Gates et sa forte différence

Plus que jamais, le secrétaire à la défense Robert Gates apparaît comme la force principale de modération au sein de l’administration GW. Jim Lobe rapporte et commente, le 17 octobre, la “performance” de Robert Gates devant le JINSA (Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs), l’organisation juive US la plus proche des néo-conservateurs, qualifiée justement par Lobe de “ultra-hawkish”. Gates était invité par le JINSA et a parlé de la situation au Moyen-Orient, particulièrement de l’Iran.

Lobe analyse le discours en fonction de l’audience et trouve toutes les raisons de confirmer l’approche modérée de Gates sur ces questions. L’analyse est précise, assez fine, répondant à une intervention qui a sûrement été très précisément calculée. Par exemple, Lobe note que Gates mentionne “[the] Iran strident posturing” par rapport à la situation en Irak, et non des accusations comme l’“intervention de l’Iran” ou les “violences de l’Iran”, qui sont les accusations standard de l’administration et, plus encore, de l’institut JINSA.

Un passage conséquent de l’analyse de Lobe:

«In his four-page acceptance speech, Gates did indeed attack Iran, calling its government “an ambitious and fanatical theocracy,” noting that, in 28 years, he had failed to find “the elusive Iranian moderate,” and warning his audience that, “We should have no illusions about the nature of this regime or its leaders — about their designs for their nuclear program, their willingness to live up to their rhetoric, their intentions for Iraq, or their ambitions in the Gulf.” But he devotes only one paragraph to how Washington should deal with Tehran, and, as you can see below, his “all-options-on-the-table” language appears almost as a throw-away line:

»“This Administration is keenly aware of the threats posed by Iran. It is also keenly aware of the challenges we and our allies face with a regime that seems increasingly willing to act contrary to its own national interests. With a government of this nature, only a united front of nations will be able to exert enough pressure to make Iran abandon its nuclear aspirations – a source of anxiety and instability in the region. Our allies must work together on robust, far-reaching, and strongly enforced economic sanctions. We must exert pressure in the diplomatic and political arenas as well. And, as the President has said, with this regime, we must also keep all options on the table.”

»Having said that, however, he immediately changes gears by explicitly distinguishing — through the use of the word “but” between Iran and the threat posed by Sunni extremists (no doubt inflicting intense irritation on Ledeen who asserted through a press release on his new book, The Iranian Time Bomb, put out by his American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Tuesday, “that it is difficult today not to conclude that Iran was involved in the 9/11 attacks.”) Here’s how Gates changes the subject:

»“But, obviously, instability in the region is not just driven by state actors. The recent history of the Middle East has demonstrated the lethality and persistence of armed militias and movements that have no allegiance to any government, only to death and destruction and chaos. Where extremists have seized and controlled territory – in western Iraq or eastern Afghanistan, for example – the result has been misery, and poverty, and fear. The future they promise is a joyless existence – personified not by piety or virtue, but by the executioner and the suicide bomber. Symbolized by men kneeling not in prayer before their god, but kneeling and waiting for the executioner’s sword.”

»From there, Gates goes on to argue that the principal danger resulting from a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq lies with an emboldened al Qaeda and other Sunni extremists, omitting, quite significantly in my view, any mention at all of Iran in this context. “That would surely dramatically embolden an entire generation of Islamic extremists, and encourage countless others to join their ranks and wage war on our allies and our interests in the region, in Europe, and ultimately here at home,” he asserted.»

Lobe parle d’un “acceptance speech” de Gates parce que le secrétaire à la défense recevait la distinction annuelle du JINSA (le Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award, du nom du sénateur démocrate pro-israélien des années 1960-1970, reconnu comme un des parrains historiques des néo-conservateurs). Cette distinction donnée à Gates était surtout considérée comme un test et, éventuellement, un piège qui lui était tendu, pour le forcer à s’engager d’une façon plus affirmée dans une voie extrémiste anti-iranienne. D’une façon générale, une intervention devant le JINSA implique de la part de l’orateur un engagement extrémiste, même si cet engagement n’est pas le sien habituellement, par crainte d’une mise à l’index terroriste de cette organisation. Gates n’a pas cédé à cette menace, ce qui paraît indiquer, outre le fait de sa propre conviction, une certaine solidité de la fraction modérée qu’il représente à l’intérieur de l’administration. On peut peut-être y trouver la confirmation que cette fraction s’appuie sur une partie importante de la puissante hiérarchie militaire US, assez indifférente aux pressions du type JINSA.

Mis en ligne le 18 octobre 2007 à 10H28