Il y en a même (aux USA) pour se réjouir de la crise du dollar

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Certains analystes US ne sont pas mécontents de la crise du dollar. Ils en font une analyse géopolitique et estiment que cette crise forcera les USA à renoncer à leurs engagements militaro-stratégiques dans le monde. C’est un raisonnement quasiment “ron-paulien” (Ron Paul, dénonciateur et adversaire de l’hégémonie du dollar). Il apparaît essentiellement dans la conclusion de l'analyse développée par Edward A. Olsen, professeur des affaires de sécurité nationale à la Naval Postgraduate School à Monterey, en Californie, dans un article mis en ligne le 16 novembre, sur Antiwar.com.

Selon ses conceptions, Olsen apparaît proche des tendances libertariennes. Son raisonnement conduit à proposer une sorte d’isolationnisme par nécessité, selon la fameuse doctrine dite “America First” en vogue jusqu’à l’attaque de Pearl Harbor, mais qui serait cette fois appliquée aux activités postmodernes : tourisme, achats en ville, etc.,– et, au-delà, aux dépenses considérables qu’impliquent les engagements militaires outre-mer et les aides militaires accordées par les USA. Avec un dollar réduit à la portion congrue et ces dépenses multipliées à mesure, Olsen espère que les pressions populaires convaincront le pouvoir américanistes d’abandonner sa coûteuse politique extérieure d’engagement stratégique.

«While the domestic tourism business – for obvious marketing reasons – does not utilize that "America First" label, the more American travelers choose to not go abroad because of higher costs, the more the hidden geopolitical virtues of a declining dollar will become evident. As Americans become less inclined to travel to other countries deemed to be too expensive, the more likely such Americans are to question the logic of the United States being substantially entangled in these wealthy countries' national security as part of American commitments to internationalist geopolitical paradigms.

»The more that many Americans become aware of how expensive it is to be a tourist in these countries because of the foreign currency exchange rates, the more likely it will be that such Americans shall raise questions about how expensive it is for the U.S. government to continue to be a strategic benefactor for such countries. Becoming more conscious of these exchange rates may well cause a growing number of Americans to think about the rising costs in U.S. dollars of maintaining extensive military bases and some very large diplomatic posts with substantial security perimeters in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East which includes paying local supplies, transportation, and infrastructure bills as well as the salaries of numerous local employees. This will become even more evident as "host nation support" programs are cut back due to serious questioning about their virtues in several strategic partners. The more the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the currencies of these allied states shifts in those states' favor, the more expensive the United States' strategic burden shall become. Similarly, as Americans become more conscious of this situation, they may well raise questions about the growing costs of large scale U.S. foreign aid programs in diverse countries due to how currency exchange rates influence the U.S. dollar's buying power overseas. In turn, this may cause Americans to ask why other wealthy countries are not doing more in this regard.

»If Americans become more willing to question the fiscal rationality of such growing internationalist costs, a major example of a hidden geopolitical consequence of the dollar's decline in the international currency exchange system would be how it could create incentives for Americans to press the U.S. government to save money by refocusing upon truly "national" national defense. The more Americans become fiscal conservatives who are aware of, and sensitive to, the growing costs of interventionist international strategic commitments the more likely they are to exert political pressure on the U.S. government to shift the high costs of defending existing allies to all those countries' own national and regional defense programs. Just as Americans are being attracted to a de facto "America First" brand of less expensive domestic tourism as they become conscious of the high costs of traveling abroad, so too may Americans be attracted to a literally "America First" brand of defending their own country – utilizing a "Made in USA" form of defense industrial base – due to the excessively high costs of being an overly generous strategic benefactor for a number of countries around the world. Whether the currency exchange rate shift proves to be of short or long duration it can teach useful lessons to Americans about genuinely conservative U.S. priorities internationally.»


Mis en ligne le 17 novembre 2007 à 18H43