La démission de Fallon, ou la question des prérogatives des “CinC?

Il est intéressant d’avoir l’analyse de Gareth Porter sur la démission de l’amiral Fallon, dans la mesure où Porter a été constamment le meilleur pourvoyeur d’informations sur le comportement de Fallon. Il donne cette analyse dans Antiwar.com, aujourd’hui.

Porter rappelle l’historique du commandement controversé de Fallon et donne une interprétation de sa démission. Il la voit comme un acte provoqué par l’amiral lui-même à la suite d’une situation devenue intenable moins en raison spécifiquement de la crise iranienne que de son activité en tant que commandant en chef de théâtre (qui implique évidemment des activités autour de la crise iranienne).

«But Fallon's role in regional diplomacy proved to be an even greater source of friction with the White House than his position on military policy toward Iran. Personal relations with military and political leaders in the Middle East had already become nearly as important as military planning under Fallon's predecessors at Centcom.

»Fallon clearly relished his diplomatic role and did not hesitate to express views on diplomacy that were at odds with those of the administration. Last summer, as Dick Cheney was maneuvering within the administration to shift U.S. policy toward an attack on bases in Iran allegedly connected to anti-U.S. Shi'ite forces in Iraq, Fallon declared in an interview, “We have to figure out a way to come to an arrangement” with Iran.

»When Sunni Arab regimes in the Middle East became alarmed about the possibility of a U.S. war with Iran, Fallon made statements on three occasions in September and November ruling out a U.S. attack on Iran. Those statements contradicted the Bush administration's policy of keeping the military option "on the table" and soured relations with the White House.

»Fallon also antagonized administration officials by pushing for a faster exit from Iraq than the White House and Gen. Petraeus wanted. Fallon had a highly publicized personal and policy clash with Petraeus, for whom he reportedly expressed a visceral dislike. Sources familiar with reports of his meetings with Petraeus in Baghdad last March told IPS last spring that he called him an “ass-kissing little chickens**t” in their first meeting.

»Fallon later denied that he had used such language, suggesting to Esquire that the sources of the report were probably army officers who were indulging in inter-service rivalry with the Navy. In fact, however, the sources of the report were supporters of Fallon.

»Fallon's quarrel with Petraeus was also related to the latter's insistence on keeping U.S. troops in Iraq, even while the NATO position in Afghanistan was growing more tenuous. Fallon was strongly committed to a strategy that gave priority to Afghanistan and Pakistan as the central security challenges to the United States in the Middle East and Asia.

(…)

»Fallon was playing a complex political game at Centcom by crossing the White House on the two most politically sensitive issues in Middle East policy. As a veteran bureaucratic infighter, he knew that he was politically vulnerable. Nevertheless, he chose late last year not to lower his profile but to raise it by cooperating fully with the Esquire article.»

Le problème des “CinC” (abréviation de “Commander in Chief”, souvent prononcé par ironie “King”, pour “roi”) remonte à l’époque Clinton. L’affaiblissement du pouvoir civil au profit du pouvoir militaire à Washington a, dès cette époque, tendu à donner aux commandants de théâtre des activités diplomatiques en plus de leurs activités militaires, qui ont interféré de plus en plus souvent sur la diplomatie officielle US. Il semble que les prérogatives de sa fonction, ainsi que le caractère personnel de l’homme, aient poussé Fallon très loin dans ce sens, d’autant que les circonstances (la crise iranienne) l’y poussaient irrésistiblement comme elles poussaient les dirigeants politiques de la région à l’y inciter. L’article de Esquire y fait d’ailleurs largement allusion, détaillant ses rencontres avec l’Egyptien Moubarak, avec le Pakistanais Musharaf, etc., comme s’il s’agissait de véritables missions diplomatiques.

Mis en ligne le 12 mars 2008 à 09H37