Les experts sortent de plus en plus du bois pour nous dire : la bombe iranienne? Bof…

Il est vrai que, depuis quelques semaines, le sentiment général est que la perspective jusqu’alors cataclysmique d’une arme nucléaire iranienne est en train de s’évader vers une certaine relativité de la chose. On l’a déjà signalé et il est bon d’observer que cette évolution se poursuit. Une analyse en date du 11 novembre de McClatchy Newspapers développe ce thème.

«“Would I like Iran to have a nuclear bomb? No,” said Robert Jervis, a Columbia University professor of international politics who has written widely on nuclear deterrence. But, “the fears (voiced) by the administration and a fair number of sensible people as well, just are exaggerated. The idea that this will really make a big difference, I think is foolish.”

»Even some commentators in Israel, whose leaders see themselves in Iran's crosshairs, present a more nuanced view of the potential threat than the White House does.

»An Iranian nuclear bomb could present Israel “with the real potential for an existential threat,” Ephraim Kam of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv wrote in February.

»But Kam noted that Israel has its own unacknowledged nuclear deterrent — estimated at 100 to 200 warheads — larger than anything Iran could marshal for years to come.

»Despite Iran's “messianic religious motivations,” he wrote, “it is highly doubtful that Tehran would want to risk an Israeli nuclear response” by attempting a first strike.

»Moreover, Iran, which says its nuclear research is aimed at generating electric power, is not thought to be close to having a nuclear weapon. In the worst-case scenario, it could have enough highly enriched uranium, a basic weapon ingredient in weapons, in two to three years.

(…)

»We haven't talked to the Iranians well enough. We talked to the Soviets all the time,” said former CIA analyst Judith Yaphe, now at the National Defense University. She added: “But I don't trust someone like (Iranian President Mahmoud) Ahmadenijad to understand where the red lines are.”

»Others, including Columbia's Jervis, say the U.S. government has not examined in depth how a nuclear armed Iran might behave for a simple reason: Bush's policy is that Iran will not be allowed to have the bomb.

»U.S., Israeli and European concerns about a nuclear Iran generally fall into three categories:

»The first is that it would hand over a nuclear weapon to terrorists, hoping to elude responsibility for an attack on Israel or America.

»But Kam, the Israeli analyst, wrote that the chance of this “appears low.” A more serious worry, he wrote, is that Iran could deter Israel from acting against Hezbollah, Iran's terrorist proxy that opposes Israel's existence.

»Mohsen Sazegara, who helped found Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and is now a U.S.-based dissident, also predicted Iran would not engage in nuclear terrorism. “If I found out somebody was thinking of this, I'd have to say I don't know my country,” he said.»

Quand on observe que certains continuent à s’appuyer sur, ou à fréquenter encore les thèses apocalyptiques, type Troisième Guerre mondiale de GW ou “l’arme nucléaire iranienne est inacceptable” de Sarko, on se dit que tout cela commence à faire désordre. Il faut mesurer la stupidité himalayesque de l’intelligentsia occidentale type BHL lorsqu’elle se paye des jugements comme celui de Dame Daley, philosophe consacrée (sottise presque parfaite d’un jugement tel que «…Iran, whose nuclear ambitions are the greatest threat to international security in our time»). Si le courant relativiste du nucléaire iranien progresse encore et devient jugement commun, peut-être même jugement officiel dans certains cas, nous devrons alors observer avec intérêt les difficiles contorsions des moralistes publicitaires pour évoluer et tenter de se détacher d’une position si complètement verrouillée dans le radicalisme absolue. C’est un des grands sports de notre époque.

Mis en ligne le 12 novembre 2007 à 18H37