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4 octobre 2004 — Voilà une remarquable analyse psychologique des deux candidats américains à l’élection présidentielle, par Michael A. Weinstein, de PINR. En effet, par le mot “Style”, c’est bien psychologie qu’il faut entendre.
L’analyse de Weinstein n’est pas précisément optimiste. En traçant les portraits de deux hommes si différents, il en arrive à la conclusion que l’effet de leurs psychologies ne sera pas loin d’être équivalent dans l’orientation de la politique et dans les décisions prises (ou pas prises). Face à un GW qu’on connaît, simpliste, inculte, sans intérêt pour la compréhension de la politique, mais complètement “idéologisé”, radical dans ses appréciations, rapide et abrupt dans ses décisions irraisonnées, apparaît un Kerry qui est à peu près le contraire, qui écoute, qui mesure, qui balance, qui s’interroge, qui réfléchit, qui soupèse et ne décide pas… Aux mauvaises décisions du premier répond la lenteur ou l’absence de décisions du second, avec un résultat qui risque fort d’être semblable. Weinstein résume ainsi son propos, entre un candidat qui a une vision ferme mais erronée et têtue, et un candidat qui n’a pas de vision et hésite à s’engager :
« The executive who is unconcerned with policy and impervious to its effects will end up in thrall to whomever has his ear or will continue to pursue the line of failure. The executive who has no stable vision and lacks resolve will agonize over decisions and make ad hoc adjustments to adverse contingencies. The apparent contrast between Bush's and Kerry's decisional styles turns out to be less marked than it seems; either half of the model executive leads to the same result of being at the mercy of contingencies and being forced to back and fill, or to lash out spasmodically. »
La question qui se pose, à suivre ces deux portraits, est de savoir si le système est capable d’enfanter autre chose que cette sorte de candidats. On a l’impression de deux hommes incomplets, donc effectivement conduits à conduire une action nécessairement incomplète et, par conséquent, une action dans les deux cas vouée à l’échec, — cet échec se mesurant à l’évolution catastrophique en Irak, qui sera simplement différemment catastrophique selon que ce sera l’un ou l’autre. (Cette situation se manifeste a contrario, lorsqu’un néo-conservateur comme Max Boot, estime que le candidat idéal serait l’addition des deux candidats incomplets. Cela permet, en passant, au moins de donner au président en place certaines qualités, même incomplètes, — Boot parle d’un « affrontement d’esprits » à leur propos, impliquant que GW en est doté. C’est un grand progrès.)
Cette sorte d’“incomplétude” des candidats, — pour employer un terme de psychiatrie signifiant la sensation d’inachèvement à laquelle se heurtent des malades — pourrait être une des caractéristiques des êtres qui, aujourd’hui, sont seuls “autorisés” par le système à s’imposer. Comme si la crise du système se reflétait, au niveau des psychologies, par la sélection de dirigeants ne disposant dans tous les cas pas d’une autonomie psychologique, d’une autonomie de comportement, donc d’une autonomie de jugement. La pesanteur du système est effectivement de favoriser la sélection de dirigeants qui dépendent de lui-même, qui ne peuvent rien faire sans lui.
By Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, PINR, 1 October 2004
Such has been made recently of the contrasting decisional styles of American presidential candidates George W. Bush and John Kerry. According to the consensus of insider books and press interviews, Bush is a leader of the “C.E.O.” type who dwells on the “big picture,” chooses the side that conforms with that moralized picture and then proceeds with unwavering resolve to adhere to policies that he has been convinced by advisers conform to his vision. Kerry, on the other hand, is reported to be a “consulter” and “deliberator” who entertains multiple perspectives and has no clear big picture, does not choose sides on the basis of a clearly defined ideology and is disposed to shift policies when he is confronted with evidence of their adverse consequences.
Decisional style is the bridge between individual psychology and the power struggle of interests. Although most of politics, particularly at the geostrategic level, can be explained without resort to individual psychology — interests endure and individuals come and go — executives who must mediate and resolve conflicts among powerful interests can affect outcomes decisively. What difference does the contrast between Bush's and Kerry's leadership styles make for American geostrategic behavior?
An effective executive decisional style combines characteristics of the styles attributed to Bush and Kerry in a happy medium. The strong rational leader melds a general and realistic vision of national interest with an informed understanding of the policies that are meant to implement it, and joins a firmness of will in executing policy with a willingness to adapt policy to adverse and beneficial outcomes. The executive who is unconcerned with policy and impervious to its effects will end up in thrall to whomever has his ear or will continue to pursue the line of failure. The executive who has no stable vision and lacks resolve will agonize over decisions and make ad hoc adjustments to adverse contingencies. The apparent contrast between Bush's and Kerry's decisional styles turns out to be less marked than it seems; either half of the model executive leads to the same result of being at the mercy of contingencies and being forced to back and fill, or to lash out spasmodically.
Bush
The consequences of Bush's decisional style in the sphere of geostrategic behavior are on record in the failures of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the decisive application of the vision of his administration's National Security Strategy. Assuming a decade-long window of opportunity for the United States to become the protector of a worldwide system of market democracies, that strategy involved securing regime change in “rogue states,” whether peacefully or through preemptive warfare. Iraq was the test case of the regime change policy and it has been a failure because the assumption that Iraqis would welcome American occupation proved unfounded.
Since Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime was toppled in 2003, administration policy toward Iraq has proceeded along the lines of backing and filling — surrender of important cities in the Sunni Triangle (Fallujah and Ramadi) to the insurgency against the occupation, compromise with Moqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, rushing in a governing authority comprised mostly of unpopular exiled politicians led by Iyad Allawi, and currently insisting that elections for an Iraqi government be held in January of 2005, despite the insurgency — a position that might well be abandoned in another ad hoc retreat.
Throughout the series of tactical retreats, Bush has doggedly stuck to his vision of a democratic Iraq and has continually discounted adverse contingencies, insisting that he will “stay the course,” even as he has countenanced one concession after the other of his initial war aims and the successive policies meant to implement them. The result has been a loss of American power and credibility in the world, providing the opportunity for regional and world powers such as Iran, North Korea, the Franco-German combine, Russia and China to assert their own interests more successfully against those of the United States. American military power has had its limitations revealed and the vision of the National Security Strategy is, for the present, not actionable.
The failures of Operation Iraqi Freedom have not merely thrown the National Security Strategy into doubt; they have also diminished the influence of the neo-conservative advisers who formulated it. At the present time, the administration lacks a coherent strategic doctrine and there is no current contender for that role. Unless a new strategy is formulated, a second Bush administration would be more prey to making ad hoc adjustments to adversity, retrenching as a rule, but also tempted to abrupt and excessive action if placed under sufficient pressure.
Under the imperative to rebuild American power or retreat further, Bush will be faced with conflicts between factions within his security team and will lack the confidence provided by even an unrealistic vision. The way will be open to decisional paralysis at the extreme and at least half measures in different directions punctuated by confrontational outbursts. Geostrategy in a second Bush administration is a question mark. Its daunting challenge will be to secure stability in Iraq — requiring a continued military commitment — as it rebuilds American power and responds to initiatives from contending powers. If it were unable to achieve those aims, the consequence would be further loss of American power in the world. Bush's leadership style does not portend success in the project of recovery.
Kerry
Were Kerry to capture the presidency, he would bring to the office a decisional style that appears to be the opposite of his rival's. Based on the many reports gathered from interviews with the candidate and his current and former political associates, Kerry focuses mainly on the possible consequences of alternative policies, seeking to gather information on issues from a variety of sources, playing devil's advocate and taking multiple perspectives on the meaning of the information he receives, and concentrating on worst-case scenarios and trying to anticipate the responses to his initiatives by allies and opponents. Whereas Bush is interested in his vision, Kerry is concerned with applications. Whereas Bush restricts his sources of information, Kerry expands them. Whereas Bush adheres to an ideology, Kerry is pragmatic and accepts established parameters. Whereas Bush is optimistic, Kerry is skeptical.
The terms used to characterize Kerry's decisional style in press reports are “perfectionist,” “prosecutorial,” “painstaking,” “deliberate,” “diligent,” and “pragmatic.” Each member of this cluster of kindred terms points to a disposition to caution. As a senator, Kerry has been more a follower than a leader, with few major legislative initiatives to his credit. He is most comfortable if all the bases are covered before he makes a move, which causes him to delay making decisions until he has convinced himself that he grasps the safest course of achieving his objectives, whatever they have become in the deliberative process, which can lead to altering aims, if not broad principles.
Kerry's decisional style is most of all prudent. His concern to anticipate adverse consequences does not result in decisional paralysis, but in hesitation, which he has been able to overcome at critical junctures. Nonetheless, his political associates report downsides to his difficulty in gaining closure. He has reportedly held protracted strategy sessions with his campaign advisers, reached decisions and then altered those decisions when someone else got his ear after the meetings had ended. Kerry sometimes gets buried in details as he attempts to anticipate every possible contingency. When he expresses a position, he often qualifies it with caveats.
The Republican charge that he is a “flip-flopper” does not get at Kerry's weakness — he is not at the mercy of the winds of doctrine and is not an expedient chameleon: he works within established institutional parameters and a received centrist ideology, normally proceeding with caution and sometimes striking out when he feels pushed into a corner. The problem is that he is often motivated by anxiety and ultimately lacks confidence in his own judgment, despite his earnest efforts to cultivate it.
A telling insight into Kerry's decisional style has been provided by his former political director Chris Gregory, who told Chicago Tribune reporter Jill Zuckman that Kerry's proclivity to keep questioning and debating with others and within himself comes out most markedly when he is anxious: “If he's anxious about something, he'll ask and ask and ask and ask.” As is indicated by the consensus of his political associates, Kerry is frequently anxious.
Kerry's decisional style has not been tested in an executive capacity, but it is possible to project how it would be likely to affect his geostrategic decisions if he assumed the presidency. Confronted with repairing the damage done by Operation Iraqi Freedom to American power, Kerry would be faced with making critical and complex decisions that would tax his limited ability to remain calm and confident. He would be prey to resorting to his defense mechanism of hesitation and might be unable in some cases to make a clear choice, not because he was ill-informed, but because the complexity would be too great and the stakes too high for him to be able to achieve closure. The result would be exactly the same as it is for Bush's contrasting decisional style — stop-gap and ad hoc measures, normally spelling retreat and sometimes lashing back.
Conclusion
If anxiety is at the root of Kerry's incomplete decisional style, it is the same for Bush. One way of coping with lack of trust in one's own judgment is to immerse oneself in details in a fruitless attempt to anticipate all contingencies, and another is to ignore the contingencies altogether and dwell within the big picture that one has constructed within one's imagination. In both cases, the decisions that must be taken under the pressure of events will lack clarity of purpose and strength of resolve — they will be reactive rather than proactive. In Bush's case, reactivity is the result of the failure of visionary proactivity and the absence of any strategic replacement for it. In Kerry's case, reactivity is his habitual mode of adaptation to stress, which would be unlikely to change if he became president.
Neither Bush's nor Kerry's decisional style is optimal for meeting the challenges to American interests that are growing in the world. Regional and world powers with interests that conflict with the United States will sense the drift in American geostrategy and will seek to exploit American vulnerability. After the presidential elections, a period is likely to open in which competing powers will test American resolve. In pursuing their interests, their challenge will be to push against the United States, but not so intensely that they provoke a spasmodic backlash.
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