USA versus Europe

USA versus Europe

9 février 2003 — Voici une analyse intéressante de la société d’analyse américaine PINR (PINR, pour Power and Interest News Report). Il s’agit des relations entre les USA et l’Europe.

[Avant de présenter cette analyse, nous publions à nouveau (nous avons déjà utilisé du matériel PINR et publié cette présentation) la présentation que cette société fait d’elle-même  :

«  The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests

involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. PINR seeks to inform rather than persuade.  »]

L’intérêt de l’analyse de PINR est qu’elle se démarque du courant, notamment en écartant les consignes virtualistes des centres de pouvoir. C’est notamment sur les points suivants que cette attitude est notable  :

• PINR ne se laisse pas influencer par les positions convenues, par des lettres de chefs d’État ou de gouvernement sans légitimité, ne représentant qu’eux-mêmes. L’analyse mais bien en évidence que les USA « continues to distance and isolate itself from key European nations — and indeed much of the world... »

• PINR constate que la position du Royaume-Uni marginalise cette puissance en Europe, plus qu’elle n’entraîne l’Europe dans l’orbite US. PINR ne se laisse pas impressionner par des pantalonnades grotesques comme sont, aujourd’hui, les votes à l’OTAN, — sauf lorsqu’ils sont négatifs, bien entendu. (Ce parti-pris affiché, qui est le nôtre, vis-à-vis des procédures de l’OTAN, est la condition sine qua non d’une compréhension saine et juste du caractère fondamentalement subversif de cette organisation.) Tout au plus pourrait-on reprocher à PINR de définir de façon trop tranchée la position du Royaume-Uni, étant admis qu’il ne serait pas étonnant, ni impossible d’ailleurs, de voir un jour le Royaume-Uni proposer un rôle européen beaucoup plus constructif, en prenant ses distances des USA et en donnant des gages aux Européens.

• Enfin, PINR met bien en évidence l’incohérence de la politique US vis-à-vis de l’Europe, laquelle cherche à déstabiliser l’UE avec la manipulation à peine dissimulée de pays marginaux contre les pays centraux, avec toute la liberté de s’exprimer donnée à une “diplomatie” qui fait beaucoup de dégâts par son ambiguïté et sa brutalité (diplomatie-Rumsfeld), — au bout du compte, une politique risquant d’obtenir le contraire de ce que cherchent les USA. (Mais les USA cherchent-ils quelque chose ? Grave question.)

Divide and conquer

Drafted by Matthew Riemer on February 09, 2003

As the United States continues to distance and isolate itself from key European nations — and indeed much of the world — the question should be asked whether or not this is intentional on the part of Washington or whether it is an unintended, and to many insiders an undesirable, result of a fractured foreign policy. Though the effects of this policy are global, they are felt most significantly in the arena of Greater Europe, meaning the current European Union (E.U.) and all the prospective, surrounding clients — the Baltic nations, Ukraine, Poland, etc.

The United States has deep ties with much of Europe in the form of a common Christian heritage, and, in the case of Great Britain and Ireland, language. Obviously, such commonalities are non-existent when considering the Middle East and Asia. It is because of this that a trans-Atlantic political alliance was always thought to be of the soundest construction. Yet this seems to no longer be the case amidst the groundswell of loaded rhetoric being issued by all sides in the protracted build-up to an invasion of Iraq by the United States.

Several U.S. officials, most notably Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, have made disparaging comments about various members of the European community. Rumsfeld recently referred to France and Germany as "old Europe." Such comments are left to interpretation, which then only further adds to their ambiguity and highlights their lack of

constructive diplomacy.

One can probably safely assume that Rumsfeld meant that France and Germany are part of an influential and established Europe in which they are now the leaders of a larger union that occasionally challenges the hegemonic aspirations of the United States, and that a theoretical "new Europe" would be comprised of states only now reaching respectable levels of economic and social development who advertise these trends in their interest in either E.U. and/or NATO membership. These "newer" countries are presumably then more agreeable

when it comes to U.S. policy initiatives.

Such an outlook, whether or not this is what Rumsfeld was actually implying, is a dangerous one as it seeks to divide the European continent rather than unite it; this is essentially the Cold War model. By seeking to polarize the European nations, the Bush administration is modifying U.S. policy towards a strengthened and evolved E.U.

Inherent in this approach must also be the acceptance of the prominent role of both France and Germany. As analysts have stated for years, these two countries form the axis of a broad and highly integrated Greater Europe. Yet now it is these two countries that seem to be

raising the ire of Washington the most with their refusal to unquestioningly support a war in Iraq. But it is exactly these countries that are needed as part of any U.S. coalition if it is to

have a sense of legitimacy.

Great Britain could be considered as important as France and Germany for coalition building purposes, but they are marginalized in the context of a Greater Europe. Great Britain, in addition to being physically separated from the European mainland, has always strived to

maintain an exceptionally distinct national identity manifested in such policies as the decision not to switch to the Euro as the new currency.

So at the very least there is the feeling that London seeks to integrate itself as little as possible and is perhaps even resistant to integration in general within the E.U. London has no designs for increased power within the framework of an empowered E.U. Their security and sense of place as a nation is not found within a Greater Europe but under the protective umbrella dutifully provided by the United States in one of the closest political alliances in the world

today.

However, this is a point of debate among analysts: Which countries are the most important in the formation of a coalition to invade Iraq? How many countries are truly required to achieve "multi-lateralism"? Many look to the permanent members of the United Nations Security

Council as being indicative of global moods. One could also look to the world's regional powers as well, which in many cases duplicates states found in the Security Council.

In Southeast Asia, China is the growing regional power with Japan as the regionally uninvolved, economically powerful "international" country. Representing the nebulous entity known as Eurasia, Russia ad Turkey are other regional powers; Iran is also a regional power but is too marginalized as a "rogue state" to be truly valued in any kind of Western-led coalition. In Western Europe, France and Germany are the regional powers of significance. It's worth noting that France is still capable of dispatching troops to former colonies in Africa like Ivory Coast. Not many players can do this anymore.

A poll of these countries -- China, Japan, Russia, Turkey, France and Germany -- is a good starting point for the creation of a truly "global" coalition. But the problem is that the U.S. has

repeatedly underscored the fact, most recently in President George W. Bush's State of the Union Address, that they will launch preemptive war on Iraq even unilaterally if necessary.

To wage a preemptive and unilateral war is probably the most hazardous precedent the U.S. could establish. With much of the world as yet unconvinced of the need for an invasion at all, any pronouncement that such an invasion must not only happen but happen immediately can only be seen as questionable, and even inflammatory, diplomacy on Washington's part.

It sets an even more dangerous precedent when countries that resist the U.S. war drive are harshly criticized even to the point of being accused of sympathizing with "the terrorists." The most shocking part of all is when such countries are France and Germany, ostensibly

representing the cornerstone of the E.U.

Many countries in Europe may feel that Washington is attempting to politically destabilize the European Union by publicly and confrontationally challenging European nations rhetorically, such as Rumsfeld's "old Europe" comment. In fact, United Press International (UPI) recently quoted Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon's Policy Advisory Board, as saying, "France is no longer the ally it once was." The report stated later that "[Perle] went on to accuse French President Jacques Chirac of believing 'deep in his soul' that Saddam Hussein is preferable to any likely successor."

Again, whether this effect is calculated or not, it reveals a common affliction felt by nearly every single power or empire that has ever exerted itself in an imperial manner: the habit of fostering behavior that one also dedicates itself to eradicating.

[This report may be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast provided that any such reproduction identifies the original source, http://www.pinr.com All comments should be directed

tocontent@pinr.com.]