La crise iranienne (Iran-USA) ne s’arrêtera pas avec GW

En général, par réflexe finalement du à l’épouvantable réputation de GW, nous jouons inconsciemment la montre dans nos raisonnements à propos de la crise iranienne. L’attaque éventuelle de l’Iran par les USA n’est perçue comme possible que d’ici à novembre 2008-janvier 2009 (départ de GW). Est-ce bien le cas?

L’historien et chroniqueur d’origine iranienne Trita Parsi nous rassure, ce qui est vraiment façon de parler : même après le départ de GW, le conflit est très probable. (Dans The American Conservative du 10 septembre). «Clearly, America would not be facing a debacle in the Middle East today had it not been for the misguided policies of these hawks. But as responsible as they are for the current situation and as dangerous as it is to underestimate their influence, there are several flaws with the assumption that the odds for confrontation with Iran will automatically diminish once the Bush presidency is over.»

Parsi place le conflit actuel dans une perspective historique, en remontant jusqu’au Shah. C’est sous la direction du Shah, dans les années 1970, que l’Iran a affirmé sa volonté d’une certaine hégémonie régionale. Les Américains ont accepté cette ambition du Shah, mais plutôt contraints et forcés, parce qu’ils étaient engagés au Vietnam et parce que l’Iran jouait un rôle important dans la stratégie anti-soviétique des USA. Le changement de régime en Iran n’a pas modifié la politique iranienne. Mais les freins à la réaction US du temps du Shah (l’alliance avec le Shah, la stratégie anti-soviétique) ont disparu depuis. Pour Parsi, c’est un point fondamental qui, dans les circonstances de tension actuelles, fait penser que la crise survivra au départ de GW. Les conditions de la compétition pour l’hégémonie sur la région sont plus fortes que jamais, surtout avec les USA en plein déclin et qui tentent de freiner ce mouvement. Parsi est très pessimiste sur les perspectives parce qu’il estime qu’il existe les conditions d’un enchaînement presque automatique vers l’affrontement. Dans tous les cas, il estime que les conditions de cet affrontement seront réunies dans les 12 mois qui viennent.

«This competition is bound to climax as America’s position continues to decline and Iran continues to present itself as Washington’s chief contender. If the two countries continue on their current trajectories, particularly in the nuclear field, the face-off may occur within the next 12 months. The question is not so much if and when it will happen—but how. Historically, these shifts in power have rarely been peaceful, at least not when diplomatic activity has been virtually non-existent.

»Unless a significant shift is made toward robust diplomacy—in which the two states negotiate an agreement for co-existence and a new order for the region—the clash is likely to be violent. In short, as geopolitical forces push the two toward a climax, there will either be comprehensive talks or a confrontation. Washington would be mistaken to think that containment and economic pressure can serve as a middle ground, evading both a costly military showdown and a potentially painful compromise with the mullahs.

»These illusionary alternatives could potentially be pursued if the U.S.-Iranian clash was solely centered around the nuclear issue or Iranian involvement in Iraq. But in this larger strategic battle over pre-eminence in the Middle East, these policies are untenable, largely because time isn’t on America’s side. Sanctions can’t cripple Iran’s economy faster than Tehran marches toward nuclear capability, and perhaps more importantly, Washington can’t weaken Iran faster than it is being weakened in Iraq. As time passes, Iran’s position relative to the United States will likely strengthen. Indeed, Iranian leaders already refer to the U.S. as a “sunset” state and describe themselves as a “sunrise power.” Sooner or later, the containment policy will deteriorate into either talks or military action. More likely than not, the sanctions approach will increase the risk for a confrontation precisely because it renders a diplomatic opening less probable.

»The recent U.S. move to designate the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps as a global terrorist organization is a case in point. The decision has been presented as a step to ratchet up pressure on Iran, even though experts point out that the classification will at most have a marginal effect on the organization. The real impact of the terrorist listing—which is a tricky thing to undo—will be political, for further entrenching U.S.-Iran relations in an antagonistic framework will negatively impact future U.S. presidents’ ability to pursue diplomacy.

»The U.S. and Iran face a situation not too different from the one European powers found themselves in right before the outbreak of World War I. Robust diplomacy has been all but discarded, just as it had been in 1914. Strategists subscribed to the view that the initiator of a conflict would be at such an advantage due to modern technology that mere mobilization should be considered an act of war. Historians have argued that this strategic outlook created an inherent mechanism for self-escalation toward armed conflict. By adhering to these doctrines, decision makers simply abdicated foreign policy to military strategy. Today, the U.S. has put the idea of pre-emption at the center of its National Security Directive to guide both its military decisions and its statecraft.

»Add an already poisonous political atmosphere hovering over the two countries, and the dangers of accidentally slipping into war are palpable. But whereas the simplest mistake—or even inaction—can spark a conflict, diplomacy can only be achieved if deliberately and persistently pursued. Sadly, in spite of much rhetoric to the contrary, real diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran has not even been attempted yet.»

Un dernier mot est de constater que, pour les Européens, cette perspective est évidemment à considérer avec sérieux et gravité. Leur engagement avec les USA sur la question nucléaire iranienne n’implique nullement la question de l’hégémonie dans la région. Clairement, les USA ont, dans cette crise, une autre vison et d’autres intérêts que les Européens. Est-ce beaucoup demander aux Européens d’envisager la crise sous cet angle? Oui, c’est sans doute beaucoup leur demander.

Mis en ligne le 14 septembre 2007 à 09H22