Quelques pièces du puzzle

Ci-après, nous publions quelques extraits qui nous paraissent intéressants, qui concernent l’attitude américaniste (étendue aux dirigeants et militaires occidentalistes) dans la guerre d’Afghanistan. Nous traitons cette attitude essentiellement du point de vue psychologique. Ces extraits nous serviront également de référence pour un texte que nous publions également ce 27 octobre 2009 dans notre rubrique Notes d’analyse, sous le titre de «Notes sur le désintérêt pour la victoire».

• D’abord un extrait d’une très longue interview de Andrew Bacevich, professeur, historien et ancien colonel de l’U.S. Army. Bacevich est l’un des critiques les plus avisés de la politique belliciste du système, et des “guerres” qui sont menées en son nom – d’une façon générale, les circonstances opérationnelles de la “Grande Guerre contre la Terreur” (GWOT). L’interview, publiée le 13 octobre 2009, sur le site PBS.org, a pour sujet la guerre en Afghanistan. Le premier extrait concerne un passage de réflexion de Bacevich sur la signification, sur l’identification même de cette guerre, et, d’une façon générale, sur l’évolution étonnante de l’armée US en faveur de la “guerre contre-insurrectionnelle”, ou guerre anti-guérilla que l’armée US n’a jamais su faire.

Question: «Are you surprised by the ascendance of counterinsurgency as a current term defining the debate?»

Bacevich: «I am baffled by the fad of counterinsurgency, and I'm especially baffled by the extent to which the American officer corps has embraced this fad. Now, I say that from the point of view of somebody who comes from a generation when counterinsurgency was anathema to the United States military.

»In the era after Vietnam, the officer corps believed with something close to unanimity that long, protracted campaigns were very much at odds not only with the well-being of the military as an institution, but frankly at odds with the interests of the country.

»Post-Vietnam, the officer corps was committed to the proposition that wars should be infrequent, that they should be fought only for the most vital interests, and that they should be fought in a way that would produce a quick and decisive outcome.

»What we have today in my judgment is just the inverse of that. War has become a permanent condition. I mean, we've been at war now for eight years, and for all practical purposes, nobody can say with any accuracy when war will likely come to an end. In my judgment – I know people that would disagree with this – we are now engaged in wars where we do not have vital interests at stake.

»And ... we've now abandoned the notion that we can win wars quickly or cheaply. Our approach to war is one in which we now accept the notion that war is an open-ended proposition and that if someday out there some outcome is reached, it's likely to be an ambiguous outcome that really doesn't resemble in any sense the traditional definition of military victory. ...»

• Le deuxième extrait, toujours de la même interview, concerne l’attitude des dirigeants US, dans l’administration Obama. A côté d’une politique partout défensive, de mouvements évidents de repli ou d’accommodements défensifs (Russie, Japon, Chine), subsiste une rhétorique triomphaliste, utopiste, messianique…

Question: «On some level, are we caught in a cycle of American hubris that never quite resolves itself?»

Bacevich: «... It seems quite clear that, in one sense, the Obama administration is quite consciously trying to demonstrate that they learned the lessons of the Bush era. They will not be guilty of arrogance and hubris and anti-Americanism. They will not promise to eliminate tyranny from the face of the earth or to eliminate evil, as President Bush did. ...

»On the other hand, the president, Secretary [of State Hillary] Clinton, Ambassador Susan Rice at the United Nations, others, continue to make statements that clearly indicate their belief that the United States is called upon and has the capability to bring history to its intended destination.

»I mean, in his Grant Park speech the night he was elected, President Obama talked about America bending the arc of history. In a speech not long ago, Hillary Clinton quoted [revolutionary Thomas] Paine. I think the quote goes, “We have it within our ability to start the world all over again.” I don't think she realized that was one of Ronald Reagan's favorite quotes. But she went on to say, “Yes, we need to exercise that power now.”

»So on the one hand, they seemed to be less hubristic. On the other hand, I think hubris continues to be an abiding theme in our policies and helps, I think, to buoy these convictions that yes, we'll just send U.S. troops to Afghanistan, and if we give them the right doctrine, they'll succeed in fixing the place. Ain't going to happen.»

• Le troisième extrait vient d’un autre texte. Dans une très récente mise en ligne (le 22 octobre 2009) pour TomDispatch.com (le site de Tom Engelhardt), l’historien Nick Turse rappelait un autre texte que lui-même avait écrit, pour le même site, le 15 janvier 2009, où il faisait rapport de la 26ème conférence scientifique de l’armée (Army Science Conference). Cette conférence, qui définit l’évolution technologique de l’U.S. Army, est, au niveau du langage, d’un ton et d'un esprit extrêmement surréalistes. (Exemple cité par Turse d’une intervention d’un conférencier – que ceux qui comprennent nous le traduisent, ou bien que ceux qui le traduisent le comprennent pour nous – au choix: «Osteomyelitis Treatment with Nanometer-sized Hydroxyapatite Particles as a Delivery Vehicle for a Ciprofloxacin-bisphosphonate Conjugate; New Fluoroquinolone-bisphosphonate Derivatives Show Similar Binding Affinity to Hydroxyapatite and Improved Antibacterial Activity Against Drug-resistant Pathogens.») Mais cessons de rire sérieusement et passons aux choses sérieuses; il s’agit d’un passage (du texte du 15 janvier) où Turse s’entretient avec de hauts gradés sur les conditions de la guerre en Afghanistan, au niveau des équipements des soldats:

«But as one panel discussion drew to a close, one of the top-ranking enlisted men in the Army, a highly decorated veteran of the Global War on Terror, made a startling admission. He was discussing the typical pack-laden, weapons-toting, up-armored U.S. soldier “goin' up and down the mountains of Afghanistan right now.” As he pointed out, that grunt could not haul one more piece of gear. “Nor is there a soldier,” he continued in a burst of candor, “that, currently configured, can keep up with al-Qaeda because we're chasing guys that are armed with AK-47s and tennis shoes.”

»I asked him later whether it made sense to spend close to $20,000, the average price today to kit up (as the British might say) a soldier who can't keep up with the insurgents he is meant to track down. Has anyone considered, I asked, going back to the $1,900 it cost to outfit a less encumbered grunt of the Vietnam War era who could, assuredly, have kept better pace with today's guerillas.

»As I learned at this conference, however, questions like these go nowhere in a big hurry. Instead, he backpedaled quickly, declaring that, in Afghanistan, “we're gettin' it done.” A colleague of the same rank, and fellow GWOT veteran, quickly jumped in, pointing out that today's bulky body armor has saved a lot of lives. As for today's insurgents, he said, “Yeah, I can't run the mountain with them, but I'll still get them – eventually.”»

Mis en ligne le 27 octobre 2009 à 04H57