L’hypothèse de Lind: le calme en Irak avant la tempête par l’Iran

Certains milieux et experts occidentaux restent persuadés qu’il y aura une attaque US contre l’Iran avant la fin du mandat GW Bush. (C’est le cas notamment des Français et de Sarkozy, selon des sources européennes impliquées dans les négociations avec l’Iran, – très intenses en ce moment. Ce serait une explication de la politique française, dont le maximalisme serait tactique et aurait pour but de pousser les Iraniens aux concessions pour éviter le plus possible tout prétexte d’attaque US. Les Français considèrent cette perspective d’une attaque US comme catastrophique et il est hors de question qu’ils y participent.)

William S. Lind est de ceux qui penchent pour cette hypothèse d’une attaque. Il est d’autant plus à l’aise pour présenter une hypothèse sur la situation en Irak, actuellement marquée par un apaisement certain. (Lind a toujours considéré avec un certain scepticisme l’explication officielle de la “victoire” US du “surge” en Irak.) Il avance une autre explication, qui a notamment à voir avec la situation iranienne, – mentionnant d’ailleurs une observation du New York Times ayant un rapport avec la décision du chef chiite extrémiste Sadr et d’autres chefs chiites de cesser leurs attaques contre les forces US en Irak («The Sunday, November 18 New York Times made passing mention of a possible clue. It suggested that the Mahdi Army and some other Shi'ites have backed away from confronting the U.S. because Iran asked them to»). Dans cette hypothèse, on relève effectivement la possibilité d’une attaque US de l’Iran d’ici la fin du mandat Bush.

Le texte de Lind paraît aujourd’hui sur Antiwar.com.

«Here's a hypothesis. What if the Iranians had determined, rightly or wrongly (and I suspect rightly), that the Bush administration has already decided to attack Iran before the end of its term? Two actions would seem logical on their part. First, try to maneuver the Americans into the worst possible position on the moral level by denying them pretexts for an attack. Telling their allied Shi'ite militias in Iraq to cool it would be part of that, as would reducing the flow of Iranian arms to Iraqi insurgents and improving cooperation with the international community on the nuclear issue. We see evidence of the latter two actions as well as the first.

»Second, they would tell their allies in Iraq to keep their powder dry. Back off for now, train, build up stocks of weapons and explosives and work out plans for what they will do as their part of the Iranian counter-attack. Counter-attack there will certainly be, on the ground against our forces in Iraq, in one form or another. In almost all possible counter-attack scenarios, it would be highly valuable to Iran if the Mahdi Army and other Shi'ite militias could cut the Americans' supply lines running up from Kuwait and slow down their movements so that they could not mass their widely dispersed forces. In John Boyd’s phrase, it would be a classic Cheng-Chi operation.

»Again, I cannot say this is what lies behind the Mahdi Army's stand-down; Zeppelin reconnaissance over Iran has been inconclusive. But it is consistent with three probabilities: that the Bush administration has decided to bomb Iran, that the Iranians plan in response to roll up our army in Iraq and that Muqtada al-Sadr and other Iraqi Shi'ite leaders coordinate their actions closely with Tehran.

»In past wars, quiet periods at the front have often preceded a “big push” by one side or both. Such may prove to be the case in Iraq as well, at least as far as Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army are concerned. If so, in view of the situations in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Lebanon and the almost certain failure of the Tea Lady's Annapolis initiative, 2008 may see the Islamic world in flames from the Himalayas to the Mediterranean. To paraphrase Horace Greeley, buy gold, young man, buy gold.»

Mis en ligne le 29 novembre 2007 à 15H03