Une appréciation critique de la “politique” française d’exportation des armements

Le chroniqueur des questions européenes de Aviation Week & Space Technology, Pierre Sparaco, consacre sa chronique (“European Perspective”) du 1er octobre à une appréciation critique de la politique d’exportation des armements françaises. Son analyse suit les interventions critiques du ministre français de la défense contre l’avion de combat Rafale. Elle rencontre notre appréciation générale de cette question des exportations d’armement, et précisément le cas particulier de la France et de son étrange impuissance dans cette matière où elle fut la première à mettre en place une grande politique avec une composate géopolitique.

»However, the roots of Rafale’s dismal record in the marketplace lie elsewhere. France still doesn’t acknowledge that exporting state-of-the-art weapon systems involves much more than selling arms. This is not business as usual, it is a geopolitical act. Although Eurofighter is a pan-European company, the Saudi deal is a British success that probably owes more to Tony Blair’s cabinet than to BAE Systems’ sales team. (Although inked in September, the arrangement was completed before Prime Minister George Brown came to power.)

»Such a deal establishes or reinforces durable links between two nations and, in doing so, plays a key role in the buyer’s and seller’s foreign policies. Just keep in mind the true meaning of establishing the Joint Strike Fighter’s international team. It goes well beyond the limits of Lockheed Martin’s capabilities and influence around the world. If needed, another confirmation comes from Japan’s desire to procure F-22 Raptor stealth fighters.

»Ironically, France forged a similar, forward-looking armaments export strategy 50 years ago and succeeded in exporting impressive numbers of Mirage fighters. Today, a narrow-minded attitude can’t resist the U.K.’s (and U.S.’s) firm stance. Moreover, Defense Minister Herve Morin has recently criticized the dearth of export orders for the Rafale as additional proof that the government of Prime Minister Francois Fillon still has a lot to learn. However, note that under President Jacques Chirac results were no better.

»France’s armaments policy is based on a 30-year plan, last updated in 2005, which lists potential threats “in an unpredictable, evolving world.” The agenda reviews all forms of potential conflicts, analyzes U.S. dominance and discusses the emergence of so-called peer competitors, though it fails to establish clear, direct links between Defense and the quest for armaments export sales—a prerequisite to extended production runs and lower unit costs. France’s defense budget, about $65 billion or 1.7% of the gross national product, includes $22 billion for military procurement.

»Last month, President Nicolas Sarkozy established a high-level working group to draft a new defense white paper. It should contribute to decisions that lead to superior military efficiency, the strengthening of overall security, and help to inform political choices down the road (including, perhaps, fully rejoining NATO). In the shorter term, however, difficulties will pile up when Morin tries to reconcile increasingly tight budget constraints with the need to further modernize the three arms of the military. For example, the long-term commitment to procure 294 Rafales for the air force and navy could be questioned.

»If Sarkozy, Fillon and Morin don’t use this opportunity to overhaul an armaments export strategy, the exclusion of Rafale will continue unabated.»

Mis en ligne le 9 octbre 2007 à 06H06