Situation des forces irakiennes

Situation des forces irakiennes

10 avril 2003 — La société d’analyse stratégique et de renseignement AFI Research publie une analyse de la situation des forces irakiennes, ou de ce qu’il en reste. En même temps, AFI Research donne certaines analyses du comportement stratégique des forces irakiennes.

Nous signalons notamment cette remarque insistant sur l’erreur fondamentale de Saddam Hussein d’avoir laissé sa Garde Républicaine dans des positions très vulnérables à l’attaque aérienne (« Saddam still made the unforgivable military mistake of underestimating the true effect of modern airborne technology and allowed many of his elite Republican Guard units to be bombed to destruction in positions along an exposed perimeter 30-50kms from central Baghdad »). Nous sommes tout à fait d’accord avec cette évaluation, qui ressort à notre avis clairement d’erreurs de jugement dûes aussi bien aux caractères du régime qu’au caractère individuel de Saddam Hussein.

D’une part, Saddam n’a pas été suffisamment informé des risques courus par ses divisions, par un renseignement habitué en général à brosser l’aspect positif de toute situation, pour garder de bonnes relations avec le président ; d’autre part l’isolement, l’arrogance et la vanité que donnent l’exercice du pouvoir absolu et la déliquescence intellectuelle du milieu qu’il avait ménagé autour de lui, ont conduit à cette catastrophique sous-évaluation par Saddam. Non seulement Saddam n’aurait pas dû déployer ses divisions où il les a mises, mais plus encore, il aurait dû les fractionner en petites unités mobiles auxquelles il aurait assigné des missions de harcèlement et de guérilla. On pouvait croire qu’il avait pris cette orientation lorsque les Américains connurent des difficultés à la fin-mars. C’était une erreur.

What remains of the Iraqi military machine?

By Richard M. Bennett, AFI Research

With the destruction of the Iraqi forces in the Southern and Central fronts being quickly followed by the collapse or withdrawal of the vast majority of those units expected to make a last stand in Baghdad the defensive tactics of the Iraq regime appear increasingly muddled. The Iraqi military would seem to have had no firm idea of how to mount a serious defence against a fast moving invasion force. Few if any bridges were destroyed; dams were left intact and areas that could have been denied to the advancing coalition troops by flooding remained passable. No widespread serious attempts were made to mine vital approaches or construct strong points or defensive positions at junctions or in buildings anywhere in Baghdad. In fact despite the colourful rhetoric that flowed from Iraqi leaders the impression that no significant attempt was going to be made to defend Baghdad is growing.

Despite apparently paying close attention to the lessons that could be learnt from the use of American airpower in the first Gulf War, in Kosovo and Serbia and even more recently in Afghanistan, Saddam still made the unforgivable military mistake of underestimating the true effect of modern airborne technology and allowed many of his elite Republican Guard units to be bombed to destruction in positions along an exposed perimeter 30-50kms from central Baghdad. Once the United States had been able to degrade the Iraqi Command and Communications systems to a point where control of forces in the field became fitful, if not non-existent, then the cohesiveness and military effectiveness of the main combat formations quickly collapsed. The United States field commanders kept the advantage of strategic surprise at all times and cleverly exploited every battlefield opportunity to press forward.

While much of the advanced units of the US ground forces may unwillingly become tied down in restoring Baghdad to some form of control, there must remain the clear opportunity for surviving Iraqi forces to attempt to regroup. Airpower and the addition of troops from the 101st Air assault and 4th Infantry Division will probably be called upon to take the battle north into Tikrit, Kirkuk and Mosul over the coming days, though it must be hoped that the remaining elements of the former regime recognize the facts and surrender, if only to save more bloodshed. There are still considerable Iraqi forces unaccounted for and in the absence of serious opposition the suggestion put forward by US analysts is that the majority have simply deserted. The Allies only hold some 13-14,000 POW and with perhaps 10,000 killed so there are in theory some 375,000 or more soldiers plus upto 100,000 Fedayeen and Paramilitaries which on paper are still available to Saddam or his successors. However these figures would now appear widely exaggerated and the real number may now be around 100-150,000 as a maximum.

Most of these are in the Northern Front area with the First Corps at Khalid Camp in Kirkuk made up of the 2nd Infantry Division, 5th Mechanized Division, the 8th Infantry Division and the 38th Infantry Division and the Fifth Corps in Mosul with the 1st Mechanized Division, 4th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division and the 16th Infantry Division. While there are still two major Republican Guard units largely intact, the 7th Adnan Mechanized Division based at Mosul and the Al Abed Mechanized Division based at Kirkuk. The fate of those Republican Guard units involved in the failed defence of Baghdad including the 2nd Al Medina Armoured Division, 5th Baghdad Mechanized Division and the Al Nida Armoured Division is fairly certain, while that of the 1st Hammurabi Mechanized Division, the 6th Nebuchadnezzar Mechanized Division and the 8th Special Forces Division appears lest certain and indeed many of the surviving units may have retreated through the northern outskirts of the city on the first night of blackouts, possibly with the majority of the four brigades of the Special Republican Guard and much of the regimes leadership. Thus leaving behind a few spokesmen and the militia's to delay the Allied forces with a show of token resistance.

The regular forces belonging to 2nd and 3rd Corps south of Baghdad have been decimated or have now effectively surrendered. The CIA and senior US Special Forces officers are understood to have negotiated the defection of most, if not all of the remaining 4th Corps in recent days and these forces may in due course form the nucleus of a new National Army. With no air cover; a virtually non-existent air defence capability and a fractured command structure the remaining Iraqi forces certainly present no long term military threat. However the United States will want to defeat these forces at the first opportunity for sound military as well as political reasons. A spectacular display of airpower can be expected to prepare the battlefield for operations by the United States ground forces to seize the strategic triumvirate of vitally important cities in Northern Iraq and bring closure to at least the conventional stages of this war.

[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit être lu avec la mention classique à l'esprit, — “Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.”.]