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10 janvier 2004 — Le texte ci-dessous, de Erich Marquardt, de PINR, est intéressant pour exposer la crise des effectifs US. Par ailleurs, les articles foisonnent dans la presse US sur cette question, qui devient la question du jour. Un exemple de ce foisonnement est la revue de presse du Christian Science Monitor, qui est consacrée à cette question. (Et notre commentaire à ce propos doit être rappelé ici, pour que le lecteur de tous ces déboires extraordinaires d’une armée dans une crise d’effectifs profonde parce qu’elle occupe un pays de 25 millions d’habitants : « pensez qu'ils dépensent $400 milliards par an pour ça. »)
Il y a un décalage stupéfiant entre le catéchisme que continuent à psalmodier nos experts européens et admiratifs à propos de cette “plus grande puissance que l’Histoire ait connue” et les extraordinaires déboires que rencontre cette puissance aujourd’hui. L’argument du budget US, également psalmodié jusqu’ici par les mêmes experts pour magnifier les USA et ridiculiser l’Europe, devient un argument complètement A contrario ; un argument pour élever un monument à l’incompétence humaine, dans le chef du Pentagone et des méthodes américaines : dépenser $400 milliards par an pour en arriver à cette situation, — et songer que toute la direction du Pentagone, l’état-major et les diverses directions de ce ministère restent à leurs postes sans être plus inquiétés que cela...
Mais l’important, que nous voulons signaler ici, au travers de cet intérêt grandissant pour cette question, c’est bien que le débat devient public, qu’il touche désormais la grande presse. Les événements sur le terrain vont évidemment le nourrir et l’aggraver chaque jour davantage. Il faut s’attendre à des remous importants car il s’agit là de la mise en cause de la puissance américaine et de la politique de l’actuel gouvernement américain.
By Erich Marquardt, PINR, 09 January, 2004
In the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration likely planned on stationing U.S. troops in the country years after an established peace. U.S. military interventions have traditionally been followed by a period in which U.S. troops remain in the host country in order to influence future developments there. Even more importantly, interventions that take place in countries located in strategically vital regions give Washington the wherewithal to play a central role in the affairs of those regions. The invasion of Iraq in March of 2003 followed this trend, although not exactly in the manner that Washington policymakers initially hoped for.
Dispelling any notion that U.S. troops were planning on leaving Iraq quickly, various Bush administration and Pentagon spokespeople stated early on that U.S. troops would remain in Iraq for an indefinite period of time. As late as December, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers assured that U.S. troops were not planning on leaving Iraq anytime soon: ''It's going to depend on events over the next couple of years. It's to be determined.''
General Myers' suggestion that U.S. troops will remain in Iraq until possibly 2006 was confirmed by recent comments made by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. Speaking with BBC Radio this month, Straw said that he had no idea when British troops were going to leave Iraq: ''I can't say whether it's going to be 2006, 2007. It's not going to be months, for sure.''
While it was expected that contingents of U.S. troops would remain in Iraq for years after the U.S. occupation was completed, it was not expected that over 100,000 troops would be needed for this mission. The U.S. military, which is composed of an all-volunteer force, is not suited to handle large-scale missions -- such as this one -- for long periods of time. As U.S. Representative John Spratt of South Carolina warned late last year, ''We are pushing the envelope. We are using our troops pretty much to their maximum utility.''
A report released by the Congressional Budget Office recognized this dilemma, concluding that the active Army would be unable to maintain current troop levels in Iraq ''beyond about March 2004 if it chose not to keep individual units deployed to Iraq for longer than one year without relief.'' Indeed, the Pentagon will now be relying on reserve soldiers for combat missions rather than for their traditional combat support roles. This state of affairs has a broad array of implications.
For one, by having such a significant amount of its forces stationed in one country, Washington has less leverage to deal with other world developments that may require a deployment of U.S. troops. It also adds strain to U.S. deployments in other strategically significant states, such as South Korea and Afghanistan. Even though stationing troops in the center of the Middle East gives Washington significant influence in the region, the amount of troops currently needed, in addition to the losses that they are enduring, is not desirable or sustainable.
As a result of the extra strain imposed on U.S. forces due to the length of their deployments, it is becoming harder for the Pentagon to rely on an all-volunteer military force to handle the White House's foreign policy initiatives. Many soldiers in the military originally enlisted during times of relative peace and did not expect to be deployed for months at a time in the Middle East, let alone being placed in a country that is sending body bags and stretchers home on a consistent basis.
This current reality has concerned Washington policymakers as there is a justified fear that troop retention rates will decline and that less individuals will sign up for military service. The idea of an all-volunteer military is now being tested in a manner not experienced before.
Lieutenant General James Helmly, chief of the 250,000-member Army Reserve, told USA Today in the fall of last year that, ''Retention is what I am most worried about. It is my number one concern. This is the first extended-duration war the country has fought with an all-volunteer force.'' Helmly assured that he and other Pentagon officials would be carefully monitoring retention rates in 2004.
There are a few principal reasons why Pentagon officials are concerned about troop retention rates. Even though National Guard and reserve troops were sent to the 1991 war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan, they rarely were deployed on the front lines, and were instead relegated to combat support roles. With the new troop deployment rotation planned by the Pentagon, these troops will serve on the front lines and will certainly see casualties among their ranks.
Additionally, the long troop deployments add quite a burden to the lives of National Guard and reserve troops since these soldiers usually have full-time civilian jobs and only perform military training one weekend a month and for two weeks in the summer. After spending many months away from their civilian jobs, getting reacquainted with the life that they left becomes difficult. While their employers are obliged by law to take them back once they return, they often find that their work opportunities suffer as a result of their extended time away.
Washington policymakers have drafted a number of plans to combat the possibility of decreasing retention rates. One policy decision, which went into effect at the start of 2004, prevents active duty and reserve troops deployed to Iraq and Kuwait from leaving the Army before serving 12 months on the ground, plus another three months once they return from their tours. This order is aimed at preventing soldiers from retiring from the Army after they fulfill the duration of their initial commitment.
The other proposal that has been decided in Washington offers economic bonuses of up to $10,000 to soldiers who are willing to reenlist in the Army for an additional three years and serve in Iraq, Kuwait or Afghanistan.
While these proposals may alleviate troop retention concerns, they may prove to be largely ineffective. The decision to prevent active duty and reserve troops from retiring from the military at the end of their original commitment is, in a way, similar to forced conscription. This was highlighted by Ted Carpenter, an analyst with the Washington-based Cato Institute, who told Reuters, ''Clearly, if large numbers of personnel have their terms extended against their will, that violates the principle of volunteerism. It also suggests just how strained the military is in trying to provide for the Iraqi occupation plus all the other U.S. obligations around the world.''
The other proposal, that of providing financial rewards to soldiers willing to reenlist for an additional three years, also may have limited success. Associated Press writer Matthew Rosenberg, who interviewed U.S. troops in Baqouba, Iraq about the proposed reenlistment bonus, wrote that the idea ''evoked laughter from a few bored-looking troopers,'' one who said, ''there's not enough money in the world to make me stay a month longer.''
If Washington continues to fail in the pacification of Iraq, and therefore cannot reduce its current troop levels there, it will have to seriously consider how to resolve the present strain on U.S. forces. Two primary options, such as pulling troops out of Iraq prematurely, or reintroducing conscription, are not at all desirable to the administration since the former could result in a dramatic blow to U.S. interests while the latter would open up a political hornets nest.
10 janvier 2004 — Le texte ci-dessous, de Erich Marquardt, de PINR, est intéressant pour exposer la crise des effectifs US. Par ailleurs, les articles foisonnent dans la presse US sur cette question, qui devient la question du jour. Un exemple de ce foisonnement est la revue de presse du Christian Science Monitor, qui est consacrée à cette question. (Et notre commentaire à ce propos doit être rappelé ici, pour que le lecteur de tous ces déboires extraordinaires d’une armée dans une crise d’effectifs profonde parce qu’elle occupe un pays de 25 millions d’habitants : « pensez qu'ils dépensent $400 milliards par an pour ça. »)
Il y a décalage stupéfiant entre le catéchisme que continuent à psalmodier nos experts européens et admiratifs à propos de cette “plus grande puissance que l’Histoire ait connu” et les extraordinaires déboires que rencontre cette puissance aujourd’hui. L’argument du budget US, également psalmodié jusqu’ici par les mêmes experts pour magnifier les USA et ridiculiser l’Europe, devient un argument complètement A contrario ; un argument pour élever un monument à l’incompétence humaine, dans le chef du Pentagone et des méthodes américaines : dépenser $400 milliards par an pour en arriver à cette situation, — et songer que toute la direction du Pentagone, l’état-major et les diverses directions de ce ministère restent à leurs postes sans être plus inquiétés que cela...
Mais l’important, que nous voulons signaler ici, au travers de cet intérêt grandissant pour cette question, c’est bien que le débat devient public, qu’il touche désormais la grande presse. Les événements sur le terrain vont évidemment le nourrir et l’aggraver chaque jour davantage. Il faut s’attendre à des remous importants car il s’agit là de la mise en cause de la puissance américaine et de la politique de l’actuel gouvernement américain.
By Erich Marquardt, PINR, 09 January, 2004
In the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration likely planned on stationing U.S. troops in the country years after an established peace. U.S. military interventions have traditionally been followed by a period in which U.S. troops remain in the host country in order to influence future developments there. Even more importantly, interventions that take place in countries located in strategically vital regions give Washington the wherewithal to play a central role in the affairs of those regions. The invasion of Iraq in March of 2003 followed this trend, although not exactly in the manner that Washington policymakers initially hoped for.
Dispelling any notion that U.S. troops were planning on leaving Iraq quickly, various Bush administration and Pentagon spokespeople stated early on that U.S. troops would remain in Iraq for an indefinite period of time. As late as December, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers assured that U.S. troops were not planning on leaving Iraq anytime soon: ''It's going to depend on events over the next couple of years. It's to be determined.''
General Myers' suggestion that U.S. troops will remain in Iraq until possibly 2006 was confirmed by recent comments made by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. Speaking with BBC Radio this month, Straw said that he had no idea when British troops were going to leave Iraq: ''I can't say whether it's going to be 2006, 2007. It's not going to be months, for sure.''
While it was expected that contingents of U.S. troops would remain in Iraq for years after the U.S. occupation was completed, it was not expected that over 100,000 troops would be needed for this mission. The U.S. military, which is composed of an all-volunteer force, is not suited to handle large-scale missions -- such as this one -- for long periods of time. As U.S. Representative John Spratt of South Carolina warned late last year, ''We are pushing the envelope. We are using our troops pretty much to their maximum utility.''
A report released by the Congressional Budget Office recognized this dilemma, concluding that the active Army would be unable to maintain current troop levels in Iraq ''beyond about March 2004 if it chose not to keep individual units deployed to Iraq for longer than one year without relief.'' Indeed, the Pentagon will now be relying on reserve soldiers for combat missions rather than for their traditional combat support roles. This state of affairs has a broad array of implications.
For one, by having such a significant amount of its forces stationed in one country, Washington has less leverage to deal with other world developments that may require a deployment of U.S. troops. It also adds strain to U.S. deployments in other strategically significant states, such as South Korea and Afghanistan. Even though stationing troops in the center of the Middle East gives Washington significant influence in the region, the amount of troops currently needed, in addition to the losses that they are enduring, is not desirable or sustainable.
As a result of the extra strain imposed on U.S. forces due to the length of their deployments, it is becoming harder for the Pentagon to rely on an all-volunteer military force to handle the White House's foreign policy initiatives. Many soldiers in the military originally enlisted during times of relative peace and did not expect to be deployed for months at a time in the Middle East, let alone being placed in a country that is sending body bags and stretchers home on a consistent basis.
This current reality has concerned Washington policymakers as there is a justified fear that troop retention rates will decline and that less individuals will sign up for military service. The idea of an all-volunteer military is now being tested in a manner not experienced before.
Lieutenant General James Helmly, chief of the 250,000-member Army Reserve, told USA Today in the fall of last year that, ''Retention is what I am most worried about. It is my number one concern. This is the first extended-duration war the country has fought with an all-volunteer force.'' Helmly assured that he and other Pentagon officials would be carefully monitoring retention rates in 2004.
There are a few principal reasons why Pentagon officials are concerned about troop retention rates. Even though National Guard and reserve troops were sent to the 1991 war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan, they rarely were deployed on the front lines, and were instead relegated to combat support roles. With the new troop deployment rotation planned by the Pentagon, these troops will serve on the front lines and will certainly see casualties among their ranks.
Additionally, the long troop deployments add quite a burden to the lives of National Guard and reserve troops since these soldiers usually have full-time civilian jobs and only perform military training one weekend a month and for two weeks in the summer. After spending many months away from their civilian jobs, getting reacquainted with the life that they left becomes difficult. While their employers are obliged by law to take them back once they return, they often find that their work opportunities suffer as a result of their extended time away.
Washington policymakers have drafted a number of plans to combat the possibility of decreasing retention rates. One policy decision, which went into effect at the start of 2004, prevents active duty and reserve troops deployed to Iraq and Kuwait from leaving the Army before serving 12 months on the ground, plus another three months once they return from their tours. This order is aimed at preventing soldiers from retiring from the Army after they fulfill the duration of their initial commitment.
The other proposal that has been decided in Washington offers economic bonuses of up to $10,000 to soldiers who are willing to reenlist in the Army for an additional three years and serve in Iraq, Kuwait or Afghanistan.
While these proposals may alleviate troop retention concerns, they may prove to be largely ineffective. The decision to prevent active duty and reserve troops from retiring from the military at the end of their original commitment is, in a way, similar to forced conscription. This was highlighted by Ted Carpenter, an analyst with the Washington-based Cato Institute, who told Reuters, ''Clearly, if large numbers of personnel have their terms extended against their will, that violates the principle of volunteerism. It also suggests just how strained the military is in trying to provide for the Iraqi occupation plus all the other U.S. obligations around the world.''
The other proposal, that of providing financial rewards to soldiers willing to reenlist for an additional three years, also may have limited success. Associated Press writer Matthew Rosenberg, who interviewed U.S. troops in Baqouba, Iraq about the proposed reenlistment bonus, wrote that the idea ''evoked laughter from a few bored-looking troopers,'' one who said, ''there's not enough money in the world to make me stay a month longer.''
If Washington continues to fail in the pacification of Iraq, and therefore cannot reduce its current troop levels there, it will have to seriously consider how to resolve the present strain on U.S. forces. Two primary options, such as pulling troops out of Iraq prematurely, or reintroducing conscription, are not at all desirable to the administration since the former could result in a dramatic blow to U.S. interests while the latter would open up a political hornets nest.
[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit être lu avec la mention classique à l'esprit, — “Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.”.]
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