Les obligations de l’OTAN et de l'Europe, selon Robert D. Kaplan (II)

Puisque nous y sommes, poursuivons à propos de l’article de Robert D. Kaplan, décidément très intéressant.

Nous nous attachons à deux paragraphes à la fin de ce long article, où Kaplan suggère ce que pourrait être le rôle de l’OTAN dans la perspective générale du changement du centre de gravité des intérêts stratégiques vitaux des USA qu’il évoque, du Moyen-Orient vers le Pacifique. Pour Kaplan, l’Europe n’a de chance (?) de rester à une bonne place dans les préoccupations washingtoniennes que si elle fournit, non pas des bataillons supplétifs, mais des escadres navales supplétives aux ambitions US dans le Pacifique. Donc, l’OTAN, regroupant les Européens selon les vœux washingtoniens, doit changer vite fait, passer de son statut actuel de dinosaure fossilisé à celui d’une alliance navale aux ordres de PACOM (Pacific Command).

Bien : au moins, Kaplan ne se cache pas derrière son petit doigt pour dire aux Européens ce qu’on attend d’eux. Plus intéressant encore, dans le registre des confidences : il nous dit ce qu’il faut penser des efforts des Européens pour former une défense européenne. Et il ne prend pas de gants, ce qui est bienvenu: cette initiative doit être absolument liquidée. Kaplan met les points sur les i: « Let me be even clearer about something that policymakers and experts often don't want to be clear about. », — suit la prescription de liquidation des ambitions européennes. Si l’on prend en compte ce qu’on a dit dans notre “bloc-notes” précédent du crédit qu’il faut accorder à Kaplan, la confidence vaut de l’or.

La voici (nous nous permettons de souligner de gras le passage le plus abruptement intéressant pour nous autres, Européens):

« ... The sea may be NATO's and Europe's best chance for a real military future. And yet the alliance is literally and symbolically weak. For it to regain its political significance, NATO must become a military alliance that no one doubts is willing to fight and kill at a moment's notice. That was its reputation during the Cold War —and it was so well regarded by the Soviets that they never tested it. Expanding NATO eastward has helped stabilize former Warsaw Pact states, of course, but admitting substandard militaries to the alliance's ranks, although politically necessary, has been problematic. The more NATO expands eastward, the more superficial and unwieldy it becomes as a fighting force, and the more questionable becomes its claim that it will fight in defense of any member state. Taking in yet more substandard militaries like Ukraine's and Georgia's too soon is simply not in NATO's interest. We can't just declare an expansion of a defense alliance because of demonstrations somewhere in support of democracy. Rather, we must operate in the way we are now operating in Georgia, where we have sent in the Marines for a year to train the Georgian armed forces. That way, when a country like Georgia does make it into NATO, its membership will have military as well as political meaning. Only by making it an agile force that is ready to land on, say, West African beaches at a few days' or hours' notice can we save NATO.

» And we need to save it. NATO is ours to lead —unlike the increasingly powerful European Union, whose own defense force, should it become a reality, would inevitably emerge as a competing regional power, one that might align itself with China in order to balance against us. Let me be even clearer about something that policymakers and experts often don't want to be clear about. NATO and an autonomous European defense force cannot both prosper. Only one can —and we should want it to be the former, so that Europe is a military asset for us, not a liability, as we confront China. »

Mis en ligne le 24 mai 2005 à 10H15