Analysis, Context n°79 (December, 2004) — The French Factor

The French Factor

Treated with contempt, ridiculed, sidelined, France today is prominent, if not preeminent in all the institutions that matter in providing an alternative to Americanization.

Richard Allen, National Security Adviser to President Reagan (1981-82) and current member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, told Le Figaro on 20 October 2004: “Yes, France is still a major player because it has a tradition of acting independently. France has a history and an awareness; it tailors its goals to match its national interests. We always take account of what we call ‘the French factor’.”

On all sides – especially at the EU and in NATO – following France’s 2002 2003 UN performance, we have been receiving reports of France’s role and influence in the international fora that matter in the fields that matter (primarily defense, security and international relations). At the EU, France is the natural leader, the acknowledged engine, behind all progress in the security field. It is sufficient for France to launch or support an initiative for all the other countries to support it in turn. A NATO International Staff official, who, in a coordinating role, attends the organization’s main meetings, explains that “in our meetings, aside from the American position, known to everyone, only one position matters to everyone – a single question is posed: What will France do and say? It is the only thing that matters to the Secretary General himself in the discussions held with staff members.”

The first to contest the notion of France’s influence are France’s own intellectuals – more as a matter of reverse pride and vanity than through any newfound spirit of humility.

The above truths, repeated daily among those in the know, are refuted with extreme vigor within France itself. This attitude is manifested first by cries of imminent decline and fall. It is a phenomenon as old as France itself. One can go back several centuries – as far back as the 15th century, if need be, to find such self-criticism or self-flagellation. The refrain appears destined for the scrap heap of history: announcing the imminent decline and fall of a nation for several years and at regular intervals is a measure of the value of the forecast, a perfect sophism, a conundrum enshrouded in a paradox: How do the naysayers account for the fact that France has not yet disappeared? With the success of Nicolas Baverez’s La France qui tombe (‘The Decline and Fall of France’, published in September 2003), we have again witnessed a long autumn filled with grim reports of the imminence of France’s decline and fall.

This recurrent refrain is a constant of the French character and temperament. It is the dark side of the French pursuit of excellence that requires France to make extremely difficult choices and to take extremely ambitious and utopian positions. Confronted with the observation that little has been accomplished to satisfy the announced ambitions and utopian aims, the pessimistic and unrealistic conclusion is drawn that since these ambitions and aims have not been realized, the country is hell-bent on self destruction.

This attitude can be found in France’s experts and officials serving with international organizations. Although they concede the French influence reported above, it is – according to a French source at NATO – to put forward, without missing a beat, this thesis: “Of course, France has a free hand and imposes its influence, but to what end? There is nothing unifying at the European level, nothing constructive in what France does and proposes …” These critics of France argue that France uses European institutions to advance France’s position in using Europe as a tool, whereas France’s ‘civilizing mission’ should be to build the strongest Europe possible and to blend into that new fabric. In that stance lies the sin of pride, far more than an excess of humility, of defeatism or of bitterness. There is an effort to postulate an image of an idealized France on the basis of certain ideological principles. It is then fair game to criticize France for failing to live up to this idealized, ideological image. France’s French critics have created an idealized France only to knock real France down.

This attitude, so characteristic of the great majority of French intellectual circles, means that there can be no effective defense against the unrelenting offensive constantly being waged against France by the Anglo-American media. The image of a decadent, impotent, isolated France in precipitous decline is thus constantly reinforced, thereby producing a catastrophic perception of the state of France.

But this denigration is ineffective because it focuses on the image of France, rather than on France itself. There are even the beginnings of a paradoxical effect arising from calling into question the powerful conformist pressures generated by the Anglo Americans – a calling into question that is the natural consequence of the anti-American sentiments which surfaced in the wake of events subsequent to 9/11. Therefore, the denigrated image of France, which is part and parcel of such conformist pressures, is itself being called into question. The upshot – French reality is coming into to the foreground and is coming into its own as seldom before in recent history.

What we are witnessing is an increasing awareness of a fundamental psychological phenomenon.

France is today benefiting, in the prevailing perception of France, from a wave of anti-Americanism that is growing apace. This means that the situation has become more conducive to France being perceived for what it is. This in turn means that the ‘French factor’ is coming into its own. And – as the only current influence capable of confronting the sweep of the American juggernaut – France is doing this in the fields that matter, like the ones already mentioned (Europe, NATO, etc). What then is behind this phenomenon?

What we are dealing with has to do fundamentally with the field of psychology. Of course, France has the trappings of power in a material sense: militarily (a nuclear capability, a force projection capability); technologically, etc. All of that is indispensable but does not count for much if there is no sense of direction. It is only an effective combination of these that can explain that France is finally seeing its influence radiate throughout the world. We come back to the citation of Richard Allen, which embraces in few words historical truths (tradition, history, etc.), and, especially psychological truths (determination, awareness, etc.). Allen thus defines what is an essentially French phenomenon, one which we believe can be explained by France’s very strong sense of history (awareness of its past and thus awareness of its identity).

What characterizes the French character and temperament, under all circumstances, is the awareness of an identity born of the presence of the past in the collective conscience, in the service of an independent spirit. In speaking of ‘independence’ of spirit, we are not talking about substance (judgment, etc.), but about the very form of the national character and temperament. Literally, the French character and temperament has as a basic reflex that impels it to form independent judgments. It is incapable of operating differently.

Today, when a major event occurs, the current spontaneous reaction is to ask ‘What will the Americans do?’ or, at best (in the case of the British), ‘What have we to do on the basis of what the Americans are going to do?’. The French reaction is: ‘What must be done?’ – period. That is not to bestow on the French reaction every virtue – the answer could be ‘surrender’ – but to point out a naturally independent turn of mind.

This specificity is seen increasingly today, since the American action has become brutal and unilateralist. When the reaction that your initial political choice dictate for you is to follow a brutal and catastrophic undertaking (as American action is becoming), you find yourself rushing headlong toward chaos. It is then that, observing that France is reacting in accordance with its own judgment (“France tailors its goals to match its national interests”, according to Allen), you look at it with interest and you are tempted to use it as a point of reference. That does not mean that you necessarily adopt it as your position, but you find yourself drawn by such a natural and obvious approach. The method becomes a reference point that serves as a safeguard in the face of America’s imperialist unilateralism. Just as naturally, not only the method but the author and proponent of the method – France – in turn becomes a point of reference.

Such is the nature of the influence exerted by France today. It is fundamental, and all of France’s positions are today followed with interest and even enthusiasm. Whether France wants it or not, whether France is aware of it or not, whether it makes France happy or not, France is seen as the alternative in every area to the main force in the world – American unilateralism. France constitutes this alternative for the European countries, for the Arab countries, and for many Asian countries. It is not a matter of France being virtuous, or of its political leaders being repositories of wisdom – far from it. But France is today the only identifiable force that stands its ground and that dares oppose the destructive fury of American unilateralism.