Pourquoi l’attaque contre l’Iran n’aura pas lieu

Pourquoi l’attaque contre l’Iran n’aura pas lieu

L’article de Steve Clemons du 23 juillet 2010 sur The Washington Note, est cité comme le signe de ralliement de ceux qui ne croient pas à une attaque US contre l’Iran. Clemons, qui rejette catégoriquement cette possibilité, avait déjà pris une telle position en septembre 2007, lorsque la spéculation sur une attaque de l’Iran était très intense. Il estime que les conditions n’ont guères changé («While some of the terrain has changed in the nearly three years since that article was written, much has remained the same»). D'autre part, comme en septembre 2007, Clemons cite ses nombreux contacts avec des officiels en place pour rejeter cette possibilité d'une attaque.

»The many unknowables and unexpected consequences of adding another hot war to America's rather full plate of hot conflicts around the world remains the same. Iran, which clearly can dial up or dial down the activities of its transnational terrorist networks has them on low simmer at this point. An attack against Iran would probably blow this control valve off – resulting in a terrorist superhighway running from Iran through Iraq into Jordan and Syria right toward Israel. This network would also unleash itself against allied Arab state governments in the region and also cause havoc against US forces and affiliates in Iraq and Afghanistan.

»These problems were there three years ago and remain today.

»On top of this, despite the confidence, even eagerness, of the US Air Force to bomb Iran's nuclear program capacity, the other military services are not so sanguine and fear that the logistics demands for such a military action and its followup would undermine other major operations. In other words, adding another major obligation to America's military roster could literally break the back of the US military, erode morale, and result in eventual, massive shifts in American domestic support for the US military machine which had become increasingly costly and less able to generate the security deliverables expected.

»And thus, the likelihood – despite whatever Iran may or may not do as it pursues various nuclear options – is that the Department of Defense itself will find itself tied in knots during any new strategic review or decision to take overt military action against Iran.

»Then there is the question of Iran's seeming desire to be attacked. As David Frum has commented and written, one should pause a bit before actually doing what Iran's theocratic elites seem to be inviting. Frum and I recently agreed that an attack on Iran would give Ahmadinejad, the hard right clan around Ayatollah Khamenei and the most despotic, anti-reformist wings of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard exactly what they need to further consolidate their political hold today. Given the contested election and turmoil among Iran's top elites and other strong internal tensions inside Iran's political system, the leadership today does not enjoy a strongly consolidated position. Bombing Iran would solve this for Iran's current leadership.

»Other consequences of action against Iran are that it may increase by an order of magnitude the global doubt that already exists about America's ability to generate new and better outcomes in the international system. In the eyes of many nations around the world, the deployment of military force is a desperate act, not an act of confidence – and usually not an act that will generate desired, predicted outcomes. China and Russia, no matter the relative warmth of relations today, will likely veto any UN Resolution endorsing military action against Iran – and will wait on the sidelines to see what the outcome will be of a military action that doesn't receive a stamp of approval from the global body.

dedefensa.org