Victoire par l’Afghanistan

Une question qui restera longtemps dans les esprits des divers analystes de la question, tant les interprétations varient: qui l’a emporté au(x) sommet(s) de Bucarest? D’ailleurs, dans quelle arène? A l’intérieur de l’OTAN? Entre l’OTAN et la Russie? Entre Russes et Américains?

Voici une réponse intéressante parmi d’autres, car il y a plusieurs réponses à cette question d’une vastitude équivalente à celle du (des) sommet(s) en question. C’est celle de M K Bhadrakumar, ancien diplomate indien devenu chroniqueur notamment pour Atimes.com; sa réponse dans une chronique qu’il a publiée le 8 avril. M K Bhadrakumar reprend l’argument qu’il avait développé dans un précédent article en date du 15 mars. Il s’agissait d’un accord prévu pour le sommet, et qui a été effectivement signé, qui permet à l’OTAN de transiter par des territoires notamment russes pour le ravitaillement de ses forces en Afghanistan. M K Bhadrakumar renforce et argument l’idée, que nous mentionnions également le 7 avril à partir d’un texte de Martin Walker, de UPI, le 31 mars, selon lequel les Russes ne sont pas mécontents d’ainsi contribuer au maintien de l’OTAN en Afghanistan parce qu’ils considèrent qu’il s’agit là d’un bourbier où l’Alliance se trouve prise au piège.

«Once the theatrics surrounding NATO expansion and the US missile defense wear out and a reality check inevitably follows, the existential question will stare all in the face – the alliance's faltering operations in Afghanistan.

»Russia offered a rope at Bucharest, which the alliance grasped, while Washington pretended it didn't quite see that happening. The significance of the agreement reached in Bucharest on Friday is yet to sink in. The agreement concerns transit of NATO's food and non-military cargo and “some types of non-lethal military equipment” across Russia to Afghanistan.

»NATO supplies will be transported thousands of kilometers across Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Even though the letters regarding the transit were exchanged between Lavrov and NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the ceremony in Bucharest, Russia has treated this as a matter concerning the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The topic figured at the informal meeting of CSTO foreign ministers held in Moscow on March 28 “because transit to Afghanistan simply for objective geographical reasons also calls for appropriate arrangements with many countries which are members of CSTO”, to quote Lavrov. CSTO comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

»In the ultimate analysis, therefore, Russia has acted in consultation with and on behalf of the CSTO partners. This has implications, no matter CSTO's standing in NATO eyes. Moscow made no bones about the fact that sheer pragmatism had guided its decision. Lavrov said, “If we pretend to be offended and block this transit, the efficiency of the combat against terrorism, which is not very good as it is, will worsen dramatically; and the only result will be that in the absence of a restraining factor, all these drug traffickers and terrorists will feel freer in planning their actions in Central Asia and Russia ... Russia's pragmatism and interests prompt us to support the activities of those who are trying to deal with the terrorists in Afghanistan.”

»But there is more to Moscow's “pragmatism”. The Russian ambassador in Kabul, Zamir Kabulov, told Vremya Novostei, “The longer NATO remains in Afghanistan, the worse it will be for them. But it would be incorrect to imagine Russia wants NATO out of Afghanistan as soon as possible, at any cost. We will not let them out of Afghanistan until they solve the problems they have created – international terrorism, unchecked increase in drug trafficking – and build a strong state there, and rebuild the economy.”

»That is to say, Russia will provide all logistical support to NATO so that the alliance can focus attention on bleeding itself white in Afghanistan. An engrossing equation is developing that may determine the alchemy of Russia's relations with NATO for years to come. Whether Washington acknowledges it or not, the transit agreement gives Russia a role in the NATO operations in Afghanistan. The criticality of this role will only increase as NATO's heavy dependence – 70% plus as of now – on transit through Pakistani territory becomes more and more unsustainable.

»Russian and NATO intelligence cannot be unaware that the Taliban have begun targeting Torkham, the strategic check post on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which is also the main gateway for supply convoys for the alliance's forces. On March 20, a convoy of 40 oil tankers supplying NATO forces was destroyed in a series of explosions in a parking lot at Torkham. No doubt, the Taliban have identified NATO's supply and logistics systems as its Achilles' heel. Meanwhile, the willingness of the democratically elected government in Pakistan to continue as an ally in the “war on terror” itself remains to be seen.

»What all this adds up to is that the Bush administration's triumphalism over the NATO Bucharest summit is going to be short-lived. How NATO is going to be able to extricate itself from the colossal muddle in Afghanistan is a wide open question. Attacks on NATO troops are now taking place at the rate of 500 per month. With all the heavyweight punches at the Bucharest summit, Washington failed to get any significant numbers of additional troops from its NATO allies.»

La thèse de M K Bhadrakumar nous semble particulièrement acceptable dans la mesure où elle conforte deux faits qui nous semblent évidents. Le premier est que, contrairement aux apparences et/ou propagandes diverses, les Russes sont sortis vainqueur de cet étrange sommet de l’OTAN où ils ont joué un rôle d’acteur indirect. Le second est que l’Afghanistan, dont on a assez peu parlé d’une façon spectaculaire à Bucarest, est le problème essentiel de l’OTAN.

Mis en ligne le 9 avril 2008 à 12H28