La défaite du complexe militaro-industriel

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L’historien Gabriel Kolko est un spécialiste des questions militaro-politiques et des problèmes de la guerre (Another Century of War?, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern Historical Experience, The Age of War). Il suit attentivement la situation militaire des USA, et, dans le cas que nous présentons, s’arrête à la situation du complexe militaro-industriel (CMI) avec le départ de Donald Rumsfeld.

Dans cet article du 26 décembre, sa conclusion est radicale. Le CMI, préoccupé de tout autre chose que de gagner les guerres réelles, est engagé dans une impasse tragique, et il se trouve peut-être dans sa phase terminale. L’analyse de Kolko nous semble particulièrement fondée et rencontre notre propre sentiment. L’enchaînement et l’accumulation des échecs, des défaites dissimulées et de l’incapacité récurrente de tirer les enseignements de ces événements conduisent le CMI à un destin tragique.

«The fact is that the immense and costly American military today bears no relationship to politics and reality. It accounts for nearly half of the world's military expenditures but it cannot win its two wars against the most primitive enemies, enemies who exist in multiple factions who often fight each other more than Americans and who could not care less what Washington spends on weaponry and manpower. But America's leaders have always assumed convenient enemies who calculate the way the U.S. wants them to. More important, politics was never complicated; it existed as an afterthought and never interfered with fighting and winning wars the American way. But the Soviet Union and Communism no longer exist, and absolutely nothing has changed in America's behavior and thinking. The Pentagon is superb at spending money but its way of warfare in now in a profound and perhaps terminal crisis. It has lost all its wars against persistent guerillas armed with cheap, light weapons that decentralize and hide.

»The military system that Rumsfeld and his precursors created is increasingly dysfunctional and meant only to suit the expensive demands and pretensions of the powerful companies in the military-industrial complex. The emphasis on expensive weaponry is good for the American economy; successful counterinsurgency war costs too little to maintain full employment. It bears scant relationship to the political problems that the U.S. has confronted for decades – and more now than ever.

»America's weapons are made to fight state-centric wars and destroy concentrated targets – they were designed originally for the USSR and its Warsaw bloc allies, and for European conditions. China compelled some minor modifications in this strategy. Even ignoring that nuclear deterrence made this emphasis irrelevant, or that the Korean and Vietnam wars proved it was destined to fail, it took (and still takes) 15 to 20 years to develop and produce this equipment. But Communism has disappeared in Europe and in all but name in China. The budgeting cycle, which keeps the economy of the U.S. buoyant and is deftly spread to numerous Congressional districts, bears no relation to American foreign policy, which makes former friends foes, ex-foes allies and members of NATO, and changes every few years like a kaleidoscope. As a very recent study for the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute concludes, “the United States [is] prepared to fight the most dangerous but least likely threats and unprepared to fight the least dangerous but most likely threats.” The American way of war is technology intensive, firepower focused, logistically superior but politically and culturally ignorant to the point of being pathetic.

»Rumsfeld did not initiate this myopia, which has been inherent in the U.S.' foreign and military policies after 1947 regardless of whether Democrats or Republicans were in power. He only attempted to apply it to Afghan and Iraqi conditions, to sand and heat, to profoundly divided places, and he only continued the legacy of failures that began long ago.

»Hence defeat.»


Mis en ligne le 27 décembre 2006 à 10H13