L’invasion du Pakistan et l'ironie un peu lasse de William Pfaff

Les agitations washingtoniennes concernant la dernière en vogue (ah oui, il s’agit de l’invasion du Pakistan) provoquent désormais l’ironie fatiguée de l’historien. C’est ce qu’il semble apparaître dans la présentation que fait William Pfaff, ce 20 novembre, des deux plans actuellement discutés. (Il se dit que ces projets d’invasion s’appuient sur un certain sérieux ou bénéficient d'un certain crédit. Oui, cela se dit.)

Il y a quelque chose comme une ironie un peu lasse dans l’évocation que fait Pfaff d’Alexandre le Grand comme prédécesseur des plans inspirés du général Petraeus en Irak, comme dans l’appréciation qu’il nous donne de l’inévitable plan neocon («[It]possesses the relationship to reality of a computer game for adolescent boys», «In all, a modest proposal»). Au-delà de certaines limites aventureuses de l'imagination, la dérision est le remède le plus reposant.

«Two different approaches to the situation seem currently under consideration. The first is the Pentagon’s, as reported by the Times, put forward by the army’s special operations people. It is to reinforce the Pakistan army’s own efforts to intervene in the Tribal Territories by directly financing and training the tribal paramilitary force. Tribal leaders would be paid to furnish men for this force. This would require a sizable increase in the number of Americans in the area, but could be a reasonably discreet effort – or so the plan intends.

»Buying up the tribes has been tried before without great success. Alexander the Great may have been the first to do so. The U.S. State Department and the Agency for International Development already have a 5-year, $750 million assistance program in seven tribal districts.

(…)

»The other direct intervention program being promoted in Washington is, predictably, of neo-conservative origin, from Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon, and possesses the relationship to reality of a computer game for adolescent boys.

»It starts out by warning that “stabilizing” a completely collapsed Pakistan would require more than a million foreign troops. This being a rather larger number than in the current Pentagon inventory (and even Sarkozy’s France unlikely to make up the difference), it is desirable, the authors say, to move quickly, while the U.S. has “the cooperation of moderate Pakistani forces.”

»They suggest first a U.S. operation to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear warheads and materials, or move them to New Mexico, but recognize that such a plan might be opposed by “Pakistani nationalists,” so “somehow” Americans would have to team with other Pakistanis to secure or move the nuclear assets, possibly to “a remote redoubt” in Pakistan where “crack international forces” would oversee Pakistani guards. On this we need “rapid action and secrecy.”

»Another element in the plan is U.S. intervention to support “the core of Pakistani armed forces” despite ineffective government, “seceding border regions,” and al Qaeda and Taliban assassination attempts against leaders. Given Iraq and Afghanistan, the authors write, it would take months to get (a “million”?) American and other troops there to help Pakistani loyalists hold Islamabad and “populous areas like Punjab province.” But events fortunately are moving slowly.

»Since there might also be internecine struggle within Pakistan’s security forces, America might have to intervene in a civil war to secure nuclear weapons and retake crucial strategic territory. America then would probably have to establish order, prop up the state, and “[deprive] terrorists of the sanctuaries they have long enjoyed in Pakistan’s tribal and frontier regions.” In all, a modest proposal.»

Mis en ligne le 21 novembre 2007 à 14H51