Les militaires US tentent de calmer les Israéliens après la NIE 2007

Une brève visite en Israël du président du Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), l’amiral Muellen, a montré indirectement la force du choc que la publication de la NIE 2007 a provoqué chez les Israéliens. Un article de Defense News du 17 décembre nous donne quelques précisions à ce propos. (Le titre ne dissimule rien : «U.S. JCS Chief Tries To Calm Israelis Over Iran.»)

«In a brief visit here by U.S. Navy Adm. Michael Mullen, the first by a chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in a decade, Israeli officials discussed not only the differences driving U.S. and Israeli force planning, but conflicting conclusions by their respective intelligence communities regarding Iran’s nuclear weapon program.

(…)

»U.S. officials insisted the trip was not aimed at controlling damage from the controversial National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), but Mullen’s visit allowed officials to vent frustrations over findings that Tehran had suspended its nuclear weapon program and was now less intent on acquiring atomic arms.

»In a Dec. 11 interview, an Israeli official conceded that presentations by Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, director of military intelligence, contained no new data or supporting evidence that had not already been shared with U.S. allies. Nevertheless, he said, the briefing provided a thorough chronological accounting and methodological explanation of how Israeli analysts arrived at conclusions that ran counter to the NIE, released Dec. 3.

»According to the official, Mullen repeatedly tried to assuage Israeli angst over the damage the downgraded U.S. threat estimate would inflict on efforts to rally international opposition to Iran’s uranium enrichment program.

»“The chairman insisted he still viewed Iran as a significant threat to the region, and that was nice. But so what? The damage from the NIE is already done,” he said.

»A JCS spokesman, Capt. John Kirby, confirmed that Mullen “remains concerned about the continued threat by Iran’s actions, words and intentions in the region.”»

Le reste de la dépêche aborde surtout la question des capacités et des structures des forces israéliennes (IDF), dont le chef d’état-major israélien a discuté avec Muellen. Les Israéliens ont expliqué à leurs interlocuteurs US qu’ils ne peuvent organiser leurs forces en fonction de capacités doubles, – guerre conventionnelle de haut niveau et guerre assymétrique, – mais seulement prévoir une organisation pour la guerre conventionnelle à haut niveau avec adaptation aux guerres assymétriques selon les théâtres.

«In a sanitized account of his discussions with Mullen, [IDF Chief of Staff, General] Ashkenazi cited the Iranian nuclear threat and other negative developments in the region that may compel the IDF to wage simultaneous symmetric and asymmetric combat on multiple fronts. At the same time, the IDF must defend the Israeli home front from increasingly lethal and long-range rocket and missile attacks, he said.

»Addressing participants at a Dec. 12 conference by Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Ashkenazi said the IDF is reorganizing and re-equipping itself to deliver rapid, decisive victory.

»“The basis for this will be determined by our ability to be decisive in symmetric engagements,” he said. “By preparing to win conventional wars, the IDF will acquire decisive capabilities also for asymmetrical engagements, and not vice versa.

»At the same time, Ashkenazi said, the IDF knows how to build small numbers of smart, special units — such as undercover commandos operating in the West Bank — with the “unique knowledge and all the special tools in the toolbox that they require.”

»He also cautioned that asymmetrical tactics, operating concepts and force structure differs in each of IDF’s geographic theaters. “Not every asymmetric war is the same. There are differences in how we fight in Gaza, against Hizbollah in Lebanon and in the West Bank, and the key is to know how to distinguish among the differences and exploit them.”

»But Ashkenazi insisted that one thing remains common to all of the IDF’s asymmetric war-fighting scenarios: “We’ll always need a physical presence, both for intelligence and for operative control. We cannot rely on firepower to be decisive in asymmetric war.”

»In a direct reference to Iran, Ashkenazi said the coming years will require the IDF to strengthen its “long-arm” attack capabilities andearly warning, intelligence and networked command-and-control systems.

»“It’s up to the international community to act in a determined way to stop Iran’s nuclearization,” he said. “But at the same time, we have the responsibility to prepare for any scenario in the event that international efforts do not succeed.”»

On retient de toutes ces explications complexes et quelque peu nébuleuses au moins deux impressions centrales:

• La première est que les Israéliens ont admis que la NIE 2007 implique sans aucun doute l’abandon d’une possibilité d’attaque aérienne contre l’Iran, non seulement avec les USA, mais y compris pour eux seuls avec l’autorisation US. Les militaires israéliens parlent désormais des “coming years” pour se préparer à un possible affrontement avec les Iraniens et reconnaissent que c’est à la “communauté internationale” de régler le problème du nucléaire. L'ampleur du choc de la NIE 2007 se mesure à cette position.

• Il ne nous apparaît pas évident que l’IDF ait vraiment bien récupéré de son échec contre le Hezbollah. Elle continue à s’ébattre dans des concepts complexes et directement hérités des penseurs du Pentagone. L’échec essuyé par les Israéliens avec la NIE 2007 accentue certainement cette tendance en multipliant les équations d’affrontement possible et en élargissant le spectre de ces affrontements, avec l'inclusion de l'Iran comme acteur central dans ces hypothèses.

Mis en ligne le 18 décembre 2007 à 13H31