Modi est-il un nouveau Nehru ?

Modi est-il un nouveau Nehru ?

MK Bhadrakumar, qui retrouve toute sa verve, ne cache pas que le nouveau Premier ministre indien Modi est peut-être un nouvel “homme du destin” pour l’Inde, successeur dans l’esprit de Mahatma Gandhi, et pour la politique de non-alignement, du Premier ministre Nehru dans les années 1950. L’entrée de l’Inde comme membre à part entière dans l’Organisation de Coopération de Shanghai en septembre prochain (en même temps, notamment, que le Pakistan et l’Iran, voir le 5 août 2014) est la marque centrale de cette célébration de MK Bhadrakumar, dans deux longs textes d’analyse de Strategic-Culture.org, les 7 août 2014 et 8 août 2014 respectivement, – dont voici la conclusion...

«The intellectual challenge today lies in reinterpreting the idea of non-alignment in tune with the spirit of our times, which is characterized by multipolarity in international politics, so as to meet India’s needs in the coming period as an emerging power. That is also what Jawaharlal Nehru would have expected Prime Minister Modi to do as his worthy successor presiding over India’s tryst with destiny at a crucial juncture in world politics. All things considered, therefore, India’s SCO membership would signify that the Modi government is charioting India toward a new world order where the country’s political and diplomatic options will multiply.»

Bien entendu, ce grand événement pour l’Inde est d’abord un grand événement international dans une période d’exceptionnelle tension et d’un bouleversement systémique qui marque la fin d’une époque, sinon d’une civilisation (notre “contre-civilisation”) avec la mise en cause d’un Système global. Il se place au cœur de la crise bouillonnante de l’Ukraine, crise métahistorique fondamentale au cœur du continent eurasiatique, et avec une intensité jamais vue dans le champ de la guerre du système de la communication. («To be sure, Russia would be immensely pleased and a sigh of relief is audible in Moscow. A Russian pundit estimated that India’s admission into the SCO, which has been a long-cherished goal for Moscow, will pave the way for the grouping to hold itself out as “a centre of power in world politics.”»)

Pour MK Bhadrakumar, l’élargissement du SCO, en poids stratégiques (quatre puissances nucléaires regroupées), en extension géographique (désormais jusqu’à l’extrême pointe occidentale de l’extension du sous-continent indien), détaillent un formidable revers pour la grande stratégie des USA et du bloc BAO, avec l’installation d’un concurrent géopolitique direct de l’OTAN.

«During his visit to New Delhi last week, United States Secretary of State John Kerry was asked at a media interaction where India would stand in Washington’s scheme of things as regards its recent sanctions against Russia. Kerry accepted that he was disappointed but appeared resigned to India’s stance. “We would obviously welcome India joining in with us with respect to that [sanctions]. But it is up to them. It is India’s choice.”

»It does not need much ingenuity to figure out that the SCO is taking the decision to admit India at a defining moment in the post-cold war era politics. The US is pursuing a dual containment policy toward Russia and China, the two prime movers of the SCO. The US, on the other hand, has been assiduously wooing India as a strategic ally. From the American viewpoint, therefore, India’s SCO membership literally caps the trajectory of US-Indian strategic partnership. The message is clear: India is unavailable as a ‘counterweight’ against China or as a silent partner to ‘isolate’ Russia.

»India being a major power in Asia, its policy of ‘non-alignment’ takes the wind out of the US’ rebalance strategy. India has also recognized that Russia’s interests in Ukraine are “legitimate”. On a more fundamental plane, it needs to be noted that if the SCO has often been called ‘NATO of the East’, it was not without reason – although the grouping is far from a military alliance in the classic sense.

»The heart of the matter is that the SCO has disallowed a security vacuum appearing in Central Asia, which the NATO could have used as an alibi to step in. Put differently, so long as the SCO is around, NATO’s eastward expansion beyond the Caucasus runs into formidable obstacles. That is to say, SCO challenges the US strategy to project the NATO as the global security organization that bypasses the United Nations as the provider of security. This is precisely why the US has opposed the SCO and did all it could to debunk the grouping.

»With the admission of India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia, SCO will be transforming into a regional grouping that all but matches NATO in political and strategic reach. This development constitutes a major setback for the US’ regional strategies. For one thing, an expanded SCO provides ‘strategic depth’ for Russia and the US and European Union’s sanctions against Russia will be rendered even more toothless.

»Besides, it significantly weakens the American hand in the negotiations vis-à-vis Iran; it weakens the US’ ‘pivot’ strategy in Asia; it diminishes the US’ capacity to dictate terms to Afghanistan (or Pakistan); and, it holds far-reaching potential to destroy the primacy of the US dollar – that is, if and when the integration within the SCO gains traction.

»The stunning geopolitical reality cannot escape world attention – namely, that by the end of this year, the SCO will have as members 4 nuclear powers plus one ‘threshold power’. To be sure, SCO will be stepping out of Central Asia and not only vetting its toes in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf but walking into the centre stage of world politics. It is entirely conceivable that at some point sooner rather than later the SCO countries may contemplate having an ‘energy club’ and trading in their national currencies, creating banking institutions to fund intra-regional projects and moving toward preferential trade regimes. India is already showing interest to have a PTA with the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus...»

Mis en ligne le 9 août 2014 à 16H39