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15 juin 2004 — L’un des aspects les plus importants de l’aventure irakienne des USA, c’est la mise en évidence des faiblesses de la puissance militaire US. Peu d’experts auraient pu oser faire une telle analyse avant l’Irak. Aujourd’hui, cette analyse est, comme on dit chez ces mêmes experts, “incontournable”. Les Américains ont pris ce risque insensé d’exposer des faiblesses profondes de leur puissance militaire sur laquelle ils appuient toute leur prétention hégémonique ; mais s’ils ont pris ce risque alors qu’il est si peu dans la nature américaine de prendre des risques contrairement aux fables à ce propos, c’est simplement parce qu’ils ignoraient qu’il y avait risque. Encore plus que leurs admirateurs inconditionnels de par le monde et les séminaires d’experts, les Américains ont cru à leur puissance absolue, une puissance au-dessus et au-delà des normes communes.
…Et ils y croient, — nous voulons dire : ils continuent à y croire . C’est là que se trouve la principale difficulté de ce que propose le Dr. Weinstein dans son texte publié ce jour par le groupe d’analyse PINR, ou Power and Interest News Report, et que nous reproduisons ci-dessous. Le texte de Weinstein est particulièrement intéressant, d’abord parce que c’est un des premiers aux USA qui s’attaque directement à ce problème qui est aussi un tabou, et qui est exprimé par cette phrase : « The most severe consequence of America's failed adventure in Iraq is its exposure of American military limitations and vulnerabilities. »
Weinstein envisage ce que pourront faire les Américains pour remédier à ces faiblesses, tant sur le plan militaire directement, tant sur le plan diplomatique indirectement. Des choix douloureux devront être faits. Pour notre part, comme nous l’avons suggéré plus haut, nous n’écartons pas l’hypothèse d’un establishment militaire refusant d’accepter la réalité des faiblesses militaires US, refusant d’y remédier, s’entêtant dans le développement de la formule en place, etc, cela avec des déchirements internes très forts à cause de l’existence de franges réformistes de plus en plus exaspérées, et à cause de “l’existence” de la réalité irakienne. Les observations de Weinstein sont rationnellement justes et fondées, il est moins sûr qu’elles soient reprises à Washington où l’apparente rationalité cache bien des attitudes déraisonnables.
Le vrai problème des militaires US est bien qu’ils ne sont pas tombés dans le travers classique de se préparer pour “la dernière guerre” mais qu’ils ont inventé un nouveau travers, très high tech et très américaniste : se préparer pour la guerre qu’ils voudraient et aimeraient faire. Comme le montre l’Irak, cette “guerre” n’a rien à voir avec la réalité. Le dilemme stratégique sera donc entre la réalité et le virtualisme (continuer à affirmer que la guerre irakienne n’est pas “la bonne”, que les USA doivent préparer “leur” guerre). Connaissant Washington, on se permettra de ne pas donner cher de la réalité…
By Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, June 15, 2004, PINR
The most severe consequence of America's failed adventure in Iraq is its exposure of American military limitations and vulnerabilities.
The failures of the intervention are manifold. Some of them can be chalked up to
poor planning and excessive optimism — both fueled by utopian neo-conservative
ideology — but others have revealed structural weaknesses.
Just to name a few of the latter: reliance on private contractors to perform key missions at inflated prices, flawed intelligence, overuse of reserve troops, redeployment of troops from South Korea and extensions of the duration of combat duty. All of the foregoing point to the same root problem: the United States military is underforced for any major project of nation building in absolute numbers and, more importantly, in the distribution of specialties.
The occupation has revealed that America lacks the capacity to neutralize insurgent movements, run prisons effectively, procure actionable intelligence and conduct successful public relations. Most importantly, it has proven unable to provide the basic function of government: personal security in the forms of public safety and basic services.
The world now knows that there will not be another pre-emptive war launched by the United States in the near or medium term. Not only is America tied down in Iraq, but it showed that it is ill-equipped and ill-prepared for nation building in the weakest member of the “axis of evil” — the one that had been beaten down by economic sanctions and that harbored an anti-regime population, except for the Ba'athists and their tribal connections. American defense intellectuals and security leadership are aware of the reassessment of American power that is
occurring globally, and the dilemma that it poses for American strategic policy.
The hard choice that now faces the United States is whether to rebuild its military power so that it can undertake not only wars, but their aftermaths; or to retreat into a more defensive posture, opening the way to multi-polarism. Each option has its costs and its benefits. Which one is chosen will depend on the decisions of the security leadership in the United States and its ability to persuade or frighten the American public to accept its policies.
It is most likely that either a Kerry or a Bush administration will try to restore a multilateral foreign and military policy in which the United States is the dominant partner, making the move to rebuild American military power to meet the demands of future nation building efforts the most probable choice of the security leadership. If so, the military will have to be expanded in size, and investment will have to be made in labor-intensive skilled specialties such as intelligence, policing and civil affairs. The problem is getting the personnel and paying for the expansion.
The stark reality that the United States and its population will have to make sacrifices if America is to regain its power will probably play a very small role in the 2004 presidential campaigns, but will only be brought forward after the next administration takes office. The means to restoring American power are simply politically unacceptable in an election year.
The need to expand the number of troops brings to the forefront the possibility of activating the draft. Current proposals for a draft — for example, Congressman Charles Rangel's — would not allow college deferments and would place women in the pool. The upper-middle class, including its Republican members, would resist a draft that would include its children, and social conservatives would resist a draft that would include women. Yet there would be
equal resistance from the working class, economically disadvantaged minorities and the left, if those provisions were dropped.
There is also a high likelihood of the appearance of a broad anti-draft movement on campuses if a conscription policy is pursued. Other issues concern whether a draft would install universal national service or would conscript a relatively small portion of the entire pool. In the first case, public resistance would be formidable; in the second case, an element of arbitrariness and sense of injustice would create chronic social resentment.
Attempts to expand the military without a draft would require attracting recruits — particularly those capable of learning needed specialties — through higher pay scales and easier enlistment terms, increasing the cost of expansion. In any scenario, rebuilding for nation building capability will be expensive. Private contracting will be no solution; its use in Iraq was predicated on a quick victory and a short aftermath. Will the wealthier portion of the American public that has benefited from lower tax rates be willing to surrender its
advantages in order to fund military rebuilding? Will powerful interest groups and broad sectors of the public seeking to expand medical benefits be willing to see Medicare downsized? Will major financial interests sit by while deficits mount? What about competing budgetary demands for “homeland security” and squeezed social services?
In addition to the probable domestic resistance against any serious rebuilding program, the United States will not be able to count on early cooperation from other powers if it makes the effort. Traditional allies will be tentative as they assess the level of American commitment, and they will have to be responsive to their own publics, which are at best distrustful of American aims. More independent powers like Russia, China and India will be tempted to be
obstructionist.
After the November election, policymakers will confront the hard choice between pushing for measures that demand sacrifices from the public or retracting the potential projection of American power. If the decision is made to try to rebuild, the ensuing domestic conflict will deepen existing divisions in American society and create new ones, further impairing American power, at least in the short run, by weakening popular consensus on foreign policy. If the decision is made not to try to rebuild, America will not retreat entirely to its
“fortress,” but will quietly concede its influence to regional powers, intensifying the drift toward multi-polarism.
Neo-conservative strategic doctrine has stressed threats from hostile or potentially hostile nation states. Internationalist strategic doctrine has stressed threats from failed states and the transnational Islamist revolutionary movements. In both cases, the assumption has been made that America and its allies simply had to mobilize and redirect present resources properly against the threats.
Now the situation has changed. Advocates of both paradigms are faced with the same requirement to fight for rebuilding in order to fulfill their strategic designs. Look for the crunch to come after November.
[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit être lu avec la mention classique à l'esprit, — “Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.”.]
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