Confidences à l'Est

Confidences à l'Est

13 novembre 2002 — On parle beaucoup de l'élargissement. Cela ne signifie pas qu'on en parle nécessairement comme il faudrait. Parmi les sujets évités avec une attention dont il faut admirer l'efficacité, celui des liens des pays nouveaux-venus avec les USA, en tous les cas des intentions à cet égard. C'est, officiellement et impérativement, le type même du non-sujet parce qu'il recouvre un problème réel, brûlant et explosif, qui concerne le point essentiel du développement de la PESD et toute l'éventuelle logique d'une politique européenne de sécurité. (A cet égard, le deuxième double langage fait son oeuvre.)

Pour avoir une idée des sentiments des milieux officiels dans certains de ces pays, on lira ci-dessous ce texte d'origine polonaise, et diffusé par le réseau Poland Import Export Chamber of Commerce à la date du 14 octobre 2002. L'auteur est John Radzilowski.

« A Special Place For Poland? — Poland and the U.S.: Is a Special Relationship Possible?

» As the U.S. prepares for war in Iraq and continues to hunt terrorists in Afghanistan and elsewhere, many of America's allies are wavering. France and Germany nations Americans helped to free during World War II and helped to rebuild after the war are against us and one German leader even compared the U.S. president to Adolf Hitler. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, all ruled by authoritarian ex-communists, have aided Iraq, even selling Saddam Hussein new weapons. Only Britain seems to stand by our side.

» Poland has quietly supported the U.S., but the question is, what next?

» Today, Poland stands at an important crossroads. She is trying to enter the European Union. The Poles are notoriously˛ pro-American, a fact that does not sit well with the French and Germans and may even hurt Polandšs chances to enter the EU.

» Although EU membership would be a great benefit to Poland and her neighbors, it might also be a mixed blessing. The EU has changed from a common economic community into a very large, centralized bureaucracy that has attempted to impose homogeneity on the continent at the expense of local cultures and traditions. It is also relentlessly secular.

» On the other hand, an alliance with America requires that Poland be loyal, that its soldiers, sailors, and airmen be brave, and that its markets be open to American companies. Americans are not interested in changing Poland's religious practices or imposing some form of social engineering.

» In an ideal world, Poland should be both a member of the EU and a close American ally. Being in the EU would make Poland a bridge between America and Europe. Like Britain in the west, Poland in the east could put some backbone into other EU members and effectively represent American ideals. By the same token, a close alliance with the U.S. would ensure the Poland does not become too dependent, economically or politically, on other EU members, thus retaining autonomy from some of the sillier aspects of the EU and might show that the EU need not be rigidly homogeneous to be successful.

» Although Poland has done much to join the EU, it needs to be far more active in pursuing the U.S. alliance. It is crucial that Polish troops not only participate in any coalition against Saddam Hussein, but that they do more than guard some distant air bases far from the front lines. And, most critical of all, the American public must see the Poles in action and see it regularly. The British have gained much goodwill in America thanks to their very public support of the U.S. effort. Poland needs to do the same.

» To date, while Poland is clearly interested in a special relationship with the U.S., it has not done two important things. First, it has not made its case to the American public through the media as Britain has. Most Americans think that out of all of Europe, only the British support us. Second, the Poles must take a more active and hands-on approach to the Polish community in the U.S. Polish Americans are the natural ones to put Polandšs case before our fellow Americans. Yet, we are weak and divided, and consequently, often abused. A more active role by the Polish government would help galvanize Polonia and spur the development of a new generation of leaders who unlike many of our present leaders could be effective spokespeople.

» Poland needs both Europe and America. Without both, her options become far more limited and her voice for good weaker. »

La valeur de l'argumentation doit être reconnue, elle montre que le long apprentissage du voisinage d'une puissance (l'URSS dans le Pacte de Varsovie) a laissé quelques enseignements essentiels. La démarche du qui pro quo (soutien à la guerre contre l'Irak, contre ... ?) est notable à cet égard.

Une autre approche, — mais est-elle tellement différente ? — appparaît dans l'article très récent de Robert Kaplan sur la Roumanie. En bref : la Roumanie, jusqu'alors pro-française, devient pro-américaine. C'est un soutien sur lequel Washington pourra compter. Kaplan rapporte tous les arguments à ce propos, jusqu'aux plus lourds, sans qu'on voit qu'il les tienne pour suspects. Comme l'on nous dit, tous ces gens sont heureux, un peu comme Amélie Poulain, puisque « Bush is happy ». Là aussi, les méthodes du Pacte de Varsovie ont laissé des traces, et la Roumanie a su se débarrasser des habitudes d'indépendance du temps de Ceaucescu.

« So, while Western Europeans fought for a compromise United Nations resolution on Iraq and sniff with disdain at Mr. Bush's midterm election mandate, members of the Romanian elite heartily approve of the White House's policies. ”Unofficially, there is a feeling of quiet jubilation” about the American elections, said Sergiu Celac, a former Romanian foreign minister. “We're happy because Bush is happy.”

» Opinion polls in Romania show approval ratings of 80 percent and higher for the United States. Romania sent its own troops to Afghanistan and became the first country to support the American demand that American soldiers be exempted from prosecution by the International Criminal Court. Along with Bulgaria, another prospective member of NATO and the European Union, Romania recently granted the United States access to its military bases and flyover rights should there be a war with Iraq.

» Romania and Poland will bring a “pro-American critical mass” to NATO, said Mircea Geoana, Romania's foreign minister in an interview. Indeed, whenever Mr. Geoana's French diplomatic counterparts worry about Romania's enthusiasm for the United States, he said he tells them that “after Romania enjoys several decades of prosperity like France, then we will have the luxury of taking the U.S. for granted.” »

Quant à la solidité de cette alliance pour les Américains, rien n'est laissé dans l'ombre par Kaplan. Comme il nous l'indique, « Romanians... have a fine nose for power shifts ».

« This is a part of the world where weakness is detected instantly and where local alliances are built by unapologetically projecting power. The policymaking and intellectual elites tended to be fascist when Nazi Germany was dominant, communist when the Soviets were in power, and liberal democrats after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

» Romanians, in particular, have a fine nose for power shifts. They were the only people to switch sides in the middle of World War II: on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad, Ion Antonescu, the pro-Hitler dictator, started closing down extermination camps run by the Romanian army and initiated contacts with international Jewish groups.

» Today, Romania is taking a calculated risk that America will be in ascendancy for years to come. Romania sees itself as useful to the United States, not only in Europe but also in the Middle East. »