Kissinger, said that Kissinger was in ‘a unique position’ to act as ‘a messenger’ between the USA and China. ‘No one could replace him,’ Gao said. ‘No other Americans could get the same respect from the Chinese leaders or have as honest exchanges with Chinese leaders’. (Ibid).
The Bloomberg report states that Kissinger has visited China 80 times since his secret trip in 1971 (according to the official Xinhua News Agency) to restore diplomatic relations, and has met every Chinese leader since Mao. ‘State media heap praise on him during each visit, describing him as an “old friend of Chinese people”’. (Ibid).
‘Kissinger was among select U.S. experts - including former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Elaine Chao, Trump’s nominee for transportation secretary - whom Xi met in February 2012 before taking power. The group advised Xi that frequent communication with his U.S. counterpart was more important than repeat formal visits, according to a person familiar with the meeting who asked not to be identified because the talks were private’. (Ibid.)
This indicates how world diplomacy works: above and beyond the formal governmental level; between oligarchs and their ambassadors such as Kissinger. We might add that Republican globalist Paulson, supporting Hillary Clinton, condemned Trump’s ‘populism’, but recently commended Trump’s choice of Steven Mnuchin as secretary of the treasury, coming over from his position as CEO of Goldman Sachs. (‘Former Hillary backer Henry Paulson hails Trump’s choice for treasury’, Newsmax, 30 November 2016).
Veteran Russophobe, Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser for Jimmy Carter, and like Kissinger, close for much of his life to Rockefeller interests, is also a primary figure in having established relations between the USA and China. Brzezinski served as founding director of the Trilateral Commission, established by David Rockefeller for the purpose of promoting relations between China and the globalist oligarchs. In a recent interview with Huffington Post Brzezinski reiterated the globalist agenda, including the alarm over the spread of ‘populism’ and the Trump victory. Like Kissinger, Brzezinski remains a prominent player in international diplomacy. His views indicate that the Western-based oligarchs and China are in accord. Brzezinski remains as anti-Russia as he is pro-China, expressing the line that has been floated to the mass media that Russia interferes with internal politics, although the National Endowment for Democracy has long been sponsored by the U.S. government precisely for that purpose. Having been the negotiator of the USA’s ‘One China’ policy Brezinski was asked his reaction to Trump’s audacity of accepting a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s president, outraging China. As during the Cold War U.S. strategists still see China as an important element in containing Russia:
‘The danger I see is provoking antagonism in this foremost relationship of American foreign policy without any significant strategic accomplishment. It is not in our interest to antagonize Beijing. It is much better for American interests to have the Chinese work closely with us, thereby forcing the Russians to follow suit if they don’t want to be left out in the cold. That constellation gives the U.S. the unique ability to reach out across the world with collective political influence. … A world in which America and China are cooperating is a world in which American influence is maximized. If we reduce that through stupid irritations, what do we accomplish?’(Nathan Gardels, ‘Brzezinski: America’s Global Influence Depends On Cooperation With China’, The World Post, Huffpost, 23 December 2016).
Brzezinski sees Sino-U.S. accord as ‘maximising’ U.S. power. He was asked whether Trump’s pro-Russia indications would be useful in containing China as a rival to the USA. Brzezinski’s reply is an unequivocal ‘no’. He sees the real power players as the USA and China in tandem, as part of the ‘dominant pack’, and Russia as being kept subordinated.
‘Russia is not a rival to America in terms of what it has to offer in dealing with China. The Chinese know damned well that, though we may be weakened, depleted and confused, America is basically still number one in the world, and they, the Chinese, are also almost a number one. China thus has a choice to make. If it chooses to be against America, it will end [up] losing out. It is more in their interest to belong to the dominant pack. The reverse is also true for the U.S. if it pushes China away’. (Ibid).
Brzezinski uses the same rationale for justifying globalist world hegemony as that now being touted by President Xi at Davos; that only Sino-U.S. supremacy can assure global stability. Russia is of no account. She can be kept down by the two super-power hegemonists. China is reading from the globalist script written by Kissinger and Brzezinski. Brzezinski continues:
‘To underscore the strategic reality I’ve already outlined, the U.S. and China are the world’s dominant powers. To the extent we have worked together over the years since the normalization of relations, it has not been for the evil purpose of war or conquest, but for the good of enhancing the security and stability required for each to pursue their own interests. In today’s world, China can’t lead alone. Neither can the U.S. To put it in sharper, if seemingly paradoxical terms, if America tries to go it alone in the world without China, it will not be able to assert itself. If we keep that in mind, we can begin, gradually, to shape a world that is more stable than the world today, which is very unstable and very unpredictable. America’s long-term interests lie fundamentally with deepening our ties to China, not uprooting them for perceived short-term gain’. (Ibid).
The ‘people’s revolution’ in China was as phoney as Soros/NED sponsored ‘spontaneous revolts’ in Eastern Europe and North Africa. While this is not the place to examine how the USA scuttled Chiang Kai-shek, and how Taiwan under Chiang pursued a genuinely autarchic economic system for decades, we will briefly examine the way oligarchs secured China as a part of the globalist economic system. In an official history of the Council on Foreign Relations, the CFR’s Peter Grose explains:
‘The Council turned in earnest to the problem of communist China early in the 1960s. Various Council publications had started developing the idea of a ‘two-China’ policy - recognition of both the Nationalist government of Taiwan and the communist government on the mainland. This, Council authors suggested, might be the least bad policy direction. Professor A. Doak Barnett published a trail-blazing book for the Council in 1960, Communist China and Asia. A major Council study of relations between the United States and China commenced in 1964, the year China exploded its first nuclear bomb; the group met systematically for the next four years. “Contentment with the present stalemate in relations with the Chinese is not statesmanship,” declared Robert Blum of the Asia Society, the first director of the project. “American impatience and the strong currents of political emotion often make it impossible to plan ahead to manage our policy in a persevering but flexible way.’” (Peter Grose, Continuing The Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 2006; ‘ ‘X’ Leads the Way’).
Robert Blum, the CFR China analyst, is referred to above as a luminary of the Asia Society. The Asia Society was founded in 1956 by John D Rockefeller III, and remains a major player in cultivating economic and diplomatic relations with China for the benefit of big business.
Taiwan presented a problem for the globalists insofar as the USA had guaranteed the Republic’s security.
The CFR therefore formulated a dialectical solution, seemingly supporting a ‘two China’ policy that in practise would mean that Taiwan could be ditched without being too obvious. That is what happened, as the USA used the ‘two-China policy’ formulated years before within the CFR to secure Red China’s entry into the United Nations, and to side-line Taiwan. The CFR approach was one of gradual promotion of the Mao regime, decrying the so-called ‘strong currents of emotion’ that were holding back the globalist relationship with China. However, Grose is explicit regarding the CFR attitude towards China:
‘This seemed just the sort of political stalemate that the Council on Foreign Relations, free of electoral and partisan constraints, was endowed to repair. Midway through the project, the Council published an analysis of public opinion called The American People and China by A. T. Steele, who reached the unexpected conclusion that Americans were more willing than many of their elected officeholders to forge new relations with China. This study argued that it was only a steady diet of hostile public statements that had made Americans “disposed to believe the worst of communist China and they [the Chinese] the worst of us.’” (Ibid).
The CFR re-mould so-called ‘public opinion’, the ‘international community’. The CFR report indicates that they believed the public would be susceptible to a pro-China policy, and the abandonment of Taiwan. Grose continues:
‘In 1969 the Council summed up the project under the title, The United States and China in World Affairs, publication came just as Richard Nixon, a longtime and outspoken foe of Chinese communism, became president of the United States. (Some months earlier, Nixon himself had chosen Foreign Affairs as his forum for exploring a fresh look at Asia in general, and China in particular.) Tilting at the long-prevailing freeze, the Council’s project defined a two-China policy with careful analysis. It advocated acquiescence in mainland Chinese membership in the United Nations, and argued that America must “abandon its effort to maintain the fiction that the Nationalist regime is the government of China.”’ (Ibid.).
Grose concludes by citing Kissinger and Cyrus Vance in their pivotal roles of opening up Red China, inaugurating the process that made a China world power:
‘Kissinger, acting as Nixon’s national security adviser, embarked on a secret mission to Beijing in 1971, to make official, exploratory contact with the communist regime. Nixon himself followed in 1972. The delicate process of normalizing diplomatic relations between the United States and China was completed in 1978 by Kissinger’s successor as secretary of state, Cyrus R. Vance, a leading Council officer before and after his government service’. (Ibid).
Now the globalist chickens are coming home to roost. Mr Xi goes to Davos with his globalist script, but a demarcation has been clarified by Trump’s references to China and globalisation. Mr Xi generously affirms that China is willing to take its place at the head of the globalisation process. This is the situation that has long been sought by Rockefeller, Soros, Goldman Sachs, and Trilateralist coteries in America, Asia and Europe.
China has adopted the Western liberal economic development model. There is no contradiction between liberalism and political authoritarianism. We’ve seen it since 1789 Jacobin France, and how quickly liberal-democracies respond to a situation with bombs and guns in the name of ‘human rights’. What the Western globalists talk of is for China to ‘reform’. This reform has been proceeding apace for decades until China stands as co-equal with the USA as a globalist hegemon; talks the same talk and walks the same walk. On the other hand, what the oligarchs want for Russia is very different: ‘regime change’. Russia cannot be left in peace until she is a subservient member of an international economic system. China is a globalist back-entry to Russia. The Russo-Chinese relationship seems to have brought China everything at Russia’s expense. It is worth keeping in mind that BRICS example was an idea floated by Goldman Sachs. (K. R. Bolton ‘BRICS development bank an instrument for globalization’, Foreign Policy Journal).
Also significant, although little recognised, is that the Western liberal economic development model adopted by China is a product of a civilisation in a terminal state of decay. China sought a transfusion from a diseased organism.
With the liberal economic model arrives concomitant elements of moral and cultural degeneration. The politically authoritarian character of China has attempted to minimise this impact on China. The emperors through millennia sought to adapt measured foreign influences while keeping the Chinese culture-organism immune from decadence. They were able to do this by maintaining China’s traditional nexus, and although there were the cyclic rise and fall of many dynasties, Chinese Civilisation remained. Mao unleashed the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution in a zealous attempt to obliterate that tradition. Recently the Chinese regime has sought to revive something of China’s Confusion and Taoist traditions. Whether this is anything more than an attempt to manipulate tradition to maintain the authority of the regime is questionable. China already faces huge problems in terms of increasing marriage breakdown, where once there was none; urban sprawl, an ageing population and other issues related to a civilisation in a cycle of decay. In addition there are the problems of a market economy, such as pollution and soil depletion. China is, as Maoists were once fond of stating about the USA, ‘a paper tiger’.
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