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3 mars 2004 — La journée du 2 mars fut, en Irak, ce qu’on sait. Les massacres y ont été considérables, constituant une fois de plus la pire journée en Irak depuis la fin de la guerre ( !). Les attaques contre les chiites, au cours de diverses occasions de rassemblement, ont amené des réactions anti-américaines très violentes.
Les américains sont accusés de se montrer incapables d’assurer la sécurité de ces rassemblements. Certains commentateurs comme Robert Fisk, vont jusqu’à soupçonner un rôle machiavélique des Américains, — ce qui est peut-être aller un peu loin dans la spéculation.
Ces pertes civiles, surtout chiites, en Irak, s’accompagnent d’une réduction sensible des pertes américaines annoncées. Il semble effectivement que des changements de tactique et de déploiement conséquents mettent les soldats américains beaucoup plus à l’abri des attaques irakiennes.
Ci-dessous, Erich Marquardt, du groupe PINR, donne une description succincte de ces nouvelles dispositions adoptées par les Américains. Il ne faut parler que de “dispositions” et, en aucun cas, ni de tactique, ni d’une façon quelconque d’un acte militaire. Il s’agit tout simplement d’une démarche politicienne ; il s’agit d’empêcher des pertes trop voyantes des forces américaines pendant la campagne électorale. Chercher une autre explication à cette imposture est une simple perte de temps.
By Erich Marquardt, PINR, 2 March, 2004
In an effort to reduce casualties among U.S. forces, the Bush administration has decided to pull U.S. troops out of central Baghdad and place them on the outskirts of the city. This ring formation follows the administration's pattern of fear over how the U.S. electorate will respond if U.S. casualties continue to mount. Hoping that Iraq's Civil Defense Corps will be able to maintain a general atmosphere of stability in Baghdad, the administration would like to bring Iraq off the political radar for the time being.
The number of U.S. military bases in Baghdad has already been dramatically reduced, now down to 26 from a high of 60. The Pentagon plans to diminish this number to eight by the middle of April. Even though U.S. troop influence has been decreasing in Baghdad, the level of attacks against the U.S.-led coalition and U.S.-trained Civil Defense Corps and police forces has continued largely unabated. Even so, the Bush administration is hoping that the Civil Defense Corps and police will be able to at least prevent the insurgency from growing anymore powerful than it already has.
Presently, only 8,000 police patrol Baghdad, a city of 5.5 million people that probably should be policed by 19,000; hoping to reach this number, Washington has been training about 1,000 new policemen each month. This program stirred U.S. Brigadier General Martin Dempsey to say that Iraq's police and Civil Defense Corps ''are capable of handling the threat'' inside the city of Baghdad.
Taking into account the violence on the ground in Baghdad, Dempsey's hope is naive. As U.S. forces pull out of the city, it will embolden the insurgency and cause them to launch more spectacular attacks, such as the one on February 14 when guerrillas stormed an Iraqi police station freeing nearly a hundred prisoners. In the process, they managed to kill about 20 policemen. If, at the time, there were a heavy U.S. troop presence near the police station, this attack would have been much more difficult to mount since U.S. forces simply have too many resources at their disposal for the insurgency to contend with.
Therefore, by relying more on Iraqis to fight Iraqis, the Bush administration may be giving ample time for the insurgency to better organize and plan new stunning methods of attack. Having less to fear from attacking Iraqi police and members of the Civil Defense Corps, it is likely that attacks against such targets will escalate and become more successful.
The frequent attacks on policemen in recent weeks highlight the insurgents' plan. The goal of the insurgency is to destroy Washington's mission of establishing a successful Iraqi political and societal structure. They hope to continue to weaken Washington's plans to the point where the Bush administration will be so politically weakened domestically that the possibility of U.S. troops pulling out of Iraq will increase.
The insurgency also hopes that if it continues to create anarchy, the Iraqi population will become enraged with Washington's attempts at bringing stability. Already subjected to violence and large-scale attacks not seen even in the days of Saddam, Iraq's population has remained a tinder box of impatience and anxiety due to the failure of the Bush administration to bring peace and stability to the country.
If the insurgency is not stopped, the U.S.-led occupation could become so unpopular that it could lead more Iraqis over to the side of the insurgency. Increasing attacks on U.S. troops would create a difficult domestic situation for Washington's leaders, possibly forcing them to pull troops out of the chaotic country -- a decision that would be eerily similar to the political failure that occurred during U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
If U.S. troops were to pull out of Iraq, it would create yet another power vacuum that the disparate insurgent groups would attempt to fill. Furthermore, many of Iraq's ethnic differences would likely become quickly accentuated, raising the specter of civil war and ethnic violence.
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