Le FT n’est vraiment pas tranquille

Qui se souvient de la crise de l’été, de la crise financière du mois d’août? Oublié, tout ça? Toujours les mêmes questions. C’est la rentrée, les activités reprennent. Mais les activités ne sont pas très gaies. Le Financial Times se distingue, depuis l’origine de la crise, par une vision très noire, très pessimiste. On reconnaîtra au quotidien de la City une incontestable expertise dans la matière financière. Son inquiétude est donc inquiétante. Le thème de cet article de ce jour est le contraire de l’apaisement, mais plutôt le sentiment d’une montée de pessimisme, vers une crise majeure.

«As bankers have returned to their desks this week after the summer break, they have been searching frantically for signs that the markets are gaining a semblance of calm after the August turmoil.

»However, the money markets are notably failing to offer any reassurance. While the tone of equity markets has calmed, the sense of crisis in the interbank markets actually appears to be growing – especially in London.

»In particular, the cost of borrowing funds in the three-month money markets – as illustrated by measures such as sterling Libor or Euribor – is continuing to rise, suggesting a frantic scramble for liquidity among financial groups.

»This trend is deeply unnerving for policymakers and investors alike, not least because it is occurring even though the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve have taken repeated steps in recent weeks to calm down the money markets.

»“What is happening right now suggests that the moves by the Fed and ECB just haven’t worked as we hoped,” admits one senior international policymaker. Or as UniCredit analysts say: “The interbank lending business has broken down almost completely . . . it is a global phenonema and not restricted to just the euro and dollar markets.”

»If this situation continues, it could potentially have very serious implications. One of the most important functions of the money markets is to channel liquidity in the banking system to where it is most needed. These markets seize up for any lengthy period, there is a risk that individual institutions may discover they no longer have access to the funds they need.

»This danger has already materialised for vehicles that depend on the asset-backed commercial paper sector – short-term notes backed by collateral such as mortgages. In recent weeks, investors have increasingly refused to re-invest in this paper.

»As Axel Weber, a member of the ECB council, admitted this weekend: “The institutions most affected currently are conduits and structured investment vehicles . . . Their ability to roll these short-term commercial papers is impaired by the events in the subprime segment of the US housing market.”

»This problem is affecting the wider banking system because these vehicles are now tapping other sources of finance – mainly liquidity lines from banks.

»It appears that the prospect of receiving new liquidity demands has prompted banks to rush to raise funds – and, above all, hoard any liquidity they hold.

»The high demand from banks to secure liquidity for the next three months, coupled with their desire not to lend out what liquidity they have, has made it virtually impossible to execute trades – even at the official prices quoted for such borrowing.

»That has created some extraordinary dislocations such as the fact that the cost of borrowing three-month money in the sterling Libor markets is now higher than borrowing six-month or 12-month money. “The system has just completely frozen up – everyone is hoarding,” says one bank treasurer. “The published Libor rates are a fiction.”

»This situation could become increasingly dangerous in part because many other markets, such as swaps, are priced off the three-month Libor and Euribor rates. So the interbank freeze could have knock-on effects throughout the financial system.»

La crise est une crise typiquement postmoderne dans sa substance: la mise à jour, dans une situation d’urgence de la réalité de l’argent disponible par rapport au volume d’argent sur lequel portent les transactions. La disproportion énorme en défaveur des liquidités, alors que de nombreuses banques cherchent justement à retrouver des liquidateurs, est une illustration de l’état du système, — système financier mais aussi système politique et “philosophique” si l’on peut dire. La pression psychologique de cette situation, entre réalité découverte à sa juste mesure et mesure de l’importance du virtualisme dans la richesse affichée constitue un redoutable cocktail qui put être générateur de panique.

Effectivement, on se rapproche du mécanisme de la vraie crise qui a “dynamisé” la Grande Dépression à partir de 1931-32. Dans ce cas, ce furent les particuliers qui commencèrent à retirer leurs liquidités des banques, acculant celles-ci à des faillites retentissantes, nourrissant la sensation de l’effondrement du système, l’angoisse, la panique, etc. C’est ce phénomène qu’évoquait récemment Evans-Pritchard, de Times. L’on voit à cette occasion que la situation évoquée au niveau des banques par rapport au système dont elles dépendent peut effectivement se transmettre au niveau du public et retrouver les pires moments du déclenchement de la Grande Dépression US, — “modèle” à privilégier parce qu’il concerne un effondrement intervenant dans une situaton d’économie [également avec ses tendances virtualistes] triomphante — les Roaring Twenties aux USA, — à l’inverse des économies européennes ravagées par la Grande Guerre.

Mis en ligne le 5 septembre 2007 à 12H39