Qui n'a pas sa définition de la G4G?

La définition du concept de “guerre de 4ème génération” (G4G), qui prétend englober le type de “guerre” en cours aujourd’hui, semble être un exercice sans fin. Chaque auteur, chaque chroniqueur, y apporte sa vision et sa conception. Plus sûrement que toute analyse, cela rend compte de la confusion d’un temps historique où la notion de “guerre” ne peut plus être comprise selon des références fermes et définies, — d’ailleurs, une notion de la “guerre” qui semble ne plus répondre du tout à des références. Les seules affirmations solides auxquelles on parvient dans ce genre d’exercice est bien de définir ce que la G4G n’est pas. Pour le reste, tout le monde livre la G4G, ou disons “sa” G4G, sans savoir de quoi il est question, et si l’adversaire livre la même guerre que lui.

Le Britannique Simon Jenkins s’exerce à son tour à la définition de la G4G, dans le Times de ce jour.

«Conventional military theory calls these conflicts fourth generation wars (4GW), succeeding conventional, nuclear and guerrilla ones. They are wholly new, characterised by a blurred line between civil and military realms, an absence of any clear enemy, a disregard of national boundaries, the exploitation of terror to incur overreaction and a reliance on primitive ethnic and religious sympathy to achieve a political goal.

»Above all, 4GW involves trapping the enemy into a blundering counterproductive response, much as a cunning wrestler uses the superior weight of an opponent to bring about his fall. The American and British responses to 9/11 ignored all the maxims of 4GW.

(…)

»A 4GW army is not about capture and hold, nor even winning hearts and minds, since its objective is not to defeat an army or dominate territory.

»It is to prevent the dissemination of ideas and restrict the manoeuvre of those who plot terrorism. Such an army is light, mobile and possibly secret. Its interventions barely qualify for the term military but are rather diplomatic, economic and propagandist. If an army stays too long on foreign soil after its initial thrust it becomes a hated occupier. Its gains are consolidated by contractors, aid workers, journalists and spies.

»A 4GW victory may be no more than a tilt in the balance of power within a regime, to encourage the suppression of a terrorist cell. Such wars are not pursued by threats, sanctions or military assault, so often welcomed by an embattled enemy. America’s most effective 4GW was to support the mujaheddin (later the Taliban) to defeat the Russians in Afghanistan in the late 1980s — hardly anyone knew.»

Il n’est pas inintéressant d’ajouter à ces quelques extraits du commentaire de Jenkins, un commentaire ajouté à son texte par un lecteur. Encourageant pour la compréhension du concept.

«Simon Jenkins states “military theory calls these conflicts fourth generation wars (4GW), succeeding conventional, nuclear and guerrilla ones.” Rubbish! 4GW was first published in 1989, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.’ (Lind et al) Four Generations began with Peace of Westphalia (1648);arguing that this established a state monopoly on war. Previously, different entities fought wars (families, cities, etc) First Generation War runs roughly to 1860(Napoleonic line and column tactics). 2GW is “massed firepower”: WW1 is typical. 3GW is manoeuver (Blitzkreig tactics in WW2). In 4GW, the state loses its monopoly on war and we return to an era of warfare reminiscent of pre-1648 with non-state actors and intra-state rather than inter-state war dominating. There is some empirical evidence to support. Guerilla warfare, terrorism, civil war etc are typical 4GW examples. Hence the generations should read line and column, massed firepower and manoeuver!

»Andy, London, UK»

Mis en ligne le 11 mars 2007 à 12H03