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1258@SURTITRE = Revolution in the Making
@TITREDDE = What is War Today?
It is clear that the world today is about to witness the birth of new forms of political and military action that can be expected to have far-reaching strategic and geopolitical implications. The events that have shaken the world since 11 September 2001 have unveiled greater uncertainty, greater disarray and greater disenchantment than they have resolution and awareness of what is at stake in what some have described as the greatest war that civilization has ever been called upon to wage – the War on Terror. These negative aspects are to be found in the areas of strategy, geopolitics and technology.
‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, the code name given to the war launched against Iraq on 19 March, has brought no satisfaction and no relief in that regard. It is even an extraordinary paradox that a war that commentators were so quick to label as brilliant and decisive should give way so rapidly to a situation as chaotic and as dismaying as that which Iraq has known since April 2003. What is most striking in all of this is the speed of the events. The Iraq War has also offered technological and tactical lessons that can be learned from events on the ground, but such lessons are practically of no use, since just as instantaneously as the point is made – most often in the form of a deafening blast or an apocalyptic conflagration – the ground rules change and ten new threats emerge to take the place of the dastardly act most recently perpetrated.
The two main lessons learned from ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, in terms of equipment deployment, were:
• The rehabilitation of heavy tanks which had been thought to be outmoded in 21st Century warfare.
• A very serious rethink of the role of combat helicopters in the wake of the problems and setbacks encountered by the Apache helicopters during the March-April campaign, arising especially from the effective use against those craft of small arms and of grenade launchers as elementary as the RPG-7.
These two lessons, which would appear to be revolutionizing warfare – or more accurately to be ‘counter-revolutionizing’ warfare, since we seem to be walking back the cat on many of the revolutionary lessons learned in recent years – are in fact highly disputable. The situation in Iraq today, since April, shows not only the usefulness of combat helicopters, but the unsuitability of combat tanks, to ‘low-intensity’ conflict or ‘fourth generation’ conflict situations. That leads us to confirm what we think of the first lessons drawn and to pose the broader question: Does the situation in Baghdad today form part of the war itself? Just what is war today?
Which brings us to a discussion of the conditions for the employment of military equipment, rather than of the equipment itself. We shall endeavor to examine what could be called ‘the future of warfare’ through what is currently occurring in Iraq on a daily basis. That will provide us with a more useful tool than the parameters normally available to us (military expenditures, level and utilization of technologies, etc.) to measure the power of the contending parties to the conflict.
@TITREDDE = Iraqi Freedom Revisited
Operation Iraqi Freedom presents several aspects that are completely at variance with what we have come to know as normal warfare. In its initial or preparatory phase – a sort of lead-up to the war – there was an unreal or surrealistic atmosphere: the patent, unconcealed preparation of an attack announced as inevitable, against an already weakened adversary, who, instead of preparing by arming itself, seeks on the contrary to disarm. In the three months before the initiation of hostilities, the UN inspectors succeeded in destroying certain types of weapons, unobstructed by the Iraqis – one might almost say with their active assistance.
Viewed with hindsight, it appears obvious that allowing the UN inspections and the efforts to disarm were only tactical. If there had been a genuine attempt to avoid the war on the Iraqi side, there would have an acceptance of the proposal made by the US at the end of the lead-up, just before the onset of the war itself, that Saddam Hussein step down voluntarily and leave the country: “Since the feigned disarmament convinces no one, just surrender and there will be no war.” Instead of which, there was a war, one waged on the terms of the attacker, against an enemy that had been rendered ineffective in the area of advanced weaponry for conventional warfare, an enemy that did not deign to go through the motions of deploying its conventional forces to mount even a half-hearted defense.
In the light of what followed – in particular the evidence that networks of clandestine resistance had been formed – it seems obvious that the operational phase of ‘Iraqi Freedom’ (the triumphal March-April offensive culminating in the fall of Baghdad on 9 April) was only the first operational phase of the war and only a tactical phase in fact; and that it had been, more generally, only the second phase of the ‘war’, following the first tactical, diplomatic ‘preparatory’ phase of the war which played such an important role in dissimulating the Iraqi plans. After the second phase (first operational phase up to the fall of Baghdad), the war continued in its third phase with organized resistance and guerilla-type harassment of coalition forces, stigmatized as ‘occupation forces’. The outcome is not yet known, but it appears today to be much less to the advantage of the US than the 19 March-9 April operational phase.
In other words, according to our interpretation, the ‘war’ is a sort of ‘package’ that includes
• the ‘pre-war’ and the ‘disarmament’ operation (phase one);
• the lightning March-April offensive (phase two)
• the ‘post-war’ and the harassment of ‘coalition forces’ (phase three).
This totally unusual ‘war’ corresponds better to what is referred to today as ‘asymmetrical war’ or ‘fourth generation warfare’ than anything we have seen until now. The reality of the war against Iraq, according to our analysis, is that the fall of Baghdad, which represents a tactical victory for the US, in fact represents a strategic American defeat. The American forces have in effect been placed in a strategic posture that prevents them from employing their power, as shown by the tactical phase described below.
Our analysis leads us to offer a new definition of war. Henceforth, the military aims of warfare are no longer directly linked to the political aims for which the war is fought. Achievement of the military goals can even prove directly counterproductive when it comes to achieving the political ends sought. In a way, the war in Algeria is a good example, one drawn from the world as it existed prior to 11 September 2001, presaging the new situation.
In 1960, the French Army had won the war after the battle of Algiers that dealt a crushing blow to urban terrorism and the battle of the borders that reestablished secure borders. General Challe conducted Operation Jumelles that destroyed the infrastructure of the ALN (National Liberation Army, the army of the National Liberation Front, the FLN). But de Gaulle decided to open a political process that was to rapidly lead to independence for Algeria. Thus we have a situation where a military victory gave way to a political defeat. It is a case where the military victor himself decided that it was in its interest to appear vanquished. France withdrew from the war, yielding the political victory to the rebels, because Algeria was deemed to be too costly and not capable of being assimilated by France. De Gaulle’s political decision to grant Algeria its independence was not determined by operational events.
In Iraq, we are faced with the converse situation: it is the US victory in the first operational phase which sets the stage for the second operational phase in which the enemy places the US forces at an operational disadvantage. It was the conditions of phase one – the diplomatic ‘pre-war’ phase – that are allowing phase three to transpire in the way it is. Certain statements by US military are confirming the breakdown in the relationship between power and victory. We see that when General Sanchez, US Army Commander in Iraq, states, according to the Los Angeles Times of 14 September, that a battalion would be adequate to control Iraq, if the requisite intelligence were available: “His troops are facing not a guerilla war, he said, but a ‘low-intensity conflict environment’ that a single battalion would be enough to handle militarily.” The US power (150,000 men, tanks, etc.) serves no purpose other than the negative one of providing targets to the enemy.
War now has another definition than that of raw power. War, as always, is defined in terms of its political outcome, but in Iraq that outcome is now quite far removed from the array of military power on the ground. We find ourselves confronted with an extraordinary paradox: in a post modern war, it is the belligerent with the greater power that finds itself with the greatest potential problems, because it is bound to prove, at one point or another, unsuited to the terrain.
@TITREDDE = What Is US Power Today?
In order to fully understand the paradox set forth whereby power translates into impotence, it is necessary to take into account the power structure in question. That is especially the case as far as US military power is concerned.
It is indisputable that the US armed forces, incorporating the latest word in technology, have striven to achieve flexibility and coordination through ‘jointness’. These efforts are generally presented as proof that these very powerful forces are also rapid and flexible, and, above all, that they are adaptable to 21st Century conflict. Nothing could be farther from being proven, however. Events in Iraq have shown this, once it is recognized that the fall of Baghdad was not the end of the war, but the end of the first operational, tactical phase of the war, and the end of phase two of the war.
The incomparable power of the US is in effect incomparable in several meanings of the word. It is incomparable in terms of brute force, in terms of the weight of military hardware, which is conventionally the quantitative measure of military force. It is also incomparable in terms of the proportion of high-technology systems deployed – so overwhelming that we could coin a phrase and speak of the ‘technologization’ of the forces. A pet concept bandied about for several years, the ‘system of systems’, is typical in this regard: it signifies a determination to effectively envelop the fighting man in a doctrine based on technological capabilities incorporating not only great power but a very high degree of sophistication and of automaticity. But no more so than in the case of the systems of one or two countries with equivalent qualitative capabilities: what counts here and what makes the difference in US forces compared to others is that the mass and the structure constitute an impenetrable power. The crucial role of information and of high-technology communications rounds out the array, providing capabilities for interpretation and transformed perception of reality – what is called ‘virtual reality’.
In the ultimate analysis, what you have is a world unto itself, a world that is totally detached from the real world. When you hear that US military power constitutes ‘a class in itself’, what is really meant is that the US military has a reality of its own.
It is in that context that we must assess the true significance of the adaptability of US forces as they are deployed today. That adaptability relates to the world created by those forces, with their sophistication, their perception as manipulated by the power of their communications. That adaptability has nothing to do with the real world, as the situation in Iraq eloquently shows. It is at that point, of course, that power turns to impotence: if your power serves to distance you from the real world, the more powerful you are, the more impotent you are, incapable of acting effectively in the real world.
@SURTITRE = Another World
@TITREDDE = Meanwhile – Artemis Breakthrough
Have you heard of Operation Artemis? Probably not, unless, of course, you are a regular reader of Context (See Context No. 64 of June 2003, TO THE POINT, “From Paris to the Congo”). Such near-anonymity is a tribute to the success of Artemis – the code name for France’s operation in the Republic of the Congo, which began in June and which wound up on schedule on 1 September, without any major problem.
We know that it was a UN resolution of 30 May that mandated intervention in the Bunia region of the Republic of Congo, where the situation was –according to the official report on Artemis made 18 September in Brussels – marked by “violent confrontations between militias, as well as by a very serious humanitarian situation”. France mounted the operation in under ten days, with the initial preparatory forces arriving in country on 5 June. On 12 June, the operation was ‘Europeanized’, with the backing of the EU. The operation was rapidly extended to 17 countries (12 of them EU), contributing with varying levels of participation. The circumstances of the launch of the operation were, as pointed out above, detailed in the June 2003 issue of Context.
France, as lead-nation, took pains to put in place a multinational structure, very close to the NATO model, in order to reassure her European partners and to demonstrate that an autonomous European operation did not mean a total break with the NATO framework.
UN procedures were respected with the contacts made on the ground and with authorities outside the country. In-country, contacts with the existing structures undertaken preparatory to deployment included the militias and armed insurgents. The planning was minute, but was concerned less with military operations – which were kept to the strict minimum – than with the political-military situation, as well as with social and cultural factors. Sound planning in this type of operation, which means the least possible confrontation, is the measure of its success; and such success can only be achieved if the intervention immediately follows the planning, as quickly as possible since the factors that need to be dealt with are in a state of constant flux.
It goes without saying that the requirement for rapid intervention and the conditions under which the intervention had to take place called for a structure and for equipment that was light, adaptable and flexible. It is unthinkable – as well as useless and counterproductive – to envisage such operations with tanks heavier than 50 tons. Air support was very restrained, more demonstrative than destructive, and never massive. The vehicles deployed were ‘light armored’, generally wheeled, where the requirement for speed was given the nod over weight and power. The issue of ‘force protection’ was never posed in static, negative terms (armoring, fire power, digging in), but rather in dynamic, positive terms (rapid securing of areas, protective deployments, population reassurance and alliances on the ground).
Contacts on the ground are essential – with the contending forces, with the authorities (often multiple sets), with the population, with external elements, etc. For example, the end of Operation Artemis was marked by a ‘gift’ of a stash of arms taken from irregulars, provided to the Uganda authorities in appreciation for their contribution in making the airport of Entebbe available as the strategic rear support base for the operation. The gesture was practical and immediate, cost nothing, and presented no threat of misuse. In addition, it laid the groundwork for future cooperation, should the need arise.
The outcome of the operation is measured in strictly non-military terms. The city of Bunia, which numbers 200,000 inhabitants in normal times, was reduced to 40,000 at the launch of the operation, in a climate of total disorder and insecurity, with all economic activity halted. As of 1 September, the population had gone back to over 100,000 and economic life had resumed (with traditional market days being held starting in August). The key to this turn-around had been Operation ‘Bunia Without Weapons’, conducted 24 June-28 June, calling for the withdrawal of all unauthorized weapons, as well as the withdrawal of various irregular forces. That initiative was reinforced by a determined attitude on the part of Artemis forces. Some incidents did take place, with the death of some irregulars. According to a source close to the operation, “We wanted to show clearly that we weren’t kidding, that we meant business, and that things had changed. After a few skirmishes, the irregulars got the message.”
@TITREDDE = Is It Possible to Compare Artemis and Iraqi Freedom?
Is it possible to stack Operation Artemis up against Operation Iraqi Freedom in terms of lessons learned? The response that immediately springs to mind is that the two cannot be compared because of differences in scale between the two operations. It is true that the difference in the resources placed in the field is enormous: in the case of Iraqi Freedom, there were 150,000 American military on the ground, several hundred aircraft and helicopters, four or five aircraft carriers, etc.; in the case of Operation Artemis, there were 2,000 troops transported, 400 combat or support vehicles, a squadron of Mirage aircraft based at Entebbe, no aircraft carrier, etc. What must be borne in mind is that these ‘assets’ were not those required by the situation on the ground but those determined by the intervening powers on the basis of vastly divergent doctrines. In Iraq, before the kickoff of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the situation on the ground was more peaceful than in Bunia; and it is untrue to state that there was no alternative to Operation Iraqi Freedom as conducted by the Americans. For example, in the UN-Baghdad negotiations and the standoff in the Security Council in the stage before 19 March, various alternative solutions were advanced, such as the peaceful stationing of UN forces in Iraq, with the implicit control of the country which that proposal envisaged.
The extent of the territory subdued was substantially different in the two cases. But here again, this reflected a deliberate political and military choice. The subduing of Iraq could have been conducted in a way quite different from that chosen, without it being said that the outcome would have been worse, especially when one looks at the situation in Iraq today.
Let us look at it the other way around: if, for some reason or other (oil, main base in Africa, extension of democracy, etc.), the US had chosen to intervene in Bunia, what do you imagine they would have done? The American way would have been chosen there as elsewhere and there is every likelihood that the American version of Artemis would have been a major operation, undertaken after protracted preparations, with a cumbersome military structure, conducted in a climate of growing tensions conducive to confrontation.
When General Sanchez tells us that the situation in Iraq, in the ultimate analysis, could have been controlled with a battalion, if there had been a sound command, communications and intelligence structure, is that not an implicit acknowledgment that the great failure of Iraqi Freedom was in not having been able to pull off an Operation Artemis? He is implying simply that if it had been possible to establish a secured situation, as was the case in Bunia, the force that would have had to be deployed would not have been very extensive.
@TITREDDE = The Changing Face of War
It used to be that once hostilities commence, war has a way of changing the world radically. Suddenly, all the caution, all the objections, the criticism and the opposition vanish in a flash (in all likelihood, only to give rise to others). Today, that is no longer the case. The extraordinary development, telling us that war has changed totally in its very nature, is to be found in the fact that the main elements of the pre-war phase (the phase before the first operational phase) did not fall by the wayside and that they are still to be found today, stronger and more menacing than ever. That is the sad truth in the case of Iraqi Freedom. It goes without saying that the leaders who gave the go-ahead for the attack of 19 March, Bush and Blair, expected that the onslaught would sweep away all uncertainty and silence any and all criticism. In a way, that is what happened for better than a month, up until the triumphal culmination of the March-April offensive. As we have seen, however, that victorious offensive did not by and of itself constitute the be-all and the end-all of the war, contrary to what those leaders had believed (with GW Bush announcing the end of hostilities on 1 May on board the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln). After this first operational phase – which was supposed to be the only one, the decisive one, and which it turned out not to be – the second operational phase breathed new life into all the uncertainties, doubts and anguish that preceded the first operational phase, going so far as to produce effects that adversely – and most gravely – affected the interests of the putative ‘victors’.
Two cases serve to illustrate the point:
• After the first operational phase (the 19 March-9 April offensive), the question of the existence of weapons of mass destruction and the matter of the alleged links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda came to the fore with a vengeance, threatening to affect the political fortunes of Bush and of Blair far more seriously than before their ‘victory’. As a result, Bush and Blair today find themselves confronted with crises of confidence at home that are the outgrowth of their ill-starred ‘victory’.
• France, the main country to oppose the war, which was supposed to fall in line and toe the line after the 9 April victory, has in fact emerged stronger than ever diplomatically and politically.
What we are witnessing is a new phenomenon, the new nature of war that combines all the constituent elements (disputes that preceded hostilities, high-intensity operations, low-intensity operations, etc.), without any decisive outcome for either side – despite the military might deployed by the one side (19 March-9 April) and the failure to deploy such military might by the other side. This snatching of defeat from the jaws of victory is a new phenomenon in warfare. To our mind, only operations such as Operation Artemis are capable of grasping the nettle in situations of the type we have been examining.
Contrary to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Artemis accepted the chaotic conditions of the war in the Congo. Operation Artemis agreed to go through the UN, thereby entailing contact with people on the ground. The operation went to great lengths to prepare for the political integration of the force that it was to deploy, by laying down the limits of its strategy and the conditions for its utilization. The preparations entailed negotiating alliances in advance and acquiring support for the forces on the ground (not the type offered by the Iraqi exiles that the Neoconservatives presented in support of their assessment of the situation in Iraq).
There is therefore this fundamental point, already mentioned, which governs everything: contrary to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Artemis did not seek to change the world. It was an exercise in exploiting a force and modern Western doctrines to resolve problems arising in a country that is part of a different world and of a different civilization. Which approach is the better one? The facts speak for themselves.
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