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1996Depuis quelques heures dans cette journée où l’on vote aux USA, les articles commencent à s’empiler sur les révélations concernant les nouveaux ennuis du JSF. La “rumeur” signalée dans cette rubrique ce même 2 novembre 2010, de plus en plus confirmée, devient une lame de fond.
On s’arrêtera à l’article de Bill Sweetman, sur Ares, ce 2 novembre 2010, qui exprime, sur un ton inhabituellement grave, la dimension désormais bien plus que préoccupante, la dimension catastrophique de cette dernière mauvaise nouvelle. Il devient extrêmement difficile de ne pas envisager, d’une façon sérieuse, un destin effectivement catastrophique pour le JSF, dont les versions A et C sont désormais prévues pour atteindre le stade de la possibilité de l’entrée en service en 2016-2017, et la version B (Marine corps) en 2018. Nous ne sommes plus très loin, considéré dans son ensemble, d’une décennie (bien cela, 10 ans) de retard par rapport aux prévisions initiales de ce programme…
Outre les nouvelles qu’il relaie, Bill Sweetman donne ses propres commentaires, où l’on retrouve au cœur de la catastrophe l’“usual suspect” qu’est l’appareillage informatique extrêmement complexe de l’avion, si complexe qu’il en devient une prison et une dynamique déstructurante. Avec le JSF, nous sommes bien au cœur de la crise du système du technologisme.
«The need for more time to mature the aircraft's complex software is a big driver, although the longer delay to the F-35B points to flight-sciences or mechanical challenges with the powered-lift system. (At the International Powered Lift Conference last month in Philadelphia, engineers confirmed, for example, that a new driveshaft was still in the design stage.) […]
»The delays are almost certain to affect the ramp-up of production. As with the delay announced earlier this year, the added R&D costs are likely to be paid for by cutting US low-rate initial production (LRIP) orders, increasing the prices of those aircraft. Combined with delays in IOC dates, this will accelerate the pace at which international partners are moving their deliveries to the right.
»The new Congress, meanwhile, may take action to prevent the delays from increasing the concurrency in the program. Under today's production schedule, a one-year slip in completing development testing means that 150-plus more aircraft will be fully contracted for before DT is completed (the LRIP-8 batch, due to go on contract in early 2014) and 200-plus more before operational testing is done.
»Customers will also have to figure out how many aircraft they can afford to operate, with basically flat budgets suggesting that total force requirements will have to be reduced by one-third. This will put at risk the 200-plus annual production rates on which the program's projections of low average procurement unit costs have been based. For the USAF, this could mean other extra costs to extend the life of older fighters.
»Finally, the entire management structure and culture of the Pentagon's largest project, up to the highest levels, will come under scrutiny. The Pentagon's Joint Estimating Team reported that the program was in trouble in September 2008, but was pooh-poohed by the JPO, Lockheed Martin and senior Pentagon leaders, including deputy defense secretary Gordon England and then acquisition chief John Young. In its second report, in November 2009, the JET warned of a 30-month delay - but that conclusion was watered down, once again, after the JPO and Lockheed Martin promised better performance.
»Now it seems that the JET had it right more than two years ago. How many billions would have been saved if Gates had acted on those recommendations?»
dedefensa.org
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