Mais l’Iran n’est pas l’Irak, et 2007 est bien différent de 2002

A propos de la conférence de presse du 14 février à la Maison-Blanche, au cours de laquelle GW nous donnait ses considérations sur sa solitude, Robert Dreyfuss tire une réflexion sur TomPaine.com, le 15 février, où il constate les difficultés considérables du Président dans la tâche qu’il semble s’être confiée de réduire à merci, d’une façon ou l’autre, les Iraniens.

(On comprend combien la faiblesse de l’argument de Bush est en rapport direct avec ses considérations sur sa solitude, sur sa difficulté d’évaluer la situation sur le terrain, en Irak.)

Dreyfuss met en évidence que le Président est isolé ; que les puissantes structures d’influence et de désinformation, dont il disposait en 2002 (en préparation de l’attaque contre l’Irak) n’existent plus ; que ses arguments sont extrêmement faibles par rapport à ceux dont il disposait en 2002 pour lancer l’attaque contre l’Irak (d’où le titre du commentaire de Dreyfuss : «Breakdown At The Iraq Lie Factory»). Dreyfuss dépeint le désarroi considérable de Bush, son incapacité de développer un raisonnement acceptable, sa confusion, etc. Cela n’a rien à voir avec 2002, avec les certitudes roboratives du président triomphant, avec son patriotisme enflammé soutenu par une majorité écrasante d’Américains. Au terme de cette analyse se dégage l’impression d’un amateurisme complet, d’une considérable impuissance d’action d’influence. On voit difficilement comment Bush et son équipe pourraient parvenir à monter un argumentaire acceptable pouvant justifier une logique conduisant à une attaque de l’Iran.

«Without his Orwellian apparatus behind him, the president spent most of his hour-long news conference yesterday shrugging and smirking, jutting his jaw out with false bravado, joshing inappropriately with reporters asking deadly serious questions and stumbling over his words. It was painful to listen to him trying to justify the nonsensical claims that Iran and its paramilitary “Quds Force” are somehow responsible for the chaos in Iraq:

»“What we do know is that the Quds force was instrumental in providing these deadly IEDs to networks inside of Iraq. We know that. And we also know that the Quds force is a part of the Iranian government. That's a known. What we don't know is whether or not the head leaders of Iran ordered the Quds force to do what they did.”

»Pressed about what the “head leaders” are doing, he went on:

»“Either they knew or didn't know, and what matters is, is that they're there. What's worse, that the government knew or that the government didn't know? … What’s worse, them ordering it and it happening, or them not ordering it and it happening?”

»If that makes no sense to you, well, that’s because the whole thing makes no sense. It’s a farcical replay of Iraq 2002, when the White House demonized Saddam Hussein with fake intelligence, turning him into a menacing al-Qaida backer armed with weapons of mass destruction. This time, however, the lie factory has been dismantled. All by himself, the president is trying to turn Iran into a scary, al-Qaida-allied, nuke-wielding menace. But he’s not fooling anyone. The potent “war president” of 2002-2003 is now an incoherent, mewling Wizard of Oz-like figure, and people are paying attention to the man behind the curtain.

»Unlike 2002, when the White House fired salvo after salvo of fake intelligence about Iraq, today it can’t even stage its lies properly. Like the incompetents who couldn’t organize a two-car funeral, the remaining Iran war hawks in the administration held a briefing in Baghdad on Sunday to present alleged evidence that Iran is masterminding the insurgency in Iraq. But it was a comedy of errors that convinced no one. Twice, at least, the administration had earlier postponed or canceled the much-promoted event, designed to reveal the supposed secrets behind Iran’s actions in Iraq. When it was finally held, it was not in Washington, but in Baghdad, with not a single White House official, no U.S. diplomat, no State Department official, no CIA official and no one from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Instead, a couple of anonymous military officers held a background-only briefing, barring cameras and tape recorders, to present some blurry photographs of bomb-looking things—and not a shred of evidence of Iranian government involvement.»

Mis en ligne le 16 février 2007 à 13H43