Une orgie de mensonges

Parmi les divers points d’exploration de la façon dont le système s’enfonce aujourd’hui dans ses labyrinthes catastrophiques en Irak, relevons celui de la présentation régulièrement faite du niveau des forces irakiennes. Un rapport du CSIS du 26 avril, de Anthony Cordesman, présente une image absolument catastrophique de la situation. Particulièrement, le rapport précise ce qu’il faut penser des informations qui sont diffusées de source américaniste, qui sont dénoncées comme donnant une vision absolument fausse de la situation :

«It is never quite clear whether these exaggerated reports of progress in ISF force development are the product of ‘spin’ and the search for political advantage, the desire to avoid seeing the US accept defeat, or self-deception on the part of those doing the reporting. The reality is, however, that virtually nothing the US officially says about Iraqi force development can be taken at face value.»

Le rapport est présenté de façon intéressante par le site WSWS.org, avec l’appréciation critique habituelle que dispense ce cite (en ligne aujourd’hui) . Le texte fait bien la différence entre la situation présentée et la situation réelle, telles qu’elles sont développées par le rapport du CSIS :

»The Bush administration has repeatedly asserted that the soldiers and police of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are taking the lead in fighting the armed opponents of the US occupation and the US-backed Iraqi government. Announcing the deployment of 21,000 additional American troops to Iraq on January 10, Bush declared that the “well-defined mission” of the US forces would be “to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs”.

»In March, the theoretical strength of the new Iraqi Army was 177,000 troops, organised into 10 divisions and 112 battalions, as well as 17 “Strategic Infrastructure Battalions” (SIBs) dedicated to protecting oil fields and pipelines, two special forces battalions, a token air force and a small navy. The regular police had 135,000 officers on its payroll. The paramilitary national police fielded 24,000. The Border Police and other specialised units under the Ministry of Interior had 28,000.

»On paper, therefore, a total of 364,000 trained and equipped Iraqi security personnel are available to fight alongside the 140,000 American troops in the country. However, as with everything else the American people have been told about the Iraq war, the White House’s claims that Iraqi forces are “stepping up” to replace US troops in front-line combat are a combination of lies and self-delusion.»

La réalité offre une vision complètement différente, qui n’est évidemment pas sans rappeler la situation de l’armée sud-vietnamienne durant la guerre du Viet-nâm. La différence vient certainement de ces affirmations officielles selon lesquelles l’efficacité de ces forces est très grande. Jamais la chose n’a éé affirmée de cette façon durant la guerre du Viet-nâm, et jamais, surtout, les officiels de l’administration en place n’ont cru aussi fermement à cette reconstruction virtualiste par la communication.

«Iraqi units are completely dependent on the US military for air support, armoured support, artillery, medical facilities and even supply and logistics. The Iraqi soldiers are given just five weeks of basic training before being assigned to a battalion. Their weapons and equipment are sub-standard. As a consequence, they suffer high casualties when thrust into combat operations. At least 5,300 Iraqi soldiers and police have been killed and possibly as many as 40,000 wounded over the past four years.

»Few soldiers have any motivation to fight for the central Iraqi government and even less to fight for the US military. Most of the troops and police who were recruited in Baghdad and southern Iraq are Shiites with sectarian loyalties to parties such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) or the Sadrist movement led by cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. They see their role as primarily defending Shiite communities and provinces from attacks by Sunni extremists. Entire battalions have refused orders to deploy into offensive operations.

»In Sunni areas, the army and police are generally viewed as nothing more than Shiite militia in uniform. Sunni Arabs, who constitute over 20 percent of the population, dominated the officer caste under Saddam Hussein and provide the greatest support to the anti-occupation insurgency. They currently make up less than 10 percent of the new Iraqi security forces.

»The army divisions in northern Iraq were overwhelmingly recruited from the Kurdish peshmerga militia and have their first loyalty to the Kurdish nationalist parties that have established a de-facto autonomous state in Iraq’s three northern provinces. In cities such as Mosul and Kirkuk, Kurdish troops have been accused of carrying out ethnic cleansing operations against the Arab and Turkomen populations.

»Cordesman drew attention to the divisions and general morale crisis afflicting the Iraqi security forces: “Men who did not volunteer for demanding combat missions, particularly in complex sectarian or ethnic environments or outside their home areas are being pushed into combat. They often have poor facilities, equipment and weapons that are sharply inferior to their US counterparts, are at least partly excluded from the command and intelligence loops to preserve security. They are treated as second best or unreliable partners.

»“Some Iraqis are truly motivated. Most are not, but are asked to fight as if they were truly motivated to support the national government, rather than signed up to earn a living and survive. As was the case with the ARVN [South Vietnamese Army] in Vietnam, their [US] advisors often are not trained and lack the language skills to monitor pay, equity in promotion, conditions in quarters, food supply, and the other material conditions critical to real world morale and motivation.”»

Mis en ligne le 30 avril 2007 à 12H48