Il n'y a pas de commentaires associés a cet article. Vous pouvez réagir.
364… Effectivement, l’expression d’‘attaque-surprise’, si l’attaque avait lieu, serait bien étrange. (Certes, il s’agit des USA contre l’Iran)… Hier, RAW Story signalait deux communications récentes à ses clients du groupe financier (banque) hollandais ING, qui présentent l’hypothèse d’une attaque comme probable. (Les deux communications d’ING sont du 9 janvier et du 15 janvier, dans la lettre d’information interne ‘Prophet’.)
Les deux rapports ont été rédigés par Charles Robertson, le Chief Economist for Emerging Europe, Middle East, and Africa des services prospectifs du groupe ING (Robertson est basé à Londres). Résumant ses prévisions pour ses clients investisseurs, Robertson donne ces précisions : «Investment implications: Geopolitical tension will likely rise in February/March, impacting on risk appetite and asset prices across the board.»
RAW Story signale ceci, sur l’origine du document pour ce qui le concerne : «The ING memo was first sent to RAW STORY as an anonymous tip and confirmed Monday by staff in the bank's emerging markets office, who passed along the Jan. 15 update.»
Le rapport fait par RAW Story, en date du 15 janvier, résume les appréciations d’ING de cette façon :
«ING's Robertson admitted that an attack on Iran was “high impact, if low probability,” but explained some of the reasons why a strike might go forward. The Jan. 9 dispatch, describes Israel as “not prepared to accept the same doctrine of ‘mutually assured destruction’ that kept the peace during the Cold War. Israel is adamant that this is not an option for such a geographically small country....So if Israel is convinced Iran is aiming to develop a nuclear weapon, it must presumably act at some point.”
»Sketching out the time line for an attack, Robertson says that “we can be fairly sure that if Israel is going to act, it will be keen to do so while Bush and Cheney are in the White House.”
»Robertson suggests a February-March 2007 timeframe for several reasons. First, there is a comparable situation to Israel's strike on Iraq's nuclear program in 1981, including Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's political troubles within Israel. Second, late February will see Iran's deadline to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1737, and Israel could use a failure of Iran and the UN to follow through as justification for a strike. Finally, greater US military presence in the region at that time could be seen by Israel as the protection from retaliation that it needs.
»In his Jan. 15 update, Robertson points to a political reason that could make the assault more likely – personnel changes in the Bush administration may have sidelined opponents of attacking Iran.»
Robertson parle notamment du départ du général Abuzaid. D’autres sources ont évoqué et évoquent ce départ comme étant lié à la perspective d’une attaque (que Abuzaid désapprouverait). C’est le cas notamment de la lettre d’information EIR Strategic Alert du 11 janvier (accès payant), qui apporte quelques précisions, notamment sur le rôle que devrait jouer en réalité le contingent de renforcement US.
«[One wellplaced Washington intelligence community source] said that an added 20,000 to 30,000 American combat troops would be required to fight the anticipated Shi’ite insurrection against any US attack on Iran—even a “limited” air
strike against select so-called nuclear weapons sites. Other sources have told EIR in recent weeks that the sudden announcement by CENTCOM head Gen. John ABIZAID, that he would be retiring from military service in March 2007, was a direct response to White House plans to attack Iran. Abizaid, according to these sources, opposes any such attack, and chose to make sure that he would no longer be in the US military chain of command when such a strike occurs. Abizaid’s March 2007 departure date could be an indication that military action
against Iran could occur as soon as next Spring.»
Mis en ligne le 16 janvier 2007 à 16H24
-
