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29 juin 2004 — Michael A. Weinstein est un analyste à suivre. On a déjà lu un de ces textes, où Weinstein est l’un des rares à analyser le phénomène capital de la mise en évidence des très graves faiblesses des forces US durant la guerre et l’après-guerre en Irak.
Weinstein a l’immense avantage, pour un historien et un analyste américain, d’appeler en général un chat un chat, de ne pas se payer de mots, d’identifier précisément ce que sont les USA et ce qu’est leur politique. Nous publions un autre texte de lui, publié d’abord par le groupe PINR, sur la question de la stratégie du “changement de régime”. On méditera, comme un exemple assez remarquable, combien de choses inhabituelles et vraies, et inhabituelles parce que vraies, Weinstein nous dit sur l’Amérique depuis 1945, en un seul paragraphe comme celui-ci, par rapport au langage sucré et plein d’une mielleuse morale de notre conformisme courant, :
« Since the end of World War II, the strategic aim of the United States has been
to be the military guarantor of the capitalist market system, gaining thereby the economic benefits that follow from performing the role of protector. Both the Cold War and decolonization forestalled the possibility of conquest, so the operative policy became regime change wherever the United States judged that its basic interest was threatened. »
Cette fois, Weinstein propose une réflexion sur la question stratégique du “regime change”, qui représente le but affiché de la nouvelle stratégie US décidée en 2002. Pour Weinstein, l’échec irakien représente l’échec de cette stratégie, — mais un échec infiniment plus grave que celui d’une stratégie vieille de deux ans et conçue dans la fièvre d’une atmosphère post-9/11, dans la mesure où la stratégie du “regime change” est en réalité la stratégie non-dite des Etats-Unis depuis 1945, et dite clairement depuis 2002 (merci, GW).
Le paragraphe cité ci-dessus l’indique bien d’ailleurs, tout comme il a le mérite de bien éclaircir le rôle des USA, comme « military guarantor of the capitalist market system », également depuis 1945. Cela réduit à ses justes proportions toutes les jérémiades qui suivirent 9/11 sur une époque nouvelle, sur “le choc des civilisations”, la guerre contre la terreur et le reste. (Cela nous confirme dans notre conviction que 9/11 n’a d’importance, — mais fondamentale, énorme celle-là, et même révolutionnaire jusqu’aux fondements, — que dans le seul domaine de la psychologie US.)
Nous sommes moins partisans de l’analyse plus géopolitique que fait Weinstein dans la deuxième partie de son texte, justement parce qu’elle n’est que géopolitique et ne tient guère compte de la situation et de l’évolution psychologiques des USA, pour nous le facteur essentiel. Mais ce sont là des divergences de forme, des divergences de choix sur les sujets à étudier. Weinstein est un analyste intéressant à suivre parce qu’il n’a pas l’esprit encombré par la rhétorique virtualiste dans les jugements qu’il porte sur les choses.
By Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, PINR, June 28, 2004
Under the pervasive uncertainty about whether the general pattern of world
politics will mark a restoration of multilateralism with American leadership or
a drift toward multi-polarism, strategic options present themselves to the
United States. Those options define the alternative goals for American foreign
and security policy.
Making the American decisional position the major determinant of the pattern of
world politics does not imply a preference for American power. It is simply
recognition that the present global balance of power remains heavily weighted in
favor of the United States, in the sense that other powers are primarily
responsive to American behavior rather than autonomous initiators. The only
exceptions are the Islamic revolutionary movements that cross-cut state power
politics and are chronically disadvantaged by their failure to possess or be
protected by a state apparatus.
Since the end of World War II, the strategic aim of the United States has been
to be the military guarantor of the capitalist market system, gaining thereby
the economic benefits that follow from performing the role of protector. Both
the Cold War and decolonization forestalled the possibility of conquest, so the
operative policy became regime change wherever the United States judged that its
basic interest was threatened.
The utopia of American security policy is a world of ''market democracies'' with
stable representative institutions, open to trade and investment, and policed by
the United States. Short of that ultimate goal, any regime that plays ball with
the market system and does not threaten other states within that system has been
acceptable. In the worst case, there has been tolerance of dictatorships that
oppress segments of their populations and engage in wholesale corruption -- a
prescription for long-term instability.
Although the term ''regime change'' has only become current in the past decade
with the rise of neo-conservative influence in American policymaking, the policy
that bears its name has been operative for more than fifty years. One need only
think of Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Grenada, Panama and Kosovo to grasp the
consistency of that policy. Regime change will continue to be the desired
outcome of American strategy, as long as the United States remains the major
military power in the world. Whatever ideological differences that they might
have, American security elites are united in the understanding that America's
power advantage does not result from its economic strength or its cultural
appeal, but from its credibility as a protector of the market system. Wealth and
''soft power'' are important, but they are not decisive.
The notion of regime change is elastic. At one extreme, it involves the outright
removal and replacement of the policy leadership (government) of the target
state, along with its administrative apparatus. This polar case applies to
quasi-totalitarian regimes, such as Ba'athist Iraq, in which the ruling party
has staffed the apparatus with its partisans. Comprehensive regime change
involves military occupation of the target state, refashioning its constitution
and administration, and making sure the new personnel are favorable to the
market system and American security aims. It can be understood as nation
rebuilding.
At the opposite pole from comprehensive regime change is influencing the
government of the target state to alter its policies so that they fall into
conformity with the American strategic design. During the diplomatic prelude to
Operation Iraqi Freedom, President Bush at one point said that if Saddam Hussein
disarmed voluntarily, his regime would have changed and a military intervention
would not be necessary. As much of a stretch as Bush's statement might seem, it
is analytically sound. The purpose of regime change is not the replacement of
political and military forms (democratization), or even of personnel, but
transformation of policy to suit American interests. If that result is effected
by the target state's government, it is no longer an adversary.
Between the extremes of root-and-branch overhaul and persuasive instigation of
policy change are all of the other means of effecting policy change from
measures to remove governments by military action, through diplomatic and
economic sanctions, to support of proxies or opposition movements. All of those
tactics have been used, often in combination or successively, by the United
States since World War II, and they are all still on the table, depending for
their employment on America's capacity to exercise power.
The American experience of nation rebuilding in Iraq has shown that the United
States is ill-equipped to undertake comprehensive regime change successfully in
a former quasi-totalitarian state. Although Iraq is still a ''work in progress,''
it now appears unlikely that it will become a stable market democracy in the
near to medium term. The limits of American power revealed by the Iraq
experience have effectively removed comprehensive regime change from the table
for the present and have impaired the effectiveness of more modest measures. The
United States would still prefer regime change in states such as Iran and North
Korea, but it will probably have to settle for less.
Short of regime change, the most plausible apparent option is containment, which
has also played a significant role in American security policy since World War
II. Containment -- keeping the target state within bounds so that it does not
expand its military capability and threaten other regimes -- is a fall-back
position that cedes to regime change when a more favorable configuration of
power develops. For example, the containment strategy against the Soviet Union
was supplemented by support of anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan, which hastened
the collapse of the Soviet system.
The most important consequence of the Iraq intervention for American power is
the release of tendencies toward multi-polarism on the part of great powers like
China, Russia and — to a lesser extent — the Franco-German combine. The second
global consequence is the increased difficulty of containing states and
movements that fall outside the order of globalization -- specifically, the two
other members of the ''Axis of Evil'' -- Iran and North Korea -- and the stateless
movement of Islamic revolution.
Containment of a target state is relatively easy when the United States has
overwhelming military superiority and international support, as was the case
after the Gulf War, despite the progressive tattering of the sanctions regime.
It becomes much more difficult when those two conditions are not present and the
target state moves to expand its military power and/or to mix in the affairs of
its neighbors. Such is the case for Iran and North Korea at present. When target
states seek to change the balance of power in their favor, the United States is
faced with the choice of trying to repel the moves or to make concessions that
erode containment.
Iran is currently the greatest test of American security policy. The recent
face-off between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which Iran
was able to avoid having its nuclear program become an issue for the United
Nations Security Council, indicates concession by the United States rather than
effective containment. Iran has announced that it deserves a place in the
''nuclear club,'' and its path appears to be open at the moment.
In addition, Iran has close relations with the Shi'a factions in Iraq and is
preparing to exert as much influence as possible over post-occupation Iraqi
politics. Whether Iran will try to gain a sphere of influence over an autonomous
Shi'a mini-state, encourage dissidence in the Shi'a areas of a unified
federalist Iraq, or collaborate with a Shi'a dominated Iraqi state, will depend
on how Iraqi politics gel.
What is clear is that Iran is flexing its muscles. Part of the rationale for
pre-emptive war in the American National Security Strategy of 2002 was to
diminish the threats from other ''rogue states.'' The result of the first
application of that policy seems to have been the reverse of what was intended.
North Korea is also more favorably positioned than it was before Operation Iraqi
Freedom. It is still free to pursue its nuclear weapons program and is presently
simply trying to drag out the multilateral negotiations over it as long as it
can, with the help of China. Again, the United States has very little leverage,
having announced that it does not intend to launch a pre-emptive war against
North Korea, which simply reflects political and military realities. Despite
American assurances that commitment of the United States to South Korea's
defense will be undiminished, the rebasing of American troops in the south of
the country and the transfer of troops to Iraq can only heighten North Korea's
resolve to pursue its security strategy.
South Korea's decision to send 3,000 of its troops to Iraq in the face of
widespread public opposition indicates how seriously South Korea takes the
prospect of an American concessionary drift. The South Korean government
understands that North Korea seeks to shift the balance of power on the Korean
peninsula decisively, and knows that South Korea needs a protector.
The third issue of containment faced by the United States concerns the stateless
Islamic revolutionary movements, which also aim at regime change -- the
replacement of the governments of states with majority Islamic populations with
theocratic regimes, ultimately to be subsumed under a revived Caliphate.
Mischaracterized as a ''war on terror,'' the conflict with Islamic revolution is,
for the United States, a struggle of counter-regime change. Military attacks by
Islamic revolutionaries against the United States and its grand coalition of
allies are meant to further the goal of regime change by weakening American
resolve to prop up target states.
Containing Islamic revolutionary movements was difficult enough before the Iraq
intervention; it is now even more so. Recent waves of violence against the
non-democratic regimes of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan indicated increased
instability in those states, as does the resurgence of the Taliban in
Afghanistan. The United States does not have the resources to bolster weak
regimes in the Islamic world, much less to engineer their democratization. It
must rely on whomever will help it contain the revolutionaries, even if in the
long run such alliances increase instability. The United States is constrained
to condone the dictatorships in Uzbekistan and Sudan, to the point of being
unable to act effectively to stop the ethnic cleansing/genocide in the latter's
Darfur region.
Having allowed a military enemy to grow up in the Islamic world, the United
States cannot easily make concessions in a struggle which is an actual -- not a
pre-emptive -- war. Appeasement is a theoretical possibility -- and, like most
strategies, has its possible benefits -- but it is not a live policy option for
domestic political reasons and, more importantly, because it would shift the
balance of power too far to the disadvantage of the globalization project.
Given their clandestine nature, it is difficult to assess accurately the power
of Islamic revolutionary movements. What is clear is that they are still active,
possibly growing in strength and present a continuing challenge to a United
States whose nation-state adversaries are emboldened and whose allies are
skeptical. The American advantage in the conflict with Islamic revolution is the
support it gains from regimes around the world, on the basis of their own
self-interest. That advantage is considerable, but it is diminished by the
presence of weak and unpopular regimes in the Islamic world, with which the
United States is constrained to cooperate.
As the United States adjusts to its loss of power resulting from the Iraq
intervention, its security elites will attempt to recover capability for a
policy of regime change and to hold the lines of containment as that diplomatic
and military effort proceeds, with — at present — uncertain prospects for
success. Along the way, Washington will probably find that it has to make some
major concessions.
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