Que faire du traité INF ?

Que faire du traité INF ?

Après les agitations diverses autour de la question des systèmes BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) en Europe, en Pologne (et en Tchéquie) plus précisément, il y a des indications sérieuses sur un vigoureux débat en cours en Russie. Le thème : faut-il ou non sortir du traité INF (FNI) de décembre 1987, sur l’élimination des forces nucléaires intermédiaires ? Martin Sieff, de UPI, analyse ce débat, et son texte est repris dans Spacewar.com ce 2 mars.

«A remarkable strategic debate has opened up in the Russian media about the merits and pitfalls of withdrawing from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. As we reported in BMD Focus last week, Russia's most senior generals have already publicly served notice that the Kremlin is prepared to pull out of the more than 19-year-old INF, which has been a cornerstone of superpower detente since it was signed on Dec. 8, 1987.

“If a political decision is taken to quit the treaty, the Strategic Missile Forces are ready to carry out this task,” SMF Commander Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov told a news conference in Moscow on Feb. 19, according to a report from the RIA Novosti news agency.

«Solovtsov's statement followed hard on the heels of a warning the previous week from his boss, four-star Army Gen. Yury Baluyevsky, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, that Russia may unilaterally scrap the nearly-20-year-old INF.

»“It is possible for a party to abandon the treaty (unilaterally) if it provides convincing evidence that it is necessary to do so,” Baluyevsky said Feb. 15. “We currently have such evidence.”

»RIA Novosti explicitly linked this threat to the Bush administration's determination to push ahead with plans to build a base for ground-abased anti-ballistic missile interceptors in Poland and a radar tacking facility to guide them in the neighboring Czech Republic.»

Sieff note qu’un article de l’analyste Andrei Kislyakov, publié par Novosti, repris par UPI et par SpaceWar.com (et disponible par le même lien qui conduit à l’analyse de Sieff) argumente fermement en faveur du maintien de la Russie dans le traité INF, notamment selon des arguments techniques et budgétaires (difficultés et coût d’une opération de relance d’un programme de missiles nucléaires intermédiaires type-SS-20 modernisés).

C’est surtout l’ouverture et, disons, l’aspect pluraliste et démocratique du débat que Sieff met en évidence. Mais il s’agit d’un débat qui est conduit dans l’establishment russe à partir d’une position de force de la Russie, nullement à partir de la position de faiblesse du temps d’Eltsine. Il débouchera sans aucun doute sur une position affirmée, claire et qui tiendra compte d’abord des intérêts russes. La décision qui en sera tirée, qui sera une “réponse offensive” de la Russie, constituera un pas important dans l’évolution de la crise Euromissiles-II.

«But Kislyakov's article is of prime importance for several other reasons. First, it confirms that a healthy, open debate on major national security issues still exists in Russia's print and electronic media.

»Second, it raises important issues of what Russia's spending priorities should be given its impressive and once again expanding, but still finite aerospace industrial resources.

»Third, the debate Kislyakov has opened is of note because it is not about responding from weakness, but about different ways of responding to strategic developments from strength. Industrially and financially, militarily and strategically, Russia is once again on the global upswing after a quarter century of relative and absolute decline.

»Debates how to respond to challenges from a position of strength are very different from debates about to how to respond to problems from positions of weakness. The arguments now being heard in Moscow are much more likely to lead to effective answers.»

Mis en ligne le 2 mars 2007 à 16H07