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1626Whatever the fate of the Japanese interest in the American F-22 Raptor fighter aircraft, it seems that a fundamental change has taken place in the view held by the American national security Establishment as regards this weapon system. Until the Japanese affair, the system was sacrosanct, clearly reserved solely and exclusively for US military users answerable to the nation’s highest calling (often seen from an isolationist standpoint – as is frequently the situation in the case of the most advanced American aerospace systems).
The Japanese request, and the reception accorded it, made it clear that the system could be entrusted to other hands, while remaining at the highest level of America’s strategic and technological power, All that is required is that the hands be friendly hands and that they remain under close American control. Japan appears to fill the bill in this regard. There are those who believe that the number of countries meeting the criteria can be expanded. And Australia is already coming forward to make that case.
Australia entered the JSF program with the seven other countries that opted to cooperate in the aircraft’s development. In keeping with that role, the Australian government – very close to Washington – announced its intention to place an order for the JSF. For more than two years, opposition in Australia to the JSF purchase has grown in strength. This opposition does not mean – contrary to other opposition positions in other countries – refusal to buy any US aircraft but rather refusal to buy this particular US aircraft (the JSF or the F-35). The alternative that is being mentioned more and more often is the purchase of the F-22 in that the cost differential between it and the F-35 seems to be narrowing. The Australian government appeared to have resolved the issue by stating categorically that the US was not considering for a moment export of the F-22. The Japanese affair has placed the Australian government in an awkward situation by affirming the contrary in no uncertain terms.
The editorial in the May 2007 issue of Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, a monthly which had, until then, gone along with the ‘party line’ when it came to the choice of the JSF, was titled boldly – and with no small touch of irony: “F-22: Knock and you shall find…”, and proceeded to make the obvious argument: “Recent comments by senior US officials in the wake of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Washington that the White House is positively disposed to sell [up to 100] F-22 to Japan, surely indicates that Australia would be given a receptive hearing, being such a close ally.”
The incursion of the F-22 into the fighter aircraft export market domain is a key step in the media’s virtualist presentation of the broader problem. Until now, the official line had been that the export of fighter aircraft was to become – for the first three-quarters of the 21st century – a sort of exclusive preserve for a single system: the JSF fighter aircraft.
(It matters little that the JSF is clearly not alone; that there are known competitors: the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale and the SAAB Gripen. We are speaking, of course, of the media’s virtualist presentation, as the American public relations machine has spun it, and we are well aware of the limits of such cotton-candy fluff compared to reality.)
As of now, this version of the situation is no longer tenable. The F-22 has entered the arena, even if only in a highly restrictive way. The Australian reaction shows us that this restriction is no longer considered as a fundamental obstacle but as something that is now highly relative that can be negotiated. The editorial cited considers that at least three countries are in line to benefit from the export of the F-22: Australia, Israel and Japan.
The entry on the scene of the F-22 also means that there is a prospect that the virtualist and absolutist argument that touts America’s all-powerful military and technological prowess may be replaced by a more civil debate over the true operational capabilities of the competing aircraft and over the relevant financial implications. In the two years since the issue has been mooted, the interest of the anti-JSF Australians in the F-22 has centered on the aircraft’s operational capabilities first and foremost.
Australia’s geographic and strategic situation requires the country to seek out powerful weapon systems capable of operating autonomously over vast distances. That is why the RAAF had chosen the General Dynamics F-111 in the seventies. From that standpoint, of course, the F-22 is infinitely superior to the JSF in power and in range. The potential versatility afforded by its power makes it possible to envisage new missions in addition to ‘air supremacy’. For example, the destructive capability of the F-22 against cruise missiles is advanced by the advocates of the F-22 as the perfect response to future strategic threats. (That is also one of the operational arguments that induced the Japanese to seek to acquire the F-22.)
If the F-22 is barely more expensive than the JSF, what remains of the JSF as regards differences in operational capability of the two aircraft?
On the other hand, the past two years have seen the JSF program beset by a growing number of problems, and there have been increasingly detailed reports of cost overruns. We are at a point where the JSF’s forecast costs could, under certain circumstances, almost reach the level of the anticipated cost for an export version of the F-22. If an F-22 costs in the vicinity of $150 million and a JSF around $120 million, the case for opting for the Raptor becomes almost a no-brainer. It is a calculation of considerable importance and one that has dealt the myth of the JSF a stunning blow whose effects will soon spread far and wide. The JSF was designed on the basis that it would cost one-third or one-fourth of what the F-22 would cost; the F-22 was developed on the basis of operational parameters substantially above those of the JSF, with performance capabilities that seemed ‘out of this world’. The cost differential between the two aircraft is narrowing, but the difference in capabilities between them remains as wide as ever.
We can understand then that the emergence of the F-22 as a contender in the export field is quite an event – especially for the JSF. Until now, the JSF has been an aircraft which, in the description that was given in what we have called the ‘virtualist media’ presentation, was beyond any possible competition. That situation has been totally turned on its head. It is in this new light that the fate of the JSF must be judged – for therein lies the real problem for the future of export sales for America’s aerospace industry.
Of course, we are talking about a situation that is still very theoretical. We would even tend to believe that it would not go beyond the theoretical stage, if we restricted the discussion to the suppositions of the non-US players concerning their interest in buying the F-22. But there are the players within the US who are clearly concerned by the fate of the F-22 and their influence within the system is considerable. The main player, of course, is the USAF.
The drama that the USAF is living with daily is well known. For the USAF, there is only one aircraft in its future worthy of its trust because that aircraft is the guarantor of its power. That aircraft is the F-22. The program was called the ‘Advanced Technological Fighter’ in the eighties, and the USAF planned for a production run of 796 aircraft for starters (with, of course, the possibility – following the customary routine – of tacking on further aircraft to the initial buy). Since the beginning of the nineties and the end of the exigencies of the Cold War, the fate of the F-22 has been to fade into oblivion. From the initial order for 796 aircraft, the quantity dropped to just over 400, then to 382, then to 181 aircraft, and that is where matters currently stand.
Until two years ago, the fate of the F-22 seemed inextricably ensnarled in cost overruns, which seemed to rule out any possibility of supplemental production. Since then, conditions have changed. The price of the F-22 has been stabilized. The 2-3 year delay in JSF production has enabled the Air Force to convince Congress to lock in F-22 production, then to enter into contracts for a small extension with the purpose of keeping the production line going for a ‘fifth-generation fighter aircraft’.
But for now it is difficult to go beyond that point because of the substantial pressures brought on by the ever-mounting expenditures for the ‘war on terror’ (Iraq and Afghanistan), as well as by budgetary constraints related to the JSF program. It easy to understand then how, in such an environment, export of the F-22 is becoming an increasingly attractive way forward. It would mean the continuation of F-22 production and a reduction in the aircraft’s unit cost, and would provide the USAF with an irresistible argument to at least double its current order and return to the 382 aircraft called for until 2001. The F-22 would become, for the USAF itself, a direct competitor of the JSF and it is, of course, the JSF that would suffer, with a cut in the Air Force JSF order, allowing it to purchase additional F-22s with the freed-up funds.
US Control on F-22 Exports in a Bid for Strategic Integration
We find ourselves then before the domestic picture that completes the export picture described supra (the F-22 having become exportable and thus a more than valid competitor of the JSF). The necessary condition would be the strict control of the exported F-22s, which would be placed in a multinational system under US control.
(Loren Thompson’s analysis concludes that a Japanese F-22 would be integrated into an anti-cruise missile defense system that the US would put in place in Asia under US control. The Australians could be interested in such a system, which would have the advantage of bringing them closer to Japan and to the rest of Asia. All of that has its place in a context of the Pentagon’s renewed interest in Asia as a strategic area, with what is perceived as the Chinese threat. In that perspective, export of the aircraft to Japan and to Australia takes on even more significance.)
In reality, it would be a matter of the export F-22 playing a role substantially comparable to that of the JSF, but with infinitely superior operational capabilities. This time, at least, the business of US control over the exported aircraft would be clearly stated, whereas with the JSF, it is dissimulated, while still being quite real. The point here, in our view, is that, one way or another, all ‘fifth-generation’ aircraft exported by the US must remain under US control both technologically (as regards sensitive components) and operationally (in actual deployment). We see the extent to which, in this scenario, the F-22 is fast becoming a direct competitor of the JSF, both within the Air Force and in the fighter aircraft export market. We also understand how much this competition is especially disturbing for the JSF, because the power of the F-22 relegates its competitor to ‘also ran’ status.
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