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3 août 2005 — Le Dr. Michael A. Weinstein présente (son “Intelligence Brief: Caribbean Spheres of Influence”, sur PINR, le 2 août) une analyse de la situation dans les Caraïbes après deux événements: le vote par la Chambre des représentants US du traité de libre-échange avec la zone des Caraïbes (CAFTA) le 24 juillet et la réunion le 25 juillet (plus une réunion ministérielle les 27-28 juillet) de l’Association des États des Caraïbes (Association of Caribean States, ou ACS).
Ces deux événements sont mis en parallèle et en concurrence par Weinstein. Cet analyste fait de leur confrontation, fort justement, un chapitre important d’une confrontation nord-sud entre les deux Amériques, celle que dominent les USA et celle qui, aujourd’hui, est entrée en dissidence de l’influence américaine (la quasi-unanimité de l’Amérique du Sud, autour du Brésil de Lula et du Venezuela de Chavez). C’est une analyse d’autant plus acceptable que les deux structures présentées sont de création récente (l’ACS a été créée en 1994, pour CAFTA cela va de soi puisque c’est un traité en discussion), donc qu’elles expriment parfaitement les thèses actuellement débattues et les situations en évolution. Weinstein constate que le sommet du 25 juillet a été un succès étourdissant pour Chavez et sa proposition, son plan ‘PetroCaribe’ qui offre une alimentation en énergie aux pays des Caraïbes à des conditions très avantageuses. Le succès de Chavez est complètement symbolisé par cette déclaration du dernier pays sud-américain qui est classé comme un allié très proche de Washington, la Colombie, avec son président Alvara Uribe disant: « I can envision Venezuela playing a great leadership role. » Le succès de GW Bush avec le vote de CAFTA reste un événement interne à la vie politique US et ne suffit pas, en lui-même, à proposer un rythme révolutionnaire contre l’offensive ACS.
Ces constats peuvent être faits:
• On peut d’ores et déjà parler d’affrontement entre nord et sud dans les deux Amériques, ce qui représente un extraordinaire prolongement politique: en deux-trois années, un bloc du sud s’est formé, sans que Washington puisse le contrecarrer en aucune façon. Lorsqu’on se rappelle l’état de dépendance (des USA) de la zone depuis le XIXème siècle et jusqu’à la fin des années 1990, on mesure la rapidité de l’événement. Inutile d’ajouter quelle leçon de puissance, de courage et de dignité ce prolongement représente pour l’Europe bavarde, irresponsable et soumise à la ligne américaniste.
• La région des Caraïbes (à laquelle certains pays du bloc du sud appartiennent par le biais de leur appartenance à l’ACS) semble être le point de friction des deux blocs, mais avec des points régionaux en suspens, qui peuvent conduire à un apport décisif à l’évolution de la situation, — c’est notamment le cas du Mexique malgré sa position de promoteur de CAFTA, avec l’élection de l’année prochaine qui peut aboutir à un renversement de sa politique.
• … Car l’enjeu est politique, certes. Il est déjà extraordinaire que le bloc du sud ait réussi à faire la percée réalisée à l’ACS, selon des termes économiques certes, mais dont la lecture politique doit être impérative. Même dans la zone des Caraïbes, et malgré CAFTA, Washington est sur la défensive.
• La zone des Caraïbes est d’ores et déjà divisée elle-même en deux blocs (les adhérents à CAFTA et ceux qui acceptent la proposition du Venezuela), avec certains pays ayant un pied dans chaque bloc. Le vote de CAFTA par la Chambre, in extremis (217 voix contre 215), contient pour l’instant le danger pour Washington, mais d’une façon défensive et sur des bases fragiles (le soutien intérieur à CAFTA est lui-même, aux USA, extrêmement aléatoire). Finalement, cette mesure de “containment” économique défensif (un paradoxe pour un traité de libre-échange par nature offensif) a un impact politique en exacerbant justement la dimension politique de l’affrontement, là où les arguments du sud (autonomie et coopération politiques) sont beaucoup plus populaires que ceux du nord (soumission à la ligne américaniste).
Dans le texte ci-dessous, Weinstein présente cet épisode de la fin juillet, d’une situation générale dont la rapidité d’évolution est étonnante.
By Michael A. Weinstein, PINR, 2 August 2005
Widening and deepening competition for spheres of influence in the Western Hemisphere became evident during the week of July 25 with the summit meeting of the Association of Caribbean States (A.C.S.) and the passage of legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives approving the Central American Free Trade Agreement (C.A.F.T.A.).
Through the election of center-left governments pledged to implementing social welfare and import substitution models of economic development, in place of the neo-liberal free trade paradigm, in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, in addition to the election of Hugo Chavez, who promotes a more radical model of cooperativism, to Venezuela's presidency, Washington's leadership in the hemisphere has been credibly challenged over the past several years.
The rise of the center-left and populist left in South America has opened up a north-south split and a resulting competition between the two sides that reaches its flash point in Central America and the Caribbean — the border between the two power blocs where they contend for dominant influence.
With their high poverty and unemployment rates, and their lack of military power, the states of Central America and the Caribbean are dependent upon more prosperous and stronger outside powers for their economic sustenance and development, and their security. In turn, the powers of the north and south of the hemisphere bid for the allegiance of the weaker states in the center.
In part, the north-south competition is a normal development of power politics — the rise of Brazil's economic power and the use by Caracas of Venezuela's petroleum-created wealth for geostrategic purposes inexorably leads to a rebalancing of hemispheric power. The general tendency toward multipolarity is compounded by clashing models of economic development that reflect conflicts generated by domestic and national interests of the contending sides.
A.C.S. Summit
Founded in 1994 and including 25 states in and bordering the Caribbean Sea, the A.C.S. is committed to fostering “consultation, cooperation and concerted action”among its members. One of the maze of regional organizations that have sprung up around the world since the fall of the Soviet Union and the consequent collapse of the bipolar configuration of world power, the A.C.S. has functioned as a consultative forum and has made only small steps toward integration and none toward concerted action.
The A.C.S. has remained a forum because of the divergent interests of its members that reflect the pushes and pulls of the north-south split. The north projects itself into the organization through Mexico, a partner in the Washington-led North American Free Trade Agreement (N.A.F.T.A.). The south is present through Venezuela, which pursues an assertive policy of oil diplomacy. The weaker states in the middle have divided allegiances, with market-oriented center-right governments — primarily in Central America — supporting Washington, and the Caribbean islands and Panama leaning toward Caracas because of its provision of subsidized oil to them.
Although the A.C.S. cannot be expected to be a vehicle of concerted action, it is politically significant as an arena in which the competing powers can bid for influence among the member states.
The north-south split was starkly apparent at the A.C.S. summit of heads of government and top cabinet ministers held in Panama City on July 28-29. The major news from the summit was the push by Caracas of its ‘PetroCaribe’ plan, which offers Central American and Caribbean states crude oil on favorable terms. Venezuelan Foreign Secretary Ali Rodriguez announced that Caracas was ready to expand its program by tailoring deals to the particular conditions and needs of each participating state: “We can use methods from the most ancient to the most modern to achieve these types of exchanges.” Those methods include credits, subsidized prices and barter exchanges.
Caracas' oil diplomacy won wide support at the summit. Thirteen of the 15 island countries in the A.C.S. have already signed on to PetroCaribe, Panama is in negotiations and even Washington's chief ally in South America, Columbian President Alvara Uribe, said: “I can envision Venezuela playing a great leadership role.”
Mexico City's response to Caracas came in Mexican President Vicente Fox's call for a “strategic alliance” based on free trade and open markets, and investment protection accords that would give Mexican business interests in construction, manufacturing and telecom greater access to the region.
On balance, Caracas made headway at the summit at the expense of Mexico City and Washington. While the six C.A.F.T.A. states in the region — Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic — remained on the side of the north, the rest of the A.C.S. members solidified their ties with and support of the south on the basis of the tangible benefits provided by Caracas.
C.A.F.T.A.
On the day before the A.C.S. summit convened, the U.S. House of Representatives approved U.S. membership in C.A.F.T.A. by a razor-thin majority of 217-215. The agreement, which lowers tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods, had run into determined opposition in Congress mounted by a coalition of sugar growers, textile manufacturers, labor unions, and human rights, labor rights and environmentalist groups.
With the Central American and Caribbean members of C.A.F.T.A. already receiving favorable trade terms from Washington, formalizing the agreement has the economic consequence of helping domestic interests in the U.S. The Bush administration pushed hard for C.A.F.T.A. not only to reward those interests, but to lock the Central American and Caribbean members into a firm relation with Washington in order to ensure that regional trade remains geared to the U.S. and to forestall the spread of Caracas' sphere of influence.
Had Congress failed to approve C.A.F.T.A., the center-right governments in the region that had signed on to the agreement would have suffered a loss of credibility and overall U.S. trade policy would have been placed in jeopardy. As it stands, growing economic nationalism in the U.S. probably means that C.A.F.T.A. will be the high watermark of Washington's neo-liberal strategy.
The Bottom Line
The inroads made by Caracas' oil diplomacy at the A.C.S. summit and the passage of C.A.F.T.A. in the U.S. Congress have sharpened the divide in the Caribbean region between pro-north and pro-south states. With Washington seemingly unwilling to offer incentives to oil-dependent states in the region, Caracas is free to create its “solidarity” coalition, but will be blocked in efforts to expand it by the C.A.F.T.A. states as long as they retain governments favorable to Washington.
The outcome of the competition for spheres of influence in the Caribbean region will be in great part determined by the domestic politics of the region's states— whether the balance of power between center-right and center-left and left governments shifts appreciably.
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