Forum

Le Gardian s’insurge avec les syndicats contre la décision de détruire 9 Nimrod flambant neuf, qui n’étaient pas encore opérationnels, qui a été prise l’année dernière au cours d’une revue stratégique. Les anglais ont dépensé 4 Milliards de livres pour ces 9 avions alors qu’il était prévu 2,8 Milliards pour 21. Et le programme rencontrait encore des problèmes de coûts et de délais. Est-ce que cela ne préfigure pas le type de décision à prendre pour le JSF? Yes they can!
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jan/27/union-leaders-condemn-nimrod-decision

L’intervention d’un lecteur anonyme mais crédible

http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/237081.asp#extended

McNerney and his executive staff need to have a urine analysis and soon. With all the problems on the B787 and the stand around waiting for parts or engineering instructions the normal learning curve has been shot to pieces. This is scary, because idiots like McNerney will roar for more production without understanding the erosion of skills on the factory floor.

If you look at the demographics, the B787 programme has pulled the most experienced people from the B737/B777 to flog this dead horse. The experienced people will be gone via retirement and/or the lack of willingness to work 16 hours a day so McNerney and his clown club can get their bonuses. As Boeing erodes the employee benefits programmes, experienced engineering and manufacturing people will just say no and pull the plug.

While it is possible to get type certification for the B787, Boeing has yet to prove it can manufacture reasonable copies in a consistent and conforming manner, so each aircraft will be built under type certification, which will require more Boeing resources not to mention increased scrutiny from the FAA. The most current PowerPoint presentation has production certification at line number 58 as a best case scenario, and line number 85 as the worst case scenario.

No matter what McNerney says, factory floor managers are compelled to realign the deck chairs on the Titanic and fight crisis after crisis just to do the repair/rework from the “Global Partners”. This programme has shattered all previous records of what it takes to design and build a viable aircraft, and no doubt will be a case study in mis-management of large industrial undertakings.

The really savage impact can be summed up that Boeing has yet to learn what it does not know about this airplane. They just do not understand what is normative on this programme. The only real notion right now is the mendacity of the programme “leaders” who do not have a clear path ahead, as they litterally run around looking for the wolve that is not there. This is what you get when MBAs have more clout than the engineering community. How so far the mighty has fallen; and they are not out of the woods yet.