Le sombre diagnostic du professeur Galbraith

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Le sombre diagnostic du professeur Galbraith

11 octobre 2004 — William Keegan, chef du service économique de l’Observer, a rencontré John Kenneth Galbraith, vieux et célèbre économiste libéral américain d’origine canadienne, qui travailla dans diverses fonctions gouvernementales américaines, de Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) à John Fitgzerald Kennedy (JFK). Galbraith a aujourd’hui 96 ans, auteur d’une myriade de bouquins à succès et travaillant à son dernier, et toujours bon pied bon œil (« As Catherine Galbraith offered a glass of sherry, the professor boomed: “I'm still partly crippled, but alcohol is still remedial.” »)

C’est un bonheur rare de l’entendre discourir des sujets qui l’intéressent, car c’est son habitude de mener lui-même les interviews qu’on lui fait subir. Sujet de prédilection (c’est un signe des temps) : la catastrophique équipe GW. Le vieux professeur Galbraith, que l’auteur de l’interview n’a guère pu détacher de son sujet de prédilection, est extrêmement pessimiste quant à l’avenir de l’Amérique :

« Warming to his theme, [Galbraith] said: “This is a crude government, and its crude misdirection of power in minor things has more direct impact domestically than abroad.” Such as? “One of the worst things — unimaginable in Britain — is the open character of legislation for the rich, particularly on taxation; and the open resistance to support for the poor.”

» But that was not all. “When income tax reductions,” he pauses and revises ‘reductions’ to ‘slashes’, “were put into effect they were combined with this warning: ‘Let's not open the way for a softer policy for the poor and the unemployed’ — a softer policy that in Keynesian terms might have been a more important factor in alleviating the recession.” [...]

« “We are seeing the disintegration of the American economic and wider world role, which could well continue after this election. I am talking about the passage of power to the Rumsfelds of the economic and political structure.” » [...]

« In one sense, as he acknowledges, little has changed since President Eisenhower warned in the 1950s of a “military industrial complex”. As Galbraith says, “a large, vital and expanding part of what is called the public sector is for all practical effect in the private sector... much [arms expenditure] is at the initiative and with the authority of the arms industry and its political voice — the private sector.

» Galbraith gave a dire warning of what would happen if Bush was re-elected. 'Under the thrust of power of present forces, including the money-making powers, there's going to be a continuing and disastrous [American] decline. The Rumsfelds and the Cheneys will still be there, and anyone with a grasp of world history should be here to report it.' He smiled and said: “Why don't you do that?'

» The great man feels passionately. “In all my 90-odd years, I've never had such a clear view of the future,” adding with a twinkle in his eye, “with still, of course, the possibility of being wrong.” But only the possibility. “I have a feeling that not since the end of World War Two have we had such a time when the role of wisdom, action and misunderstanding in the US has such worldwide consequences.” »

L’intérêt est également, de façon plus précise, dans le jugement que donne Galbraith du comportement britannique dans l’évolution de la crise américaine, notamment le comportement et la politique de Tony Blair. Il apparaît très vite comme allant de soi que Galbraith est très sévère pour la politique de Tony Blair. Surtout, il la juge implicitement extrêmement stupide, tant elle apporte un appui à un gouvernement (US) catastrophique, — un gouvernement dans lequel Galbraith ne voit aucune raison qui justifie le moindre soutien (un gouvernement où l’on ignore même Keynes : « this is the only government in 30 or 40 years with no one in authority who has ever heard of John Maynard Keynes »).

D’où ces interrogations de Galbraith :

« Then, before I could ask a question, he sailed in. “Let's start with a few problems I have. Is Blair in trouble?” I said he ought to be, but it might be wishful thinking on my part, and reminded him of Lord Hailsham's dictum that the British political system is an “elective dictatorship”.

» Galbraith continued: “It's a strange political calculation of his to stay for so long in support of George Bush. Why did he do that?” I said his bafflement was shared by many here.

» The wise professor, who has advised both FD Roosevelt and JF Kennedy in his time, went on to express very strong views: “It is not a good design for relations with the US because the active voices in this country on international policy are all in conflict with Bush.” What the “special relationship” needed was “a certain deeper association and alliance with someone who is responsibly critical. For whatever reason, that has not been the case in Britain”.

» In Galbraith's view the French were more in tune with reality. “Politics must take account not only of the position of the government but also of the forces behind it, and Blair does not have the support of the articulate in the US.” He added: “And that is the group which has always thought well of a certain allied relationship with Britain.” He paused. “There was a better decision by Winston Churchill!” »

L’analyse de Galbraith est intéressante en ce qu’elle conduit à penser qu’une majorité de l’establishment est hostile à la politique de GW (et, par conséquent, dit Galbraith, la politique française est la bonne, au contraire de celle de Blair). Galbraith signifie-t-il implicitement que Kerry a une “bonne” politique, qui serait différente de celle de GW ? Il ne s’exprime pas là-dessus (et l’on sait que la position de Kerry est aujourd’hui un point capital, avec un tournant constant vers la droite au point où, en souriant à peine, certains font de Kerry le plus récent adepte du néo-conservatisme).

La question est bien de savoir comment les opposants à la politique de GW oseront s’exprimer, et dans quelles circonstances. Pour l’instant, on a plutôt l’impression que règne à Washington un conformisme de fer, maximaliste, patriotard, qui soutient la politique actuelle. C’est-à-dire que ceux qui sont opposés, ceux auxquels Galbraith fait allusion, continuent (pour l’instant ? Jusqu’à quand ?) à affirmer officiellement leur soutien, — par “devoir”, c’est-à-dire plutôt par conformisme et par couardise.