La guerre en virtualisme

L’excellent chroniqueur et auteur Tom Engelhardt a entrepris une série d’interviews sur son site TomDispatch.com. Celui (première partie) qui paraît aujourd’hui, sur son site et repris par Antiwar.com, est du plus haut intérêt. Engelhardt interroge Andrew Bacevich, un des auteurs les plus qualifiés et les plus critiques de la politique impériale et militariste des USA.

Bacevitch est un conservateur qui fut un faucon interventionniste, proche des néo-conservateurs, particulièrement engagé dans une politique de très grande fermeté durant la Guerre froide (il fut un collaborateur régulier de National ReviewWeekly Standard), et qui a changé son appréciation durant les années 1990. Depuis, ses livres et ses analyses sont des références de la critique de la politique belliciste US, et de la psychologie américaniste dans ce cadre (voir et surtout lire The New American Militarism, How Americans Are Seduced by War).

Tout est intéressant dans cette interview. On citera tout de même ceci, qui a le mérite de décrire l’aspect fondamental du virtualisme que les bellicistes américanistes, ces gens à la psychologie transformée, ont installé pour justifier leur projet, et particulièrement le justifier à leurs propres yeux.

« TD: Do you think that the neocons and their mentors, Rumsfeld and the vice president, believed too deeply in the hype of American hyperpower? Ruling groups, even while manipulating others, often seem to almost hypnotically convince themselves as well.

» Bacevich: That's why I myself tend not to buy into the charge that Bush and others blatantly lied us into this war. I think they believed most of what they claimed. You should probably put believe in quotes, because it amounts to talking yourself into it. They believed that American omnipotence, as well as know-how and determination, could imprint democracy on Iraq. They really believed that, once they succeeded in Iraq, a whole host of ancillary benefits were going to ensue, transforming the political landscape of the Middle East. All of those expectations were bizarre delusions, and we're paying the consequences now.

» You know, the neoconservatives that mattered were not those in government like Douglas Feith or people on the National Security Council staff, but the writers and intellectuals outside of government who, in the period from the late seventies through the nineties, were constantly weaving this narrative of triumphalism, pretending to insights about power and the direction of history. Intellectuals can put their imprint on public discourse. They can create an environment, an atmosphere. When the events of September 11, 2001, left Americans shocked and frightened and people started casting about for an explanation, a way of framing a response, the neoconservative perspective was front and center and had a particular appeal. So these writers and intellectuals did influence policy, at least for a brief moment. »

Mis en ligne le 24 mai 2006 à 12H08