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9 mai 2005 — Le 2 mai, l’OEA (Organisation des États Américains) s’est choisi un nouveau secrétaire général qui n’est pas exactement celui qu’espérait Washington. Peut-on parler pour autant de défaite de Washington ? Ou bien les Américains ont-ils, au dernier moment, limité les dégâts au point qu’on puisse parler d’une victoire par raccroc et, dans tous les cas, de la conservation du contrôle de l’organisation? Les deux textes ci-dessous exposent les deux analyses contraires, avec en plus la garantie d’une équivalence de fond dans le jugement sur l’action de Washington (les deux analystes sont plutôt nettement critiques de la politique washingtonienne).
On verra qu’aucun des deux textes n’apporte un élément nouveau déterminant, que tout est question d’interprétation. C’est évidemment là qu’est l’intérêt de l’exercice: dans l’évaluation de ce qu’il reste d’influence à Washington, avec l’idée implicite assez tordue que Washington pourrait parvenir, par son action d’influence, à influencer même certains analystes qui lui sont défavorables. Un exemple se trouve dans les déclarations du candidat chilien que Washington ne voulait pas, — déclaration d’acceptation d’être l’ultime candidat de “consensus” et la déclaration d’investiture, — avec le traitement différent des deux analystes.
• Pour Michael A. Weinstein, de l’organisation PINR, Washington a perdu la partie et le contrôle de l’OEA: « In return for Washington's retreat, Insulza released a statement in which he said, “I believe it is essential that governments that are elected democratically govern in a democratic way.” Those words, reportedly insisted upon by Rice, were seen by Washington as affirming support for its position that Chavez should be held “accountable” for violations of the O.A.S. Democratic Charter and were used by Washington as evidence that it had not retreated. When Insulza delivered his acceptance speech on May 2, he called for “forging a consensus that allows us to overcome the erroneous consensus of irrelevance that damages our hemispheric effort” — a clear reference to the alliance's Washington-dominated past — and failed to mention the need to hold states accountable to the Democratic Charter. Washington had lost control of the O.A.S., the southern cone and its outrider ally Venezuela had asserted their independence successfully, and the multipolarity of the hemisphere was confirmed »
• Pour Jonah Gindin, de Venezuelanalysis, l’analyse est complètement différente et Washington a réussi au dernier moment une manipulation: « Last Friday, (...) Insulza made a short statement that could have been written in Washington, and according to a high-level Rice aide who spoke to reporters later that evening, it nearly was. (...) “It is indispensable to point out the fundamental value that democratically elected authorities also exercise their mandate in a democratic manner, ” said Insulza, adding the threat that “those elected governments who do not govern democratically should answer to the OAS.” (...) In case Insulza’s paraphrased threat wasn’t indication enough, one of Rice’s aides spelt it out for correspondents traveling with the Secretary. According to Paul Richter reporting for the LA Times, US officials said Rice had insisted that Insulza make it clear in his announcement that he shared the US’ view that the OAS must hold its members to strict democratic standards. A Reuters report corroborated this remark, adding that Rice’s aides said Insulza’s comments were directed at Venezuela. »
Notre préférence ira à l’analyse de Weinstein. On notera que Weinstein offre une perspective plus large, qui permet de mesurer combien la décision du 2 mai (élection de Insulza) a été précédée d’une détérioration régulière de la position de Washington. Les arguments qu’il offre ensuite sont convaincants. Gindin, par contre, semble finalement épouser la manœuvre qu’il dénonce, et en être victime: nous offrir comme argument de sa thèse les commentaires de journalistes américains dont il précise qu’ils ont été influencés par l’équipe Rice n’est pas précisément convaincant sur le fond, mais convaincant par contre pour ce qui est de l’efficacité de l’action de désinformation de Washington, et d’un comportement peu reluisant des journalistes américains; affirmer qu’Insulza est sous contrôle des USA parce qu’une de ses phrases est interprétée par les Américains dans le sens de l’intérêt des Américains ne l’est pas plus. (“I believe it is essential that governments that are elected democratically govern in a democratic way”, dit Insulza, et Washington nous dit qu’Insulza désigne le Venezuela; mais ce n’est pas ce que dit Insulza, et il pourrait aussi bien désigner… Washington, non? — où les élections sont bien aussi contestables qu’à Caracas).
Bref, à vous de juger.
By Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, de PINR, May 9, 2005
With the election on May 2 of Chile's former interior minister Jose Miguel Insulza to the post of secretary general of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.), that alliance will, for the first time since its founding in 1948, have a chief executive who is not the preferred choice of the United States.
The O.A.S., which groups all of the independent states in the western hemisphere — except Cuba — into a loose strategic and economic bloc, has since its inception and until recently functioned as an instrument of Washington's global geostrategies under the general principles of the Monroe Doctrine that exclude extra-hemispheric attempts to control the political systems of states in the region. As the Monroe Doctrine has evolved in response to changing global power configurations, it has come to include the aims of establishing regimes favorable to Washington — preferably, market democracies — throughout the hemisphere and isolating regimes that do not conform to that requisite.
Washington's control of the O.A.S. is most starkly illustrated by the ease with which it got the alliance to expel Fidel Castro's Communist regime in Cuba in 1962 and its ability to foreclose the possibility of sanctioning right-wing dictatorships favorable to Washington's perceived interests in Argentina, Brazil and Chile during the 1970s and 1980s. Although the installation of market democracies is Washington's best-case scenario, it has been willing to embrace authoritarian regimes when it perceives that they are fending off political forces that would establish alternatives to capitalism and cultivate the support of powers outside the hemisphere for their experiments. Even recently, after the adoption in 2001 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which commits O.A.S. members to honoring democratic processes, Washington briefly backed an unsuccessful coup attempt in 2002 against Venezuela's quasi-socialist regime led by President Hugo Chavez.
Washington's hold on the O.A.S. began to falter after its support of the anti-Chavez coup. In 2003, the alliance's General Assembly refused to seat Washington's candidate Rafael E. Martinez on the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, leaving the Commission without a member from the United States for the first time in its history. Even more severe resistance to Washington's desires came in 2004 when an O.A.S. observer mission refused to condemn the vote in a referendum to recall Chavez, which he won by a comfortable margin.
Washington's losses in the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and in its efforts to eliminate the Chavez regime were preludes to its loss of control of the O.A.S. in the election for secretary general. Opposition to Washington in the alliance was triggered by the Chavez affair, but it reflects far deeper shifts in the balance of power in the hemisphere that spell declining influence for the U.S. over the long term, signaled at present by the rise of Brazil as a regional power center in South America and the bid by Venezuela to become a “small major power” committed to building a mixed cooperativist-capitalist economy and diminishing Washington's power in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Power Struggle and Deadlock
In the summer of 2004, Washington seemed set to continue its dominance in the O.A.S. when its choice, former president of Costa Rica Miguel Angel Rodriguez, was elected secretary general of the alliance, after Insulza reluctantly withdrew his candidacy. Tensions deepened and confrontation broke out in October, when Rodriguez resigned his position after he was indicted on corruption charges dating from his presidency and was placed under house arrest in Costa Rica.
With U.S. diplomat Luigi R. Einaudi taking over as acting secretary general, a power struggle began over the leadership of the alliance, reflecting the underlying regional and ideological divides within it. In quick succession, three candidates came forward: Mexico's foreign minister Luis Ernesto Derbez, Insulza and former president of El Salvador Francisco Flores.
Washington's firm choice was the conservative Flores, who had been the only Latin American leader to join it in backing the 2002 coup attempt against Chavez and who supported the El Salvadoran military contribution to the U.S. coalition in Iraq. By backing Flores, Washington signaled its intentions to reward its friends and bring the O.A.S. to heel. It was able to muster the support of the Central American sates, which have right or center-right governments, look forward to the ratification of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (C.A.F.T.A.) and believed that it was their turn to have a secretary general from their region.
The complex of interests that bound the Central American states to Washington's choice did not extend beyond that region. Insulza, a member of Chile's market-oriented Socialist government, who had opposed the U.S. intervention in Iraq, found an unwavering base of support in the left-center governments of the southern cone — Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay — and in Venezuela's Chavez, setting up a north-south confrontation with ideological overtones.
The Derbez candidacy was Mexico City's attempt to mediate the poles represented by Flores and Insulza, and become a bridge between north and south, which would strengthen its hemispheric influence. Derbez gained the backing of states seeking to balance the emerging power center in the southern cone, particularly Bolivia and Peru, which have persisting disputes with Chile.
Mexico City's move to put Derbez forward was ill received by Santiago, which claimed that Mexico's government had promised to consult with it before presenting a candidate and had failed to do so. Although they had been increasing ties prior to the O.A.S. election, Santiago's and Mexico City's respective interests in bridging north and south with an ideology of “capitalism with a human face” and maintaining a receptivity to the policies of both sides placed them on a collision course, with Santiago positioning itself as mediator from the southern left and Mexico City as mediator from the northern right.
As the scheduled vote for secretary general on April 11 neared, it became clear that the balance of power would fall to the 14 small states comprising the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Although one might expect those states to follow Washington's lead, Chavez had been supplying them with cheap oil, and, on April 1, Chile's foreign ministry reported that at least ten CARICOM states would vote for Insulza. The CARICOM votes plus the sure votes from the four southern cone states and Venezuela put Insulza within three votes of the majority of 18 that he needed to win the election. He had emerged as far and away the strongest contender in the three-way race.
With opposition to Insulza divided between Flores and Derbez, Washington faced an embarrassing scenario of divisiveness and nearly certain failure if it continued to back Flores. President Ricardo Maduro of Honduras assured the collapse of the Flores candidacy when he withdrew his country's support of it. After Flores resigned from the contest on April 8, Washington shifted its support to Derbez, carrying the Central American states with it.
Meeting in Washington on April 11 at O.A.S. headquarters, voting delegates held five separate ballots, all of which resulted in a 17-17 deadlock between Insulza and Derbez. Although the vote was secret, many states declared their preferences publicly, indicating that the regional and ideological blocs had held fast, with the exception in South America of Bolivia's announced support for Derbez and Peru's and Colombia's probable backing of him. A re-run of the election was scheduled for May 2, with Washington continuing to stand behind Derbez and both sides intent on winning over fence sitters such as Paraguay and Haiti.
In the aftermath of the deadlocked vote, Washington confronted an unpleasant set of possibilities. Even if Derbez won a revote by a narrow margin, Washington would face a divided O.A.S. that would be structured by a hardened regional and ideological conflict. Yet, if it conceded victory to Insulza by ceasing to oppose him strongly, it would lose its previously unquestioned domination of the alliance. Washington's best hope was for a new “consensus” candidate, but, although names were floated by Lima and Ottawa, no serious alternative emerged. Washington would have to try to make the best of a bad situation. Meanwhile, Brasilia and Caracas had shown their power to contest control of the alliance effectively.
Condoleezza Rice Engineers a Retreat
During the two weeks following the April 11 vote, the press reported persistent diplomatic efforts by both sides to sway possibly susceptible states to support them. Santiago and Caracas attempted to secure and expand their gains in the Caribbean, reportedly offering economic aid and greater representation in O.A.S. institutions. Washington and Mexico City were reported to have done the same. Yet by April 25, when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice embarked on her five-day “goodwill” tour of Latin America with stops in Brazil, Colombia, Chile and El Salvador, the deadlock was still unbroken and a divisiveness loomed that could have hobbled the O.A.S. by tearing it into contending northern and southern blocs.
Rice's trip had several goals, all of which revolved around the overriding aim of preserving and, if possible, restoring Washington's influence in the hemisphere. At the top of her agenda was the interest in persuading Venezuela's neighbors to isolate Chavez, who the week before had canceled Caracas's 35-year military cooperation agreement with Washington, the latest round in the intensifying conflict between the two capitals. A second goal was to revive Washington's plan for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (F.T.A.A.) that would place the economic future of the hemisphere under U.S. leadership. The third aim was to convince the southern cone states that Washington would no longer try to impose its policies in the region, but would “partner” with the emerging southern power bloc and seek consensus on hemispheric issues. Finally, Rice would show support for its most loyal allies in the region — Colombia and El Salvador.
The key to the success of Rice's agenda was Brazil, the emerging power center of the southern cone, which, under the administration of President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva, had made the geostrategic assessment and decision that it was strong enough to bid for leadership in South America and speak for the region in international organizations. Before Rice arrived, Brasilia announced that the F.T.A.A. was not on its agenda.
In her public statements in Brazil, Rice was unequivocally positive, acknowledging that “Brazil is a regional power and, in fact, Brazil is a growing global presence, and we think that's a good thing.” The “charm offensive” could not cover up the fact that by the end of her visit, Rice had failed to get Lula to commit to restraining Chavez, much less isolating him. In a joint press conference with Rice, Brazil's foreign minister Celso Amorim made it clear that any solution to problems in Venezuela “must respect Venezuelan sovereignty.” Rice's position was that Washington was pursuing a “positive agenda” and had no quarrels with any O.A.S. member, only concerns about the integrity of democratic processes in general.
Whether or not Rice convinced Brasilia that Washington wanted to “partner” rather than impose, she was unable to fulfill the top two items on her agenda, retreating at the end to acquiescence in Brasilia's independent stance, while withholding from it what it most desired — Washington's support for its bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Analysts agree that Brasilia holds the well-founded belief that Washington's influence is waning in South America and that Brasilia is free to act independently of Washington — Rice was simply forced to accept the fact of multipolarity.
Chile presented more favorable ground for Rice's appeals. Santiago had led the way toward the F.T.A.A. and already had a model working free-trade agreement with Washington, which was not in jeopardy. In addition, Santiago's geostrategy is to play the role of a bridge between the Brazilian power center and Washington, maintaining cordial relations with both and, in the best case scenario, mediating between them. The only problem was that having its candidate for O.A.S. secretary general elected was integral to Santiago's strategy.
By the time Rice arrived in Chile to rejuvenate ties with its Socialist president Ricardo Lagos, who had been moving away from neo-liberal economic policies to the more welfarist positions of his southern cone neighbors, the O.A.S. crisis was imminent.
Continuing her charm offensive, Rice praised Chile as a “symbol” of what Latin America could and should become — committed to market democracy and enjoying its yield. She was not able to move Lagos into opposition to Chavez. At a joint press conference with Lagos, Rice reiterated Washington's “concerns about the policies of the Venezuelan government in terms of its internal policies and in terms of its neighbors,” but stressed that Washington had a “positive agenda ” for the hemisphere. In response, Lagos took a nuanced line, walking a tightrope between Washington and Brasilia, and pointing out that Chavez was “legitimately elected,” that the anti-Chavez opposition “has to meet its challenges so as to fulfill the role of an appropriate opposition,” and that “there are a series of elements raised by the opposition party that warrant more in-depth conversation of what is happening there.” Rice had failed in her mission to gain support for isolating Chavez — Santiago remained in its role of would-be bridge.
It remained for Rice to try to do something about the O.A.S. conflict. In an effort to head off another deadlock at the May 2 election or a divisive close vote, Rice engaged in intense diplomacy with the parties to the contest, and on April 29, Derbez withdrew from the race for secretary general, leaving Insulza unopposed as the “consensus” candidate of 31 states, with only Bolivia, Peru and Mexico reserving support. Mexico City was particularly angered, claiming that it had an understanding with Santiago that both Derbez and Insulza would drop out of the race to make way for a “unity candidate.”
In return for Washington's retreat, Insulza released a statement in which he said, “I believe it is essential that governments that are elected democratically govern in a democratic way.” Those words, reportedly insisted upon by Rice, were seen by Washington as affirming support for its position that Chavez should be held “accountable” for violations of the O.A.S. Democratic Charter and were used by Washington as evidence that it had not retreated.
When Insulza delivered his acceptance speech on May 2, he called for “forging a consensus that allows us to overcome the erroneous consensus of irrelevance that damages our hemispheric effort” — a clear reference to the alliance's Washington-dominated past — and failed to mention the need to hold states accountable to the Democratic Charter. Washington had lost control of the O.A.S., the southern cone and its outrider ally Venezuela had asserted their independence successfully, and the multipolarity of the hemisphere was confirmed.
Aftermath
Having lost the battle over the secretary general, Washington is now faced with how it will orient itself to the O.A.S., which is no longer a sure instrument of its policies. Providing 60 percent of the O.A.S. budget, which is currently running a shortfall, with ten states in arrears, Washington could asphyxiate the organization by failing to provide adequate financial support, if it decided that the alliance was not worth salvaging in a multipolar form.
The alternative for Washington is to acknowledge and embrace multipolarity, and try to strengthen the O.A.S. as a forum in which disputes can be mediated and common policies forged, and Washington remains a major player across the hemisphere.
Rice responded to Washington's loss by proclaiming its commitment to a strengthened O.A.S., suggesting that it is considering increasing its funding of the alliance. She will attempt to persuade the major South American powers to do the same, making good on the notion of a “partnership” in which all powers are players. Rice also continued to promote Washington's anti-Chavez agenda, which Washington has no interest in or grounds for abandoning. Strengthening the O.A.S. by making it a multipolar forum means that Washington would continue to push its agenda, but would have to compromise if it was to win some acceptance of its preferred policies. That is the best that Washington can get in the current situation, and Rice seems to understand that.
A strengthened O.A.S., in which the U.S. is not the only major financial contributor and issues of north and south, and of social and political economy are thrashed out, is a practicable vision, although it is far from clear that either side has the commitment to make it materialize. Hemispheric partnership would demand major concessions from the United States, not only in its neo-liberal economic agenda, but in its control of hemispheric foreign policy and its control over the definition of pariah states. The Brazil-led power center would have to decide whether it is more advantageous to enter a partnership or to increase the independence of its power bloc, with the expectation that the compromises involved in partnership need not be made.
The O.A.S. is at a crossroads. Either it will become a veil covering an effective and more-or-less amicable divorce, or a marriage of distinct power centers, able to act in pursuit of interests that the partners determine that they have in common through strong consultative institutions. Partnership seems to be in Washington's interest; it remains to be seen whether it will make an effective commitment. Brasilia has a genuine choice to make between cohabitation and living single. Much will depend on whether Brasilia trusts Washington, and on what Washington is willing to offer. Meanwhile, Chavez will do everything he can to sabotage partnership. Odds are that the O.A.S. will subside into separation.
[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit être lu avec la mention classique à l'esprit, — “Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.”.]
By Jonah Gindin, Venezuelanalysis.com, May 04, 2005
Condoleezza Rice finished up her Latin American tour over the weekend, just in time to get back to Washington for the “election ” of Chilean Interior Minister, José Miguel Insulza to head the Organization of American States (OAS). It was really more of a confirmation, however, since the actual election took place—in vintage US style—behind the closed doors of Rice’s hotel suite last Friday during the Community of Democracies summit in Santiago de Chile.
The thirty-four member Organization of American States (OAS) has upped the rhetorical ante recently with the passage of a series of commitments to defending democracy in the region. Yet it has continued to be a poor model of democracy for the region; though each country only gets one vote, the US has traditionally brought considerable economic and political pressure to bear on its fellow members states, with the result that their preferred candidate has never lost an OAS election yet.
Insulza, supported by South America’s “left bloc” including Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela, and his US-backed competitor, Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez, were locked in a stalemate that saw five consecutive votes end in a 17-17 draw last month. The division was a symbolic one, since many assumed a victory for Insulza meant a victory for Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez—his most active supporter—while a Derbez win would have been synonymous with a US victory. In an intense round of back-door finagling, however, Rice managed to turn a symbolic loss into a material victory.
Many analysts portrayed the OAS election stalemate as a pitched battle between the US, whose support in the region is in decline, and Hugo Chávez, the hemisphere’s leading US critic. US-Venezuelan relations have been tense since the US gave tacit (and probably direct) support to a short-lived coup that overthrew Chávez for 47 hours in April, 2002. These tensions have been heightened recently by an aggressive campaign in the US against the Venezuelan leader, intensified since the beginning of the Bush Administration’s second term late last year. Insulza’s assumption of the OAS Presidency has, therefore, been interpreted by most analysts as Washington’s first defeat at the OAS, an organization that has historically subordinated itself to US foreign policy in the region.
Drawing such a conclusion would be a mistake, however, given the circumstances in which Insulza won. Last Friday, after a secretive meeting in Rice’s hotel Suite, Derbez pulled out of the running for OAS President. During the announcement of Derbez’ decision, Insulza made a short statement that could have been written in Washington, and according to a high-level Rice aide who spoke to reporters later that evening, it nearly was.
After thanking his fellow diplomats, and the good-sported Mexicans in particular, Insulza launched into a brief rundown of his priorities as new President-elect of the OAS. Two points in particular are striking in that they appear to have been plucked directly from Rice’s own discourse, and that of US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
“It is indispensable to point out the fundamental value that democratically elected authorities also exercise their mandate in a democratic manner, ” said Insulza, adding the threat that “those elected governments who do not govern democratically should answer to the OAS.”
Since the Bush administration’s second term began late last fall, Washington has placed a premium on convincing Venezuela’s Latin American neighbors to pressure Chávez to fall in line. His loud and frequent denunciations of US imperialism and intervention in the region, his opposition to free-trade, and his close friendship with Cuba have irked Washington since Chávez was first elected in 1998. Since that time he has emerged victorious from a further 8 electoral contests, making it difficult for the US to fit him into the anti-democratic mould. But, difficult or no, he must fit all the same. So in her confirmation hearings before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee last January, Rice referred to Chávez as a “democratically elected leader who governs in an illiberal way.”
Washington’s most recent Venezuela-strategy is based on “containment, ” and centers on the US’ hopes to convince the OAS to enact their Democratic Charter against Venezuela, an action that could entail economic and political sanctions. In an interview last fall with the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, Rice noted, with respect to Venezuela “we are going to have to, as a hemisphere that signed a democracy charter, be devoted to making sure that those who signed that charter live up to it. ” Just yesterday, Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega reiterated the point once again, saying “this means that governments must not only be elected democratically, but that they must govern democratically.”
In case Insulza’s paraphrased threat wasn’t indication enough, one of Rice’s aides spelt it out for correspondents traveling with the Secretary. According to Paul Richter reporting for the LA Times, US officials said Rice had insisted that Insulza make it clear in his announcement that he shared the US’ view that the OAS must hold its members to strict democratic standards. A Reuters report corroborated this remark, adding that Rice’s aides said Insulza’s comments were directed at Venezuela.
In his brief declaration, Insulza also took a clear stand against the proliferation of light weapons, in an even less subtle reference to Venezuela. “The effectiveness of inter-American mechanisms for transparency in the acquisition of arms, and the regulation of traffic in small and light arms in the region is especially important,” he said.
Since Venezuela began negotiating a deal with Russia to replace the Venezuelan army’s thirty-year-old Belgian FALs (Light Automatic Rifles) late last year, a veritable chorus of US officials have expressed their outrage, dutifully reproduced by the mainstream American news media. “I can't understand why Venezuela needs 100,000 AK-47s, ” US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wondered aloud at a press conference during a trip to Brazil last March. In a telephone interview with the Miami Herald, Rumsfeld appeared to answer his own question, musing philosophically “I guess time will tell, ” then having second thoughts, adding “the problem is that, if one waits till time tells, it can be an unhappy story.”
Insulza’s comments made it clear that he would not challenge the US. But, why did the US back Insulza, even given his friendly comments? The US could have decided to keep Derbez in the running and force a vote. While in all likelihood they would have lost, the move would have weakened Insulza’s leadership, and further weakened the OAS itself. But, with the OAS General Assembly to be held in the US for the first time in thirty years this June, and with a regional strategy that hopes to use multilateral pressure to advance US interests, a strong and credible OAS works in the US’ favor.
Chile’s recent alliance with Venezuela was at least in part related to Venezuela’s vigorous campaigning on Insulza’s behalf. But Chile—the first Latin American country to sign a free trade agreement with the US—is undeniably closer to Rice et al., than Chávez. Though the US only threw its support behind Insulza at the 11th hour, Rice’s ventriloquism in Insulza’s premature acceptance speech removes any doubt as to who won Monday’s OAS “election.” The fact that a predetermined outcome, brought about entirely through Rice’s unselfconscious influence-peddling, is even called an election provides as good an indication as any of the OAS’ feeble commitment to promoting and protecting democracy. It is only because the last two decades of US foreign policy has seen “democracy promotion ” take the place of military intervention and support for US-friendly dictators (for the most part) that there is any excuse for confusion when it comes to the OAS. But though they talk the democratic talk, so does Bush, and in both cases it is no more than a smokescreen.
[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit être lu avec la mention classique à l'esprit, — “Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.”.]