L’“incident du Golfe Persique”: toujours la thèse de la Navy avec sa politique d’accommodement

Il se confirme qu’un aspect important de l’“incident du Golfe Persique” entre Iraniens et U.S. Navy est le comportement de l’U.S. Navy à la lumière de ce qui est en général considéré comme sa “politique” autonome d'accommodement vis-à-vis de l’Iran. Nous citons un texte d’analyse de Philip Geraldi, aujourd’hui dans Antiwar.com, parce que Geraldi est un ancien analyste de la CIA et qu’il a gardé beaucoup de contact avec ses anciens collègues et, en général, dans le monde de la sécurité nationale à Washington. Son commentaire vient en appui d’une partie de la thèse présentée par Jim Lobe, concernant justement le rôle de la Navy et de Central Command qui en est une annexe puisque sous le commandement du désormais fameux amiral Fallon. Il inscrit son commentaire dans le cadre du voyage de Bush dans la région, et des vélléités bellicistes persistantes du président.

Geraldi fait à peine mention de l’incertitude à propos de la question de la cause initiale, en rapport avec le fascinant “Filipino Monkey”. Ce n’est pas son propos. Il s’attache surtout au détail de l’incident et en tire ses conclusions, sans doute à la lumière des informations que lui ont communiquées ses sources.

«The U.S. response, which was generally restrained and far from being close to a shooting incident as presented in the media, reflected legitimate concern for the ships' safety in light of the 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS Cole in Yemen, in which a small craft loaded with explosives staged a suicide attack that killed 17 sailors and almost sank the ship. Since the U.S. does not have diplomatic relations with Tehran and cannot discuss areas that could potentially lead to conflict, Adm. William Fallon of the U.S. Central Command has reportedly been seeking to set up incident-response protocols and a hotline with the Iranians to prevent a minor incident escalating into an act of war. As is often the case, the soldiers and sailors are reluctant to rush into wars that the politicians like President Bush are much more inclined to embrace.

»The lesson of the incident in the Persian Gulf, and the political hay that was made out of it by both sides, is that as long as the United States refuses to talk to Iran, the potential for something very small turning into something that would be devastating to both countries remains. President Bush still apparently dreams of confronting Iran, even if the imploding situation in Pakistan makes it unlikely that he will risk doing so. Israel makes no secret of the fact that it would like Washington to act, and Israel's wishes are seldom denied in Washington. And then there are the hotheads on the Iranian side. The U.S. national interest in the Middle East would be best served by marginalizing those who want war and beginning to negotiate seriously. As Winston Churchill put it, “To jaw jaw is better than to war war.”»

Mis en ligne le 15 janvier 2008 à 09H57