Tsahal en procès : une enquête au-dessous de tout soupçon

La question des enquêtes et sanctions concernant le comportement de l’armée israélienne durant la campagne contre le Hezbollah semble devoir se résoudre selon les techniques attendues. L’armée israélienne américanisée ne bougera pas d’un pouce et continuera sur sa voie, cette voie qui lui a bien réussi. Le succès est au bout du système.

Pour procéder dans ce sens, deux méthodes. Celle des politiques et de leurs conseillers en communication, qui consiste à dire : disons qu’on a gagné et la nécessité de faire des enquêtes s’évacuera d’elle-même. C’est fait.

Il y a aussi celle des militaires-bureaucrates, qui consiste à faire plutôt que dire : monter une commission, qui fera une enquête, qui blanchira l’armée. La chose semble être en bonne voie. Le résultat est, en plus sophistiqué, en plus sérieux, celui qu’atteint Olmert : on a ga-gné, mais aux points. (« “When Chief of Staff Dan Halutz says in public that we won on points, he is already setting the tone of the internal probe for the rest of the army,” said one critic. “The officers under him get the hint.” »)

Cet extrait d’un texte de Haaretz publié aujourd’hui paraît nous confirmer la chose.

« Halutz was also to meet Monday with brigade and battalion commanders who participated in the war, as officers of various ranks have severely criticized the army's internal probe into the failures of the war in recent days, with some going so far as to describe the probe as a “whitewash.”

» The mood among many of the brigade and battalion commanders is very tense, and they are expected to raise serious criticisms of the conduct of the war. Halutz has held several similar meetings over the past two weeks, mostly with reserve officers. On Tuesday, he will meet with dozens of reserve major generals and brigadier generals.

» The internal IDF probe, which is being headed by Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky, involves approximately 50 teams comprising hundreds of officers.

» Career army officers with the rank of major general are in charge of 10 teams dealing with central issues such as the use of reservists and the logistical difficulties experienced by units involved in the fighting. Some of the teams began their work last week.

» But senior officers told Haaretz on Sunday that they believe the internal probe will prove to be unreliable.

» “For some years now, the IDF — especially the ground forces ¬ has not excelled in self-examination,” said one. “Whitewashing is a disease, and it is expected to get worse now that so much lies in the balance and so many officers have something to lose if the full extent of the failure becomes apparent.”

» Even in the case of units that experienced very serious problems during the fighting, the common practice in internal IDF probes is for all units to examine themselves. Thus, for example, Division 91 will conduct its own investigation into the abduction of Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser during a Hezbollah raid on July 12 — the event that sparked the outbreak of war. Similarly, Division 162 will investigate the fighting on the central front during the last two days of the war, between Wadi Salouki and the village of Ghanduriye.

» Under these circumstances, say the critics, it is difficult to expect any substantive findings, other than detailed comments regarding the lower ranks.

» “When Chief of Staff Dan Halutz says in public that we won on points, he is already setting the tone of the internal probe for the rest of the army,” said one critic. “The officers under him get the hint.”

» Officers were also critical of the fact that the army included few retired senior officers with experience in previous wars in the probe.

» Meanwhile, criticisms by reserve officers gathered steam Sunday with the publication of a document detailing failures in the war that was prepared by reserve officers who served in command headquarters during the fighting. Topping the list were intelligence shortcomings.

» According to the document, which was exposed by Channel 2 television Sunday night, intelligence on Hezbollah's positions and order of battle was adequate, but this information never reached units in the field. As a result, many units were surprised by Hezbollah's defensive preparations, particularly in rural areas with thick underbrush.

» Another intelligence problem was outdated aerial photographs, particularly of villages where construction had been rampant in recent years. »

Mis en ligne le 4 septembre 2006 à 16H58