L’échec de Tsahal : une médiocrité étrangement classique

Le plus étonnant dans l’actuelle crise Israël-Hezbollah, c’est le contraste entre la présentation initiale de cette crise (explosive, révolutionnaire, peut-être le début de la Guerre mondiale n°III ou n°IV, etc.) et éventuellement ses effets très indirects (comme par exemple, certains aspects de la situation britannique), — et, d’autre part, le caractère incroyablement classique, habituel, répétitif, des erreurs qui y sont commises dès le départ. Ce contraste est d’ailleurs plus que saisissant, il est paralysant pour le théâtre de la crise lui-même. Comment espérer des événements révolutionnaires directs avec des outils aussi mal adaptés, aussi pervertis dès l’origine?

De ce point de vue de la médiocrité qu’est devenue la puissance israélienne, l’unanimité est en train de se faire…

Extrait de The Observer du 6 août : «  Meron Rappoport, a former editor at the Israeli daily Haaretz and military analyst, criticised the air force's methods for selecting targets: “The impression is that information is sometimes lacking. One squadron leader admitted the evidence used to determine attacks on cars is sometimes circumstantial — meaning that if people are in an area after Israeli forces warned them to leave, the assumption is that those left behind must be linked to Hizbollah ... This is problematic, as aid agencies have said many people did not leave ... because they could not, or it was unsafe to travel on the roads thanks to Israel's aerial bombardment. ”

Une vue plus large de Rosemary Hollis, du RIIA (Chatam House), rapportée par AFP le 5 août : « “The Israelis lack good intelligence. They have completely underestimated the size of the Hezbollah arsenal, the amount of weapons they've got stockpiled. […] It's the classic situation of a guerrilla (war). You can't win except by the most appalling devastation, which is a pyrrhic victory anyway.”

» Israel failed to identify how deep the militants bury themselves in southern Lebanon, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert allowed himself to be convinced by the chief of staff — who is from the air force — that air power could achieve more that it can, the analyst believes. The level of ground forces that would be required to “really smash this kind of enemy is probably something that not even a good proportion of the Israelis could tolerate,” she added.

» Israel is now scaling back its operations accordingly and is hoping to score some kind of success — such as the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah or reducing the number of rockets fired at Israel — before a ceasefire is inevitable. “They would quite like a ceasefire, but they need a success in order to get it,” Hollis said.

» “You need to address the grievances that the supporters of Hezbollah have, more effectively than Hezbollah. Even if Hezbollah stands for the elimination of Israel, that is not a grievance of their supporters. The plight of the Palestinians, the occupation or the use of military force against Israel's neighbours, the seemingly double standards by which Israel is allowed to flout international law and others are not... You have to address all of those things.” »

Mis en ligne le 6 août 2006 à 15H01