Il n'y a pas de commentaires associés a cet article. Vous pouvez réagir.
1278During the month of August, it was learned that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had decided to bring/call into question the JSF program for the IDF. (Israel, having signed onto the development cooperation phase, had decided early in 2006 to order 100 F-35s.)
On 19 August, the daily Haaretz announced:
“The Israeli Defense Forces will conduct a force structure review this week under the guidance of deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky, and will consider postponing the procurement of the F-35 stealth strike fighter
The delay announced meant that the entry into service of the first Israeli F 35s would slip from 2014 to 2015 or 2016. Confirmation of the IDF decision was not forthcoming on 25 August as expected, but came only on 10 September.
Behind the delay lay the Pentagon’s strong pressure which became apparent early in August, when the Americans first learned that the JSF was going to be brought/called into question in Israel. ‘Brought Called into question’ is the right term since it rapidly became clear that the shift in the IDF’s attitude toward the JSF extended not only to the timing element but also entailed a massive cutback in the size of the order.
Independent European sources believed that the IDF had arrived at a conclusion calling for the outright cancellation of the order. Such was not the case, in the final showdown. The US pressure was too strong to be ignored. The IDF decided to maintain an order, but at a level that effectively marginalized the program – a rather ‘symbolic’ order for 25 aircraft instead of 100. The same European sources firmly assert that it is an order that has no future, i.e., there is no real hope that the initial order will be restored for the next five-year plan (2013-2017). This pessimistic assessment was confirmed in the 10 September issue of Defense News:
“In the follow-on, five-year plan, the Air Force hopes to receive funding for another two squadrons, which would boost its JSF force to 75 by the end of the decade. However, defense and industry sources say this assessment is overly optimistic. ‘They’re now talking about one squadron of 25 planes … and if we’re lucky, we may get another squadron of 25 in the next five year plan’, said a prominent airpower lobbyist. He added, ‘Few are seriously talking any more about the full 100 planes.’”
Since the decision was announced, comments have been few and far between. Lockheed Martin has indicated that Israel’s cooperation in the developing program was continuing. There has been indirect pressure on editorial staffs and commentators specialized in the field to keep the matter ‘low key’, if not to ‘embargo’ the story. The reaction is, of course, typical, since the JSF program has been so highly ‘virtualized’ – given nonstop media hype coverage. When we look at the harsh fact, announced without commentary, it is clear that the Israeli decision is of great import and that that import is very bad news indeed for the JSF program.
Israel’s entry into the JSF program came was accompanied by special conditions going beyond the cooperation framework that links the other eight participating countries. The ‘special relationship’ between Washington and Tel Aviv explains this exception.
The fact remains that Israel’s entry into the program was a powerful boost, a welcome ‘shot-in-the-arm’, for the program. It was a major operational endorsement by an air arm whose air combat record is legendary. With the JSF, the Israelis in a way broke with their practice since 1967 in their approach to US fighter aircraft: order new generation US fighter aircraft, but only after a period of evaluation permitting validation of the new model’s operational superiority. Such was the case for the F-16, which was not ordered by Israel until the fighter entered into service in the USAF in 1979.
It is understandable, therefore, that Israel’s partial withdrawal – by cutting back substantially the size of its order – is as momentous a negative development for the program as its early entry into the program (a veritable operational endorsement) was a positive one. No one should be under any illusion as regards the prospect outlined concerning the improbability of any restoration of the order for the 100 cancelled aircraft.
The fact is clear. The Israeli order, reduced to 25 aircraft, constitutes a total marginalization of the F-35 in the future arsenal of the Israeli Air Force, at least until 2020-2025. The Israeli Air Force is centering its air combat capability around its F-15s (including the F-15E/I penetration fighter) and its F-16s – and, possibly, around UAVs. Any plans for reorganization of the Israeli Air Force around the JSF have been postponed – sine die.
The cause for this change in course – beside the aside from competition between the forces – is obvious. The July failure of the summer of 2006 debacle, attested to and explained by three reports issued from different sources, led to the IDF acknowledging a new reality. The new reality is the unexpected victorious showing of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) and the failure of the Pentagon’s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) initiative, organized around the highly sophisticated air component, utilizing the centralized automatism, high precision guided munitions, the ‘shock & awe’ aerial offensive, as the solution to all operational problems. The IDF, for its part, was obliged to concede the capability of Hezbollah and to acknowledge the inability of a high-technology, modern, air force to destroy that capability. At that point, Israel’s aggressive modernization of its air force around the JSF was suddenly no longer a top priority.
Of course, this shift goes hand in hand with the rehabilitation of the key role of the ground forces around the IDF’s main battle combat tank; the need to maintain ground combat capability, including the capability of seizing and holding enemy positions, etc. It is less than a foregone conclusion that rehabilitation of the Merkava Mk 4 main battle combat tank is really a lesson of the summer of 2006; it offers, however, an insight into the competition of the forces and the refound ascendance of the ground component. This inter -service rivalry plays a certain role, but the fact remains that the key lesson is remains compelling. That lesson entails as its prime conclusion the substantial downgrading of the utility of air power; in 4GW, air power becomes an adjunct of the ground forces, and no longer constitutes the main force determining the outcome of the battle
The same day, 10 September, that Israel announced its decision to cut back its JSF procurement order, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) in Washington published an analysis of the JSF. We accord great importance to this analysis because it is, to our mind, the first one, in the world of the Washington analysts, to break out of the Pentagon/Lockheed Martin circle of influence. Specifically, we would point out the following important aspects:
• The analysis is important because it is published by the CDI, a reformist think tank that is very critical of the Pentagon’s weapon system management and of its budgetary situation practices. Since its creation by Admiral Gene LaRoque at the end of the sixties, the CDI has been recognized as one of the top repositories of critical analyses of Pentagon systems development and management.
• One of the two authors of the analysis, Winslow Wheeler, is a recognized authority in the national security field, particularly on Pentagon program management and budgetary matters, having worked with the Senate on Capitol Hill and with the GAO.
The authors’ judgment on the JSF is extremely critical. It comes in sharp contrast to the palaver on the JSF ladled out for almost a decade by the members of the Washington Establishment with vested interests in the program:
“… a significant performance step backwards, but one that comes at great cost”, — and, further on, “more a threat to the US military’s efforts to modernize its tactical aviation capabilities than a solution.”
The CDI criticism is total and unrelenting, sparing no domain (with the exception of international cooperation, and that, simply, because it did not address the subject). The article lambastes the cost of the aircraft, the program management, and especially the aircraft’s role – or lack of one – and its operational effectiveness – or ineffectiveness. It is the last point that interests us more particularly. For until now, the JSF has been touted in terms of its political-commercial appeal and for its technological innovation.
The audacious aspect of the criticism is that it does not evaluate the degree of progress the aircraft embodies, considering such progress as more or less significant, but that it deems the aircraft quite simply to be the antithesis of progress – a step backwards (“… a significant performance step backwards.”) The importance significance of so radical a judgment from such a respected source being published at the very moment when Israel takes the telling decision we have seen (without precedent for a new American fighter aircraft) can only be characterized as devastating for the program. (Since Israel’s entry into its a privileged alliance with the US, the Israelis have always opted to procure top flight US aircraft – the F-4, the F-15 and the F 16.)
We are starting to recognize that, in the military sphere, in certain cases, the integration of high technology in weapon systems without the slightest restriction is beginning to seem like the situation is approaching the point of crisis, when one takes a hard look at the realities. This idea is even making inroads into the general press where, one can read in a daily as cautious in its criticism of the industrial and military Establishment as Le Monde, which in an editorial of 11 September, on the state of America, had this to say one could read: “Although the United States remains the strongest country militarily, its power is being seriously challenged on the ground, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, faced with the harsh realities of guerilla warfare. The technological revolution in military affairs does not appear to be as suited to the situation as large battalions.”
When one evaluates the capabilities of the JSF, it is necessary to bear in mind that it is paradoxically an aircraft that is both multi-mission and specialized. In point of fact, it is more multi-service than multi-mission. Consequently, the JSF is a paradox:
• It is an aircraft that is specialized in the general mission of ground support. It is in this specialized field that it is generally presented as multi-mission, in theory capable of performing everything from the most short range tactical missions (Close Air Support, or CAS) to the deepest (strategic – or rather pre-strategic) – penetration missions. This claim is disputed, however, because of the aircraft’s range which is deemed too limited.
• On the other hand, the JSF is a system presented as both versatile and ‘universal’, suitable for deployment in each of the three military services possessing an offensive air capability (USAF, US Navy, Marine Corps).
• On the other hand, the JSF is not at all designed for air superiority missions, the USAF having seen to that to protect its F-22 from any intrusive alternative. Some efforts are being made by Lockheed Martin to claim that the JSF has air-to-air capability. The test pilots speak enthusiastically of the aircraft’s ‘agility’, but none of that is fooling anybody no one is being taken in by any of that. The JSF is not and will never be a fighter aircraft.
The War in Afghanistan or the Terrible Realities of 4GW
This analysis of the JSF’s true capabilities needs, of course, to be matched stood up against the reality of the combat situation in the wars being fought in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Today, it is clear that the conflict being waged – the only conflict conceivable under the conditions prevailing on the ground – is asymmetrical warfare or Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW).
We are not saying that very high level conventional or classical war is not conceivable. What we are saying is that for the foreseeable future, it must be considered as accidental, as the product of the uncontrolled concatenation of events which somehow get beyond our political ability to control them. This view is based on the fact that very high level conventional or classical warfare has become potentially too destructive, (with today’s very real possibility of deployment of nuclear weaponry) for us to consider it as a reasonable and acceptable option.
It is surely from Afghanistan that we are receiving the clearest indications of the role that the air component must be capable of playing in a 4GW conflict. As we know, air superiority or air supremacy is not in issue since the enemy has no air force. The primary role of the air arm is air to ground operations providing tactical close air support (CAS). The phenomenon is characterized by the need for very close engagement. Major General Allen Peck, Commander Air Force Doctrine Development Center (which has formulated an Irregular Warfare [IW] Doctrine), reported at the Air & Space Conference of the Air Force Association that more than a quarter of the air-to-ground engagements employed 20 mm and 30 mm guns mounted on board support aircraft. This means action very close to the target, carried out at the slowest possible speed in order to accurately identify and accurately fire on the target.
These accounts come as a surprise to no one. Asymmetric conflict of this type has always led to the same conclusions, on occasion resulting in unexpected measures where the most effective equipment meant a step – or two – backward technologically. During the 1954-62 war in Algeria, the aircraft used most by the French was the T-6 Harvard, an armed trainer that first saw service in 1939. In Vietnam, the most effective aircraft for the Americans, starting in 1964-65, was the A-1 Skyraider, which had its maiden flight in 1946. Today, we no longer resort to such measures because to do so would be to concede the doubtful utility of high technology since because asymmetric/4GW conflict is the only type of conflict conceivable. (In the 1950-1970 period, the Algerian and Vietnam wars were secondary conflicts and possible confrontation with the Soviet Union provided the primary justification for the pursuit of high technology weaponry.)
In Afghanistan – with the exception of the Fairchild A-10A, which was specially designed for this type of mission – we have only very advanced aircraft, very poorly designed for such missions. It is absurd to hear Wing Commander Gavin Parker, Commander XI Squadron, RAF, say, in speaking of the Eurofighter Typhoon which is beginning to be deployed in Afghanistan: “The Typhoon is already an exceptional air-to-air fighter and is demonstrating excellent potential in the air-to-surface role. It will make it a fantastic close air support machine.”
On the contrary, the deployment of aircraft that are not designed for CAS missions, or that are totally inadequate for such missions, has had a devastating political effect, especially because of firing errors and collateral damage which are due to the employment of precision guided munitions in an automatic environment where errors in target identification and target position are far from infrequent. The political-military fallout (hostility on the part of the government and of the civilian population; passage of many civilians to the Taliban side) brought about by the various errors of air to ground operations (primarily American, in the case of Afghanistan) and the resulting civilian casualties, constitutes a decisive factor in the conduct of 4GW warfare.
The verdict of the CDI: The JSF is extremely poorly adapted to the new type of 4GW conflict
It is this background that must be borne in mind in evaluating the effectiveness of the JSF in the operational roles it will be called upon to perform. The verdict is less than encouraging. The JSF is lacking in all the qualities required to adapt to the asymmetric type conflict being waged in Afghanistan. There is no flexibility of employment enabling it to operate effectively in that environment: it is not designed to engage slowly, maintaining visual contact with targets on the ground; it lacks the independent capability enabling it to operate under such harsh and such primitive conditions as those prevailing in this type of mission.
That then is the judgment reached by the Center for Defense Information. Its criticism goes to the heart of the issues we have raised in the following passage:
“Like many of its multi-role predecessor aircraft, the F-35 may well turn out to be a ‘jack of all trades but a master of none.’ Performance compromises in specialized roles are already quite obvious in the close air support (CAS) mission where the F-35 purports to replace the A-10. As a fighter-bomber design, the F-35 is inherently too fast to find targets on the ground independently (that is, without being cued directly to the intended target with external assistance), too limited in range, duration, and weapons payload to persist in the air over ground combat areas, and too thin on the conventional battlefield. The absence of a more serious air to ground cannon, such as the A-10’s GAU-8, even further limits the F-35 n the close air support role.”
The operational situation is uncertain and in constant flux, but the direction in which pressure can be seen to be building is clear. The concept of the JSF, the archetype of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), results in it emerging as the paradigm of a system totally unadapted and ill-suited to the situation into which it is thrown. What we have is the clear demonstration of the disconnect between the virtual world of the RMA and the real world. And it is in this sense that the CDI’s judgment on the JSF must be understood: “… a significant performance step backwards, but one that comes at great cost”, “more a threat to the US military’s efforts to modernize its tactical aviation capabilities than a solution.” Unsurprisingly, what we have is it is the recognition that the JSF has been built for the world as the Pentagon wishes it were, a vision totally unrelated to reality.
In 1996, then USAF Chief of Staff General Fogleman had characterized the JSF as ‘a bomb truck’. That summed it all up in advance, and it is perhaps the program’s fatal flaw, announced in all candor from the outset. (It is also a measure of the way in which the USAF views the aircraft: use of the expression ‘bomb truck’ is not exactly a form of flattery.) The fact is that this pseudo-multi-mission, multi-service, aircraft finds itself relegated to a very narrow mission role – air-to-ground operations – a role where its sophistication is seriously called into question, in the era that began on 11 September 2001, with the coming to the fore of the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW).
What can save an advanced technology weapon system from the growing criticism born of the reality of 4GW is total versatility, a true multi-mission capability. That means that it must have among its missions the mission of air superiority (or of ‘air supremacy’ as the Americans have now refined it the term). It is one of the rare military missions essential to the security of a country, and thus to its sovereignty, a veritable ‘sovereignty mission’; accordingly, the system that is tasked with that mission itself acquires an inherent, an intrinsic, sovereign dimension and a political content value that stands on its own; from that point on, procurement of the aircraft becomes a national imperative. (Precisely for this reason, the 11 September criticism by France’s Minister of Defense of the Rafale fighter aircraft as representing such costly and paradoxically outmoded high technology, shows that his advisers have failed to grasp the problem of aerial missions as they relate to advanced technology, since the Rafale’s primary role is that of air supremacy.)
The CDI criticism, with the Israeli decision coming at the same time as a sort of immediate practical confirmation, leads one to believe that the JSF program is going to find itself confronted, in these times of Pentagon budgetary penury (the USAF is staring at a $20 billion annual shortfall for its procurement program for the next 10 years), with this type of operational criticism which, in American legislative and bureaucratic practice leads to endless Byzantine infighting. In the case where the prospective role of a new aircraft is attacked on the grounds of its mission compared to the models that it is replacing, the reaction of the Congress, as history shows, is to do as the CDI analysis suggests be done: confront the new aircraft with those that are already in service, comparing their respective capabilities during test trials. The purpose will be to determine if the astronomic cost of the JSF is justified, including the ulterior motives that form part and parcel of the program.
More concretely, why not buy two or three somewhat modernized F 16s, modified for air-to-ground attack – the update of the A 16 program explored in the eighties – for the price of a single JSF? It should surprise no one that Lockheed Martin has stashed away, for a rainy day, just such plans for an Updated A-16.
The CDI analysis proposes in effect that the JSF be subjected to test trials in the course of which its capabilities can be are matched up against those aircraft which it is supposed to replace: the A-10, the F-15E, the F-16, etc. That takes time and opens the way to polemics, further increasing the program’s vulnerability, while the two armed services concerned, the USAF and the US Navy, each has its champion, the F-22 and the F/A-18E/F, respectively, whose cause they advance to the detriment of the JSF at the drop of a hat. All of which makes for a highly precarious situation for the JSF.
-
